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Philip D. Stewart — Gorbachev and Obstacles Toward Détente

A. James Reichley — Religion and the Future of American Politics

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

PHILIP D. STEWART presents an interpretation of Mikhail Gorbachev's approach to U.S.-Soviet relations, based upon careful analysis of the leader's writings, which sees Gorbachev as a strident Soviet nationalist who rejects most of the assumptions and outlooks upon which Brezhnev sought to create the détente of the early 1970s.

A. JAMES REICHLEY examines the current and likely future roles in American politics of five major religious groups: Roman Catholics, mainline Protestants, white evangelical Protestants, black Protestants, and Jews. He warns that if any of these groups pursue their particular interests too aggressively, they may undermine the essential part played by religion in nurturing democratic values.

ROBERT D. THOMAS argues that American central cities confront a dilemma between pursuing a policy of economic development and that of providing better services to the poor. The dilemma is aggravated by the changes in aid programs funded by the federal government.

JOHN J. SBREGA analyzes the anticolonial views of Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War II. Although Sbrega acknowledges that important reasons prevented Roosevelt from having complete freedom of action, the author contends that Roosevelt still did not go far enough toward implementing some of his anticolonial ideas.

DOUGLAS W. JAENICKE uncovers the political theory inherent in the Jacksonian Democrats' idea of a political party and contends that the Jacksonians' procedural emphasis facilitated the integration of political parties into the constitutional order.

PETER J. MAY examines contributions of the political science literature to assessments of the political feasibility of policy proposals. He argues that methodological advances in feasibility calculations are better aimed at informing policy makers' judgments than toward developing any definitive feasibility calculus.

In his review essay of current books on recent British politics, JORGEN S. RASMUSSEN argues that nearly seven years of Margaret Thatcher has done more to change the *style* of decision making in Britain than to transform the *content* of public policy. Whether that change becomes permanent still is contingent on what party wins the next general election.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

CENTENNIAL YEAR 1886-1986

In commemoration of its centennial in 1986, *Political Science Quarterly* will be publishing five numbered issues. Two of these will consist of commissioned articles on special topics: "Promoting the General Welfare" and "Providing for the Common Defense." The publication of these special issues is made possible by a gift from the Exxon Education Foundation.

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Gorbachev and Obstacles Toward Détente

PHILIP D. STEWART

The November 1985 Geneva summit meeting between General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan has revived the hopes of many for a United States–Soviet détente similar to that of the early 1970s. Reagan administration officials indicate privately that they see the summit as showing Soviet readiness for rapid progress toward agreements substantially reducing strategic nuclear weapons on both sides, while foregoing their previous insistence on a simultaneous ban on the United States' Strategic Defense Initiative. The Soviet willingness, expressed just prior to the summit, to reunite a few Soviet citizens with their American spouses raises expectations for wider cooperation on humanitarian and emigration issues. While a persuasive case can be made that many opportunities for a lasting improvement in significant areas of U.S.–Soviet relations were indeed missed in the 1970s,[1] it is a mistake to believe that Gorbachev's approach to relations with the United States, whether the issue be arms control, economic relations, human rights, or almost any other foreign policy question, will bear but a superficial similarity to that of the Brezhnev regime in the early 1970s. In fact, this article argues that Gorbachev's deeply held perspectives, assumptions, and beliefs reflect a sea change in Soviet conceptions of what is possible and desirable in U.S.–Soviet relations. This change is away from notions of superpower partnership and toward greater

[1] Raymond Garthoff makes such a case in *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985).

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nationalist self-reliance and competition with the United States. Thus, the hopes raised by the summit are likely to prove largely ill-founded and illusory.

Contrary arguments see Gorbachev as a pragmatic politician for whom solving concrete problems will take precedence over any personal beliefs or predispositions. Indeed, the problems Gorbachev faces at home to maintain Soviet military prowess and expand consumer welfare as a stimulus to increased productivity in the face of a sluggish, technologically backward, and unresponsive economy may well create pressures to pursue reductions in U.S.–Soviet tensions, and also to increase economic cooperation as a means of buying time.[2] If similar, but far less severe pressures encouraged Leonid Brezhnev to pursue U.S.–Soviet détente in his time, why shouldn't we expect Gorbachev to support an analogous policy now?

Of course, pragmatic responses to pressing practical problems must and do influence Gorbachev's foreign policy. Gorbachev's foreign policy tactics of summitry, smiles, and calls for renewal of détente do bear a surface resemblance to Brezhnev's style of the early 1970s, but his overarching strategy and underlying assumptions emphasize so much more strongly than Brezhnev the competitive aspects of the relationship that this must cast serious doubts on expectations of a Soviet policy more accommodating to U.S. interests and concerns. Moreover, as under Joseph Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev, we are once again witnessing the emergence of a Soviet leader determined and increasingly able to shape Soviet policy according to his own preferences. Thus, Gorbachev's deeply held perspectives are likely to be more decisive in shaping Soviet policy toward the United States than those of any Soviet leader for the past twenty or more years. Gorbachev's clear and forceful articulation of his own domestic and foreign policy program raises the prospect that, to paraphrase Richard Nixon's first inaugural address, Soviet foreign policy may have passed from an "era of negotiations to an era of confrontation."[3] This transformation represents not simply a change in the personalities of the leaders, but rather a fundamental shift in the prevailing outlook among the ruling Politburo. This shift may be characterized as movement from the moderate, outward, and western orientation of the Brezhnev era to a tough, uncompromising, predominantly inward, nationalist or self-reliant perspective that is reminiscent of the late-Stalin era.

At the same time, it must be appreciated that these changes in outlook are expressed by alterations in approach, tactics, and strategy, rather than in objectives. Indeed, the Soviet leadership as a whole since at least the end of World War II has sought to achieve for the Soviet Union the status, recognition, and acceptance of a global superpower with all the privileges they believe this status entails. All Soviet leaders clearly agree that military power at least equal to that which potential opponents may be able to bring to bear in any part of the world

[2] For an important statement of essentially this position, see Jerry F. Hough, "Gorbachev's Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 64 (Fall 1985): 33–55.

[3] Richard M. Nixon, Inaugural Address, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 27 January 1969, 152.

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is the foundation of superpower status. Indeed, Brezhnev and now Gorbachev both champion the growth of Soviet military power. Gorbachev differs from Brezhnev, however, over how to realize the global influence that this military power should produce, and at what cost.

The question of Soviet superpower status has two dimensions: how to achieve the pace of economic and technological growth essential to sustained military and economic competition with the West, and how to relate to the other superpower, the United States. For both Brezhnev and Gorbachev, a particular foreign policy design is linked to the leader's assumptions about the nature of Soviet economic and domestic problems and about how best to resolve them. Brezhnev's own world view, combined with his desire to avoid political controversy at home, led him to a foreign policy based on détentist, internationalist assumptions. Gorbachev, perceiving the Soviet Union as threatened abroad by a resurgent "imperialism" and at home by a stagnant economy, has articulated a defensive, strongly nationalist foreign policy designed to protect the Soviet Union during a lengthy period of domestic rebuilding.

Gorbachev's Response to the Soviet Economic Slowdown

Gorbachev in 1985 certainly faces economic problems of a far more acute nature than those with which Brezhnev had to deal in the late 1960s and early 1970s. With an overall growth rate of 4 to 5 percent per year, Brezhnev could count on steady growth of the military sector while assuring a continuing, if modest, rate of increase in the Soviet standard of living. By 1982 this rate had fallen to near 2 percent. Even the high pressure discipline campaigns of Yuri V. Andropov succeeded in raising the growth rate to only 3 percent by Soviet estimates.[4] Gorbachev has demonstrated a clear understanding of the long-term consequences of these trends. If Brezhnev and Konstantin Chernenko articulated the comfortable view that history and time are on the Soviet side, that the global correlation of forces is moving inexorably in the Soviet favor, Gorbachev stresses that "the historic fate of the country and the positions of socialism in the modern world depend to a large extent on how we manage things from now on."[5] In a speech not intended for publication, Gorbachev was even more straightforward: What is at stake "is insuring the consolidation of the USSR's positions on the international scene and enabling it to enter the new millenium in a manner worthy of a great power."[6]

It is not the Soviet Union's superpower status alone that is threatened by the

[4] See Gorbachev's statement at a meeting with workers in Leningrad on 17 May 1985, where he said, "Of late the rate of increase in national income has been about 3 percent, more or less." Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Soviet Union Daily Report*, 22 May 1985, R4; (Hereafter cited as *FBIS*.)

[5] *Pravda*, 24 April 1985.

[6] Quote is from secret speech to ideology conference, delivered 10 December 1984, *FBIS*, 28 March 1985, R1.

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Soviet economic slowdown, but, at least in Gorbachev's view, perhaps the future of the regime itself. In laying out his own program of ideas to guide preparation for the 27th Party Congress, Gorbachev pointed to steadily increasing living standards as "a most important source of political stability."[7] Showing his determination to avoid the cruel dilemma of choice between superpower status and domestic tranquility, Gorbachev declared unequivocally, "There is no alternative to raising the economy to a minimum of 4 percent annual growth."[8]

While the acuteness and thus the immediacy of the consequences of the Soviet economic slowdown are certainly greater today than fifteen years ago, the sources of low growth rates have remained essentially the same over this period. Most observers agree that they include: declining productivity of investment; technological stagnation; slow growth of labor supply and labor productivity; and energy production shortfalls, particularly in coal and more recently in oil.[9] These problems are made more difficult to resolve, in the view of both Soviet and western observers, by an excessively centralized and inflexible administrative and planning apparatus.[10]

While total agricultural output has increased substantially over the past twenty years even on a per capita basis,[11] production of many agricultural products, particularly meat and vegetables, lags far behind consumer demand. The consistent failure of the agricultural economy to achieve planned levels of output, however, has occurred in spite of fundamental changes in investment priorities in favor of agriculture. Thus, since 1971 Soviet agriculture has received between 26 and 27 percent of all investment.[12] To make up for these shortfalls and to provide for its minimal meat production goals, the Soviet Union increased food imports from some $5 billion in 1974 to over $15 billion in 1980, a program which continues under Gorbachev.

The Brezhnev regime's earliest response to its economic problems was the so-called 1965 Kosygin reforms, which stressed profit as the main plan indicator of economic success. By 1970, however, the reforms had made little impact on economic performance. Rather than face the political and bureaucratic turmoil that thoroughgoing implementation of the Kosygin reforms would entail, the Brezhnev regime appears to have made a deliberate choice to favor a vast expansion of foreign economic relations, especially technology transfer, as a substitute for domestic reform.[13]

[7] *Pravda*, 24 April 1985.

[8] Speech to Leningrad workers, 17 May 1985, reported in *FBIS*, 22 May 1985, R4.

[9] See Joint Economic Committee, *Energy in Soviet Policy* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 11 June 1981).

[10] For a broad review of the political sources of these economic problems, see Robert C. Tucker, "Swollen State, Spent Society: Stalin's Legacy," *Foreign Affairs* 60 (Winter 1981–82): 414–35.

[11] Karl-Eugen Wadekin, "Soviet Agriculture's Dependence on the West," *Foreign Affairs* 60 (Spring 1982): 883.

[12] Ibid., 894.

[13] See Roger A. Blough and Philip D. Stewart, "The Soviet Leadership and the Soviet Economy: Economic Reform in the 1970s," *Comparative Political Studies* (forthcoming 1986).

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If the Brezhnev regime sought to alleviate Soviet economic problems within established modes of operation, Gorbachev outspokenly argues that unless significant structural changes are pushed through, "it will not even be possible to preserve what has been achieved."[14] Rejecting the Brezhnev decision style of accommodation, Gorbachev openly lays the blame for the current economic malaise on this very approach by his predecessors. "The main reason" for the current problems, Gorbachev declared in his programmatic address to the Central Committee, laying down his guidelines for the 27th Party Congress documents, is that "they were not appraised in the required way at the right time." "What is particularly important," he stressed, alluding to the way in which the 1965 Kosygin reforms were allowed to flounder on bureaucratic opposition, "there was no persistence in either working out or implementing reform measures."[15] Gorbachev's nationalist outlook is found even in his attitude toward approaches to reform. Whether of the Hungarian or Chinese variety, not to speak of ideas developed in the West, Gorbachev seems to have little patience for "foreign" ideas on economic reform. As he has observed, "Socialism must achieve this advance in its own way—or to put it concretely, by Soviet methods."[16]

Gorbachev has already proposed the broad outlines of his program for achieving a significantly accelerated rate of growth. This program reflects a determination to bear whatever costs are required to bring about an economic transformation relying on Soviet bloc political and economic resources. At the center is "intensification" of the economy and speeding up scientific-technical progress.[17] The major mechanism for growth is to be increased efficiency in the use of all productive resources. To bring this about, Gorbachev seeks to transform the Soviet scientific establishment's evolutionary approach to technological change into one that seeks "revolutionary," fundamentally new solutions to technological problems.

Rigid discipline and abandonment of Brezhnev's "respectful" and relaxed policy toward Party and economic leaders comprise Gorbachev's approach to assuring that his economic program does not become blocked by inertia and the reluctance of the bureaucracy to adapt. In a manner reminiscent of Stalinist times, Gorbachev's speeches are permeated with praise of the virtues of discipline and order. The implications of this approach for cadres policy he states without equivocation: "Those who do not intend to adjust and who are an obstacle to solving these new tasks must simply get out of the way, not be a hinderance."[18] For enthusiastic support of his new directions, Gorbachev is counting on his appeal to youth and to greater sexual equality. "One must open the path to leadership to young people and to women," he declared in an address on cadres

[14] Quote is from secret speech to ideology conference delivered 10 December 1984, *FBIS*, 28 March 1985, R1.

[15] *Pravda*, 24 April 1985.

[16] *Pravda*, 8 May 1985.

[17] *Pravda*, 24 April 1985.

[18] *FBIS*, Moscow Domestic TV, 22 May 1985, R10.

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policy.[19] Gorbachev's removal from the Politburo of most of the Brezhnev old guard, including rival Gregory V. Romanov, significantly strengthens Gorbachev's hand and provides everyone with the unquestionable message that Gorbachev intends to brook no opposition to his domestic economic program.

Where the Brezhnev regime adopted an internationalist strategy to relieve Soviet economic problems, Gorbachev expresses a willingness and even a preference for self-reliant approaches. It is true that in his programmatic address, Gorbachev advocates "fruitful and all-round economic and scientific-technical cooperation," including the development of "new forms of economic ties," but primarily with western Europe and Japan.[20] Yet, in seeking such ties, Gorbachev displays none of the flexibility or readiness for compromise of Brezhnev in the early détente years, which even then was insufficient to assure the desired flow of technology. In discussing prospects with British businessmen, Gorbachev reflected his nationalist orientation when he emphasized: "We are confident of our potential to solve for ourselves issues arising from our national economy."[21]

If Gorbachev has his way, western nations wishing to expand trade will do so strictly on Soviet terms. These include, as Gorbachev emphasized, "removal of discrimination," including anti-dumping laws; no use of "economic levers as a means of political pressure" or for "interference in internal affairs."[22] In short, Gorbachev has made it quite obvious that there are unlikely to be any political trade-offs for increased trade, whether in the form of Jewish emigration, better treatment for dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov, any loosening of the Soviet grip on eastern Europe, or any one-sided limitations on Soviet behavior in other parts of the world.[23]

Gorbachev's View of Détente

From the early 1970s, the Brezhnev regime sought to alleviate its economic problems in part and to realize the benefits of its superpower status through a policy of détente with the West. This policy was based on several assumptions: America's entanglement and eventual "defeat" in Vietnam were seen in Moscow in the early 1970s as incontrovertible signs that the era of American global dominance had come to an end.[24] From now on, the United States' power and global influence would be on the wane. In the Brezhnev view, Nixon's proclamation of

[19] Ibid., R10.

[20] *Pravda*, 24 April 1985.

[21] *TASS*, 20 December 1984, cited in *FBIS*, 20 December 1984.

[22] Ibid.

[23] This viewpoint was evidently also repeated in the Gorbachev-Baldridge talks on improving U.S.–Soviet economic relations. *Krasnaya Svezda*, 21 May 1985, 1.

[24] See, for example, Brezhnev's remarks in Kharkov, reported in *Pravda*, 14 April 1970. See as well his speech commemorating the signing of the Paris Peace Accords on Vietnam, where Brezhnev noted that the "Victory of Vietnam shows how the possibilities of imperialism have dwindled in our day. Imperialism has no means to turn history back." *Pravda*, 30 January 1973.

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"an era of negotiation" was a signal that segments of the American leadership had come to a "sober-minded" acceptance of these "realities."[25]

On the other hand, as a result of the Soviet attainment of strategic parity with the United States and in the context of substantial if not superior Soviet conventional capabilities, the leading western powers were now believed ready to accept the Soviet Union as an equal superpower and to deal with her on that basis.[26] It was these perceptions of reality that provided the foundation for the Brezhnev approach to détente, which intended to result in the following gains for the Soviet Union: vastly expanded economic cooperation by the West with both the Soviet Union and eastern Europe; full western acceptance of the "results of World War II," or Soviet domination of eastern Europe; arms control agreements with the United States, which would assure preservation of Soviet strategic parity while limiting western, but not necessarily Soviet, ability to shift the balance further in the Soviet's favor; an enlarged Soviet role in the settlement of regional conflicts, which would ensure western acceptance of the legitimacy of the Soviet presence in these regions.

While Gorbachev does accept some of the aspirations of the Brezhnev détente, he clearly believes that most of the assumptions on which the earlier policy rested are valid no longer. For Brezhnev, relations with the United States constituted the centerpiece of his foreign policy.[27] Brezhnev's aspirations to a global superpower role,[28] to the unchallengeable right to military equality with the other superpower, and his hopes to achieve intensive economic growth through large-scale technology imports all depended on working out a kind of partnership with the U.S. It was for these reasons that Brezhnev attributed such importance to the May 1972 agreement on "Basic Principles of Relations" and the June 1973 agreement on the prevention of nuclear war.[29]

Gorbachev's approach reflects his very different assumptions about how to assure the Soviet global role and the economy necessary to support it. In Gorbachev's view, U.S.–Soviet relations should no longer be the central axis of Soviet foreign policy. As he explained to his electors in February 1985, "while the Soviet Union attaches great significance to the normalization of relations with the United States," at the same time, "we never forget for a minute that the world is not limited to that country alone but is a much bigger place."[30]

[25] See, for example, Brezhnev's speech in Alma Ata, reported in *Pravda*, 28 August 1970.

[26] For an important explication of this view, see Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *International Security* 3 (Summer 1978): 112–47.

[27] See Brezhnev's observations on the importance of U.S.–Soviet relations made prior to the first summit, *Pravda*, 21 March 1972.

[28] See his statements on the Soviet Union's superpower status in *Pravda*, 27 June 1972.

[29] See Brezhnev's address accepting the Lenin Peace Prize, *Pravda*, 7 November 1973.

[30] *Pravda*, 21 February 1985. This same concept was reiterated in a May 1985 interview with the Indian News Agency, PTI, when Gorbachev stated that "the Soviet Union has never looked at the world in the context of U.S.–USSR relations alone." *Pravda*, 20 May 1985; see also Gorbachev's statement on his proposed INF deployment moratorium, *Pravda*, 8 April 1985.

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Looking at the larger pattern of Gorbachev's foreign policy pronouncements and activities it is apparent that rather than a U.S.–Soviet "partnership," underlying Gorbachev's approach is the notion that the United States can and should be relatively isolated and outflanked by a Soviet-led international "peace movement." What is new in Gorbachev's approach is not the elements of this strategy. They have been component themes of Soviet foreign policy since the revolution and constitute the essence of what may be called a "Leninist-internationalist" outlook. Rather, what is novel and significant is the prominent place that mass movements and the international communist movement occupy in Gorbachev's approach. This emphasis becomes particularly striking in the context of the diminished significance, in comparison with the Brezhnev era, Gorbachev appears to attach to direct negotiations with the United States for the purpose of reaching mutually acceptable agreements through compromise.[31]

Arms control negotiations with the United States, of course, continue, but Gorbachev personally as of mid-summer 1985 seems little committed to their success. Even after the January 1985 framework for strategic arms negotiations had been agreed upon and when Andrei Gromyko expressed cautious optimism about the talks' prospects, Gorbachev spoke darkly about "activities which sow doubts" as to U.S. intentions.[32] As with U.S.–Soviet economic relations, Gorbachev seems to be saying that if agreements are to be reached, it will be on Soviet terms. The details of Gorbachev's proposal in autumn 1985 to reduce Soviet and U.S. strategic nuclear weapons by 50 percent and his offer of direct talks with the Europeans so far appear consistent with this approach, particularly where, as in the definition of strategic weapons, these proposals revive long-abandoned Soviet positions.

If we are to comprehend Gorbachev's approach, it is essential that we recognize that these views of U.S.–Soviet relations reflect more than temporary tactics or negotiating strategy. They arise from an outlook that is reminiscent of the Stalinist two-camps era, a perspective that envisages the United States as the implacable enemy, the source of all evil, and the Soviet Union as the protector of all civilized values. As a means of mobilizing domestic audiences, and perhaps his own elite cohorts, behind a campaign of vigilance and discipline and of uniting external mass movements and Third World nations under Soviet leadership, this conflict is depicted by Gorbachev as likely to erupt into nuclear war at any minute. Comparing the present-day situation to that on the eve of World War II, whose cause Gorbachev described as "the Munich policy" of the western powers, the General Secretary argued that "it must be fully and clearly realized" where the "menace to mankind" comes from: the United States. Ominously, he added, "the Soviet Union is saying this as forcefully as it did before the war, thus warning of the imminent danger."[33] Quoting Chernenko in his February 1985

[31] See Brezhnev's assessment of the May 1972 summit in a speech welcoming Fidel Castro to Moscow, *Pravda*, 28 June 1972.

[32] Pravda, 21 February 1985.

[33] *FBIS*, 9 May 1985, R13.

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election speech, Gorbachev expressed his two-camps viewpoint with remarkable clarity. "People realize increasingly clearly where the watershed lies between the two main political courses—the policy of peace and the line of preparing for war."[34]

Consistent with the most conservative segments of the Brezhnev leadership, and quite contrary to the views of Brezhnev himself, Gorbachev expresses a uniformly and harshly critical assessment of the entire course of postwar U.S. foreign policy. For him, current trends are not merely the aberration of a particular administration or electoral campaign, as it was frequently argued under Brezhnev,[35] but arise from the United States's "imperialist nature." Gorbachev argues that the U.S. has been the "spearhead" of attempts at "historical revenge" and "rolling back the positions of socialism" since the end of World War II. Since then, Gorbachev declared in his Victory Day speech, "American imperialism has been at the forward edge of the war menace to mankind." Today, in his view, the United States "has become a constant negative factor in international relations."[36] The two examples most often cited by Gorbachev to illustrate the "evil designs" of the United States are American "attempts to undermine the military-strategic balance," and its "reanimation" of West German "revanchism."[37]

The most direct source of Gorbachev's concerns about the military-strategic balance are undoubtedly the major increases in U.S. military spending during the past five years, which have resulted in a real increase of more than 50 percent in the U.S. defense budget. However, as Gorbachev's writings suggest, it is the implications of the long-term Soviet economic slow-down in the face of growing U.S. military and economic power together with his belief that the United States no longer accepts the principle of strategic parity, the fundamental element of Brezhnev's détente, that worry Gorbachev. In Gorbachev's view, the United States "is counting on superior force that would subordinate the rest of the world."[38] What is at stake is the potential loss of the favorable military-strategic balance as a result of Soviet economic weaknesses as well as American strength. Serving as the basis of Soviet claims to superpower status, it is little wonder that Gorbachev argues that "this parity must be cherished by all possible means."[39]

It is not only the American economy's apparent capability to support increased military growth that is perceived as a threatening challenge by Gorbachev. What he describes as "the broadening and intensification of the economic expansion of the United States," including its "blocking" of the

[34] *Pravda*, 21 February 1985; see also Gorbachev's 1984 election speech, *Izvestia*, 1 March 1984.

[35] Typical is Brezhnev's 24th Party Congress speech where he observed, "Relations with the U.S. are complicated by the frequent zig-zags in American foreign policy which are, evidently, connected with some expedient domestic maneuvers." Nevertheless, he added, "We proceed from the fact that improvement of relations between the USSR and U.S.. is possible." *Pravda*, 30 March 1971.

[36] *FBIS*, 9 May 1985, R16.

[37] For examples, see *FBIS*, 9 May 1985, R15; Gorbachev's letter to West German "peace activists," reported in *FBIS*, 28 March 1985, G1; *Pravda*, 8 April 1985; and *FBIS*, 8 May 1985, G1.

[38] *FBIS*, 9 May 1985, R16.

[39] *Pravda*, 24 April 1985.

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"economic decolonization process" and "political limitations on trade" with the Soviet bloc are seen as nearly-as-worrisome sources of threat.[40] In short, Gorbachev sees these and other current trends shifting the global "correlation of forces" against the Soviet Union, a balance which Brezhnev confidently viewed as growing inexorably in the Soviet favor. This sense of seige is reinforced by the increased assertiveness of U.S. foreign policy, whether in Lebanon, Grenada, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Kampuchea, or most recently in lifting congressional restrictions on aid to Angolan rebels. As expressed by Gorbachev, "One does not need special political vision in order to see how imperialism has intensified its subversive work and coordinated its activities against socialist states in the course of the last few years. This applies to all areas: political, economic, ideological, and military."[41]

It is this sense of the dangers to Soviet power, combined with a view of the world in which the assumptions of Brezhnev's détente are seen as no longer valid, that imparts a sense of urgency to Gorbachev's domestic economic program and that shapes his approach to U.S.–Soviet relations. To buy time for the Soviet Union to rebuild its economy and its military power, Gorbachev seeks to limit as much as possible America's military growth and its influence and capability for action in Europe and other regions of the world. His preferred strategies for bringing this about are mobilizing mass movements in Europe and the United States and strengthening anti-American and anti-western pressures in the Third World. This general approach is well summed up in Gorbachev's Victory Day speech:

> Of course, special responsibility for the destiny of the world today rests with the nuclear powers and primarily with the USSR and the U.S. However, the Soviet Union has never looked at the world in the context of USSR–U.S. relations alone. We are deeply convinced that all states can and must be involved in a search for realistic solutions to urgent problems and in efforts to ease international tensions. The voices of millions of people in various countries, raised in favor of effective measures to end the arms race and reduce arms stockpiles, against attempts to use negotiations as a cover for the continuation of this race, is of tremendous importance.[42]

Gorbachev's objectives of using mass pressures to impose limits on U.S. military programs and international action are stated clearly. In his election speech, he calls on "the peace-loving peoples," including "in western countries" to take "vigorous action to avert nuclear war and to isolate the forces of aggression and militarism."[43] In his programmatic address, noting that "no single people desires war," Gorbachev urged that this "huge reserve and potential" be used to "do everything in order that the forces of militarism and aggression do not gain the upper hand in international relations."[44] "There is no doubt that the antiwar

[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] *FBIS*, 9 May 1985, R16.
[43] *Moscow Pravda*, 21 February 1985.
[44] *Pravda*, 24 April 1985.

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movement will continue to grow, thus effectively rendering the adventuristic actions of the forces of aggression more difficult," Gorbachev declared in his Victory Day speech.[45] To appeals by a group from the Socialist International for a constructive Soviet approach to the current negotiations, Gorbachev responded by urging "effective efforts" by the International, using its "political leverage and influence" in the "struggle against the threat of war." He pledged that the Soviet Union would "cooperate vigorously with all peace-loving public forces."[46]

In contrast to his high hopes for mass movements, but consistent with his nationalist tendencies, Gorbachev appears to have modest expectations and has made only limited public commitments with respect to the Third World. His statements about this region stress only Soviet "sympathies"[47] and "solidarity."[48] Gorbachev has not even made any of the usual general commitments of "all-round" or "political and economic" support.[49] While he has emphasized Soviet interest in expanded trade with the Third World, his comments stress the importance of diminishing the economic role of western states in the Third World and assuring the Soviet Union of reliable access to essential Third World economic resources.[50]

Irrespective of Soviet commitments to provide Nicaragua with oil and other necessities, Gorbachev's own statements appear strikingly noncommital. Thus, in his April 1985 program speech, probably his most important policy pronouncement to date, after noting the "threats to the heroic people of Nicaragua," Gorbachev limits himself to noting that "solidarity . . . is a matter of principle for us." Appearing to weaken this statement further is the added comment, "Here our line is as clear as it always was."[51]

What does Gorbachev expect in return from the "liberated" world, as he consistently labels Soviet-oriented Third World nations? Gorbachev speaks of two kinds of policies he desires from his Third World friends: rejection of economic, political, and especially military cooperation with the United States and the West and active participation in the Soviet "peace campaign."[52] Underlying these limited commitments and expectations is a rather skeptical view of the potential of the Third World:

> Intense changes in the postwar world are also due to the downfall of colonialism. Tens of independent states have emerged in the place of former colonies and semi-colonies. True, their development has not been even and it has had, and continues to have, its ups and downs, achievements and tragedies. True, the developing countries must still tackle far from simple problems, both those inherited from the past and those created

[45] *FBIS*, 9 May 1985, R16.
[46] *Pravda*, 23 March 1985.
[47] Gorbachev's acceptance speech, *Pravda*, 12 March 1985.
[48] *Pravda*, 24 April 1985.
[49] *Izvestia*, 26 June 1984.
[50] See Gorbachev's statement before the November joint meeting of the Supreme Soviet Foreign Affairs Commission, *Pravda*, 12 March 1985
[51] *Pravda*, 24 April 1985.
[52] See his speech to Rajiv Gandhi, *Krasnaya Svezda*, 22 May 1985, 1.

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by the policy of neocolonialism. But, it is also true that the system of colonialism has been almost completely eradicated now . . . . With the active support of the socialist countries they persistently struggle for a new, more just world economic order. The Nonaligned Movement has become an important factor in present-day world affairs.[53]

The Roots of Gorbachev's Outlook

It would be tempting and perhaps even persuasive to argue that the transformation of the dominant Soviet foreign policy perspective from a moderate internationalist to an essentially nationalist outlook is primarily the result of Soviet reactions to the failures of détente during the 1970s. If this were true, then presumably a change in U.S. policy toward accommodating the most serious Soviet concerns should result in more constructive Soviet behavior. If, on the other hand, these shifts in perspective are due to deeper trends in Soviet political society, then U.S. leverage may be more limited.

In their own assessments, the Soviets blame the U.S. for being an "unreliable partner." The litany of complaints is all too familiar: the U.S. "refusal" to negotiate arms agreements on the basis of "equality and identical security" after accepting this concept in the "Basic Principles" agreement of 1972; the "exclusion" of the Soviet Union from the Middle East peace process; the "overthrow" of Salvador Allende in Chile; the attempts to "interfere" in Soviet internal affairs on the pretext of support for "human rights;" the imposition of "unacceptable" conditions on trade and technology transfer to the Soviet Union; American attempts to "blame" the Soviet Union for "inevitable" revolutionary changes in the Third World, from Angola to Nicaragua; U.S. efforts to undermine Soviet friends and allies, from Afghanistan to Poland; and American attempts to overturn "strategic parity," so as to "dictate" to the Soviet Union.

These arguments cannot be wholly ignored in any explanation of the shifts occuring in Soviet foreign policy outlooks, for undoubtedly they contributed to the loss of credibility within the Soviet political context of the very assumptions of détente. A careful review of statements about détente by all members of the Politburo over the 1970s reveals clearly that vocal support for détente, in fact, did increase gradually after 1970.[54] The high point for expectations about relations with the U.S. came right after the signing of the Vladivostok Accords in November 1974. Already by the next month, following the Soviet decision to reject the conditions of the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments to the U.S. 1974 trade act, tying Most-Favored Nation status and U.S. government-guaranteed credits to Soviet emigration policy, Soviet doubts about the assumptions of détente began to be expressed ever more frequently. The only slight upturn came in 1979 at the time of the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT II). However, by the point when final decisions were being made on sending So-

[53] *FBIS*, 9 May 1985, R14.

[54] These arguments are based upon my forthcoming monograph, *From Brezhnev to Gorbachev: Soviet Foreign Policy Perspectives*.

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viet troops to Afghanistan, the dominant mood in Moscow was that the impact of this act on U.S.-Soviet relations need not even be taken into account because, by late fall 1979 "there was nothing left worth saving."[55] Indeed, Alexei Kosygin was the only Soviet leader to publicly oppose this view.[56] President Ronald Reagan's policies of rebuilding and reasserting American strength, as seen from Moscow, probably would have made anything but a propaganda approach to détente politically untenable under the weak and ill Soviet leaders between 1981 and 1985.

It could be argued that if American behavior were more forthcoming and accepting of Soviet "equality," the Gorbachev leadership would respond appropriately. However, analysis of the perspectives of the Brezhnev Politburo suggests that what we are witnessing is not a matter of tactical adjustments. Rather, perspectives that always distrusted, if they did not reject outright, the assumptions of Brezhnev's détente and that were articulated throughout the Brezhnev era have now become dominant in the Soviet leadership. The Soviet explanations for the failure of détente are important to this shift in perspectives, because they strongly reinforce the predispositions and expectations of those critical of Brezhnev's détente from its inception. The Soviet leadership's experience of détente as seen through the prisms of nationalist and Leninist-internationalist perspectives, therefore, makes unlikely the revalidation of the assumptions supporting Brezhnev's détente policy.

An important source of the explanation of the roots and the political credibility in Moscow of Gorbachev's outlook on U.S.-Soviet relations lies in the nationalist and Leninist-internationalist outlooks expressed during the Brezhnev era. An intensive and systematic study of nearly all the writings and speeches of the Politburo since 1970,[57] reveals three distinctive outlooks or approaches to foreign policy that found expression throughout the Brezhnev regime. The dominant view, a moderate internationalist perspective, most clearly describes the outlooks of Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Gromyko. A second major tendency is a Leninist-internationalist orientation articulated by Mikhail Suslov, Vladimir Shcherbitsky, Viktor Grishin and Dmitry Ustinov. The third approach represents a nationalist outlook reflected by Yuri Andropov, Grigory Romanov, Andrei Grechko, and Konstantin Chernenko.

While these tendencies showed themselves in divergent approaches to significant foreign policy issues, there are two issues on which there existed an overwhelming consensus: Soviet military power and Brezhnev's consensual style. Politburo attitudes toward Soviet military power stand out from attitudes to all

[55] This observation is based on in-depth conversations with Soviet policy advisers in May 1980.

[56] *FBIS*, Moscow Radio report, 21 February 1980.

[57] For a detailed report, see Philip D. Stewart, Roger A. Blough, and James W. Warhola, "Conflict and Consensus in Soviet Foreign Policy: Politburo Priorities and Attitudes in the 1970s," mimeo, The Ohio State University, October 1982; see also Philip D. Stewart, James W. Warhola, and Roger A. Blough, "Issue Salience and Foreign Policy Role Specialization in the Soviet Politburo of the 1970s," *American Journal of Political Science* 28 (February 1984): 1-22.

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foreign policy issues in two respects. First, leadership orientations to Soviet military power are more positive than those toward any other foreign policy issues, including the liberation movement, détente, the class struggle, or arms control. Second, there is less difference among Politburo members respecting the value of military power at least equalling that of the U.S. for the entire period of the 1970s than on any other foreign policy issue, with the exception of the equally strong consensus around the Politburo's concern about and hostility toward western military power. This finding reflects both the unanimous commitment to Soviet superpower status and the recognition that military power is the Soviet Union's only meaningful basis for this claim. Politburo differences are over how to sustain and how to realize the benefits of this status.

The Brezhnev regime's near-unanimous commitment to an accommodationist style of policy making may account as much as or perhaps more than any other factor for the failure of Brezhnev's détente to attain most of its objectives in relations with the United States. However, prior to elaborating this argument, it is necessary to understand the two main competing sets of policy orientations to which substantial accommodations appear to have been made in the Brezhnev years.

The Leninist-internationalist outlook has its intellectual roots in Lenin's *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, the "Congress of the Peoples of the East" of 1921, and in the Comintern. It emphasizes the messianic mission of the Soviet Union. The national-liberation struggle, having as its objective the elimination of western political and economic influence from the Third World, is seen as a major instrument and priority of Soviet foreign policy. In the past decade, Soviet military assistance has come to be viewed as a main factor in the advancement of the liberation movement, through arms sales and the use of proxy or even Soviet troops. While this outlook does reflect a concern about preventing general war, its adherents tend to display a substantially higher regard for Soviet military capabilities and a lower estimate of western military strength and political will than either the moderate internationalists or the nationalists. Arms control and relations with the United States in general are conceived by Leninist-internationalists primarily as means of limiting American capability and will for Third World interventions. In this sense, U.S.–Soviet relations are of secondary priority and are valued primarily to the extent they facilitate the growth of Soviet influence in the Third World. These estimates in turn may lead Leninist-internationalists to see the risks associated with an activist Third World policy as lower than their moderate-internationalist colleagues.

In conducting relations with western Europe, Japan, and the United States, this outlook places more emphasis on links with and action through local Communist parties, the "working class movement," and other "mass movements," which may put pressure on bourgeois governments to accede to Soviet proposals, than it places on direct negotiations based on mutual interest and compromise. While this perspective does reject many of the assumptions of the moderate-internationalists, its principal spokesmen, however, do express support for a particular kind of détente: one that would create more propitious conditions for the

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liberation struggle as well as for the relative growth of Soviet military power, rather than placing much hope in mutual arms limitations, joint economic benefit, or even in a greater shared global role.

The most striking trait of the nationalist outlook is a deep and abiding distaste for and distrust of the western capitalist world and a general suspicion and discomfort in dealing with the non-Communist world. The nationalists part company with the Leninist-internationalists in their rejection of a high priority for the liberation movement and even the class struggle. The nationalists show isolationist tendencies in their suspicion of foreign entanglements outside the Soviet bloc, in their concern about the "setbacks" the Soviet Union has experienced in the Third World, and with their general doubt about the long-term benefits of influence in backward Third World nations ultimately beyond their control. At the same time, the nationalists emphasize the valuable role of the general anti-imperialist orientation of the nonaligned movement and do stress the importance of mobilizing this force as a means of pressure on the West.

Whereas both moderate internationalists and Leninist-internationalists support one kind of détente or another, nationalists tend to see no lasting benefits accruing to the Soviet Union from either the political or economic interdependence this policy entails. The "positive" program of the nationalists seems to include the following elements:

First, the two main interests of the Soviet Union, the security and stability of the Soviet bloc and the growth of the Soviet Union's great power role, can be protected effectively and advanced with certainty only by reliance on the strengths of the Soviet Union and its bloc allies.

Second, Soviet military power is the only effective guarantee of these interests. From this position follows continued high priority for military growth at home, with all that may imply for aspirations for revision of domestic priorities. This implication gains strength from three findings: the nationalists tend to see the West as more threatening than either the moderate internationalists or the Leninist-internationalists do, and nationalists see Soviet capabilities as relatively weaker vis-à-vis the West than leaders sharing internationalist outlooks. At the same time the nationalists appear to have faith in the capacity of an essentially autarchic, self-reliant Soviet bloc economy to compete successfully in an arms race with the West.

Third, nationalists tend to see war as a decisive factor in history through which the historic struggle between socialism and capitalism will be resolved. In principle, the nationalists do not appear persuaded that a new general war would spell the end of socialism. If prepared adequately, the Soviet Union could win and survive. It is important to note that Gorbachev gives no evidence that he holds this view. In fact, he emphasizes the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war for mankind. However, it is the views of these isolationists, expressed with considerable frankness prior to 1977, that form the basis for this argument.[58]

[58] It is important to note that Gorbachev gives no evidence that he holds this view. In fact, he emphasizes the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war for mankind. However, it is the views of these

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Fourth, this does not mean that nationalists are more likely than Leninist-internationalists to engage in actual military conflict, in the short-term at least. Indeed, perhaps because they tend to see war as more decisive than the Leninist-internationalists, and because they see current capabilities as more evenly balanced between East and West, or even favoring the West, the nationalists are apt to urge considerable caution in the actual employment of military force. This may be, in part, what is behind Gorbachev's insistence that "the outcome of the historical competition between the two systems cannot be determined by military means."[59] In his view, the rate of "scientific and technical progress" and "economic competition" is where this "historic struggle" will be decided "to a decisive degree."[60]

Fifth, the essential foreign-policy program of the nationalists comes down to mobilizing mass movements to support defensive "peace" campaigns, a propaganda approach to negotiations, and a no-nonsense, no-concessions approach to foreign economic relations. At home it includes a continuing build-up of military power and "vigilance" against domestic and foreign enemies.

While it is too early to know the extent to which Gorbachev's own Politburo as a whole will reflect the nationalist views he himself so clearly articulates, his intolerant statements about those who "stand in the way" or are "incapable of adjusting" suggest strongly that his preference is to avoid the compromises in foreign and domestic policy that characterized the Brezhnev regime.[61] Indeed, what is remarkable about the Brezhnev regime is not the persistence of diverse policy perspectives, but the extent to which Brezhnev's own expressed policy preferences were undermined internally by his accommodationist style of policy making.

Disillusionment With Brezhnev's Détente

Analysis of the Brezhnev era, supported by clues emerging from Gorbachev's speeches, suggests that one consequence of the strong consensus in support of this decision style was that *how* decisions were made may have become more important than what the consequences of any particular choice may have been.[62]

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nationalists, expressed with considerable frankness prior to 1977, that form the basis for this argument. For an elaboration, see Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Can Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary*, July 1977, 21–34. For an important alternate interpretation, see Robert L. Arnett, "Soviet Attitudes Toward Nuclear War: Do They Really Think They Can Win?" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 2 (September 1979): 172–91.

[59] *FBIS*, 9 May 1985.

[60] *Pravda*, 8 May 1985.

[61] See Gorbachev's speech to Leningrad workers, where he lays out his cadres policy in no uncertain terms, *FBIS*, 22 May 1985, R10.

[62] Gorbachev's statement that current economic problems are due to lack of timely "appraisal" and inadequate "persistence" in developing and implementing major measures, *Pravda*, 24 April 1985, constitutes indirect but clear criticisms of the accommodationist decision style. For another credible report suggesting this same style in foreign policy making, see Arkady Schevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow* (New York: Knopf, 1984).

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In short, maintaining the appearance of consensus and cohesion within the Brezhnev leadership appears often to have taken priority over the attainment of particular policy objectives.[63] The Brezhnev style deliberately sought a balance between the dominant leader (Brezhnev) and decision processes that provided access for and protection of other interests and perspectives within the leadership.

Four elements of Soviet policy and behavior contributed crucially to undermining the level of American public and political interest in détente upon which attainment of the main elements of Brezhnev's hopes for U.S.–Soviet relations depended: the steady growth of Soviet strategic and conventional capabilities following the signing of SALT I during a time when real U.S. spending on defense declined steadily; the Soviet refusal to make firm commitments on emigration and the treatment of dissidents in exchange for Most-Favored-Nation and U.S. Eximbank credits; the massive Soviet support for Cuban intervention in Angola in 1974 and Ethiopia in 1977–78; and Soviet unwillingness or inability to play an honest-broker role in the Middle East both in 1969–70 and following the 1973 war. In each of these instances there is ample evidence to argue that the Soviet leadership reasonably could have been expected to understand and calculate the consequences of its choices for long-term U.S.–Soviet relations. Yet, in each instance choices were made that appear most consistent with the preferences of either or both the Leninist-internationalist or the nationalist outlooks, with consequences which undermined prospects for what appear to have been Brezhnev's own hopes for U.S.–Soviet relations.

Brezhnev certainly cannot be accused of wishing to diminish Soviet military potential. That is not the issue. The issue is Brezhnev's apparent commitment to negotiated, interdependent security through which relatively stable levels of armaments could be attained by negotiations that on the basis of compromise take account of the real security interests of both sides[64] versus the objective of seeking simple one-sided advantages, as seems to have characterized Soviet negotiating behavior since the death of Brezhnev. There were numerous occasions in both the SALT I and SALT II negotiations when it appears Brezhnev did push agreements through the Soviet leadership apparatus that supported the first set of assumptions. Yet, at the same time, because he underestimated the consequences or because this was the price for the trade-offs reached at the bargaining table or perhaps because he thought he could get away with it, Brezhnev did not stop testing and deployment of the SS-17, SS-19, and SS-18 or later the intermediate range SS-20. Nor did he permit his negotiators to meet American concerns over these missiles, developments which gave birth to the "Committee on the Present Danger" and ultimately undermined SALT II and led to U.S. deployments of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. The reason for this

[63] See Blough and Stewart, "Soviet Leadership and Soviet Economy."

[64] As evidenced in the antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty, SALT I, and particularly the difficult compromises that made SALT II possible. See John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973); and Strobe Talbot, *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979).

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behavior most consistent with the analysis presented here is that these were limitations on his policy that Brezhnev accepted in order to avoid potential discord and disruption in the leadership. This seems to be one of the factors Gorbachev had in mind when he criticized previous regimes for not "appraising" problems in good time and not showing "persistence" in working out solutions.[65]

From the early days of détente in 1969 and 1970, it became quite clear that influential segments of the American public were unwilling to encourage, in fact would do everything possible to disrupt, closer U.S.–Soviet relations unless this were to be accompanied by some significant alterations in Soviet treatment of dissidents and emigration policies. These concerns were voiced publicly and privately to the Soviet leadership and its advisers. It can only be assumed that the actual policies adopted on dissidents and emigration reflected the leadership's consideration of these issues and their consequences and thus the limits of what the Politburo consensus would tolerate. In fact, considerable although ultimately inadequate and temporary liberalization of emigration did occur and some dissidents were given the more "humane" treatment of forced emigration and denial of citizenship. Judging from the public statements of the Soviet leadership on these issues in the 1970s, opposition to any "concessions" as the "price" for economic relations with the U.S. must have been intense. Both the Leninist-internationalist and the nationalist perspective are uncomfortable with the very idea of compromise with "imperialists."[66] While compromises might be necessary on specific issues under negotiation, demands for compromises on matters that are "strictly internal affairs" and which, moreover, question the "humaneness" of the Soviet system, let alone provide opportunities for "anti-Soviet" acts against the state, cut deeply against the grain of these two outlooks.[67]

The most credible Soviet explanation for the intervention in Angola, an act which deeply angered those American officials who had risked the most in moving détente forward in the early 1970s and markedly diminished their willingness to pay further costs for this policy, emphasizes the difficult choice between rescuing from almost certain defeat by South African tanks a movement with which the Soviets had been aligned for more than a decade, and watching their position and credibility in Africa and among Soviet-oriented liberation movements everywhere sink to new lows. Already the Soviet Union frequently was being accused by supporters in the Third World of selling out their interests in order to improve relations with the United States.[68]

[65] See *Pravda*, 24 April 1985.

[66] Gromyko doubtless had this group in mind when, at the 24th Party Congress, he posed the question of agreements this way: "Sometimes the question is asked: How realistic is the meaning of agreements with some states if those agreements are not always honored by them? This question is sometimes posed in a different, bluntly speaking, directly provocative way, and any agreement with capitalist states is said to be almost a plot!" *Pravda*, 4 April 1971

[67] See, for example, Gorbachev's remarks to U.S. Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldridge, *Krasnaya Svezda*, 21 May 1985, 1.

[68] This view was expressed most articulately by a Soviet policy adviser during an extended conversation with the author in December 1975.

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This formulation makes particular sense because it emphasizes recognition of the potential conflict between two competing sets of Soviet goals and orientations. It is entirely possible that the decision to go ahead with an action to which powerful Soviet interests were deeply committed was made in the belief that there indeed might be only limited costs in the U.S.–Soviet relationship. After all, shouldn't Africa have the same low priority for American supporters of détente as it seems to have had for Brezhnev and the moderate internationalists?[69] Thus, the Soviet Union could have it both ways, or so it may have seemed. Nearly a decade later, reflecting on these events, as well as the consequences for détente of Ethiopia and Afghanistan, a leading Soviet policy analyst noted in a conversation with this author that if ever a new détente were to be constructed, the impact on U.S.–Soviet relations of events occurring in the Third World must be more fully taken into account by both sides.

One of the benefits of the recognition of superpower equality in the Brezhnev perspective was to be an equal role in the settlement of regional conflicts, particularly the Middle East. This desire found expression in public statements, in several U.N. Security Council resolutions,[70] and in the 1 October 1977 Joint Statement on the Middle East. Ultimately, however, these beginnings never bore their anticipated fruits. While Soviet officials blame American duplicity and desire for "separate deals," the underlying reasons have much more to do with the Politburo's unwillingness or inability to adopt positions at any significant variance with those of their most radical Arab friends. Brezhnev's aspirations to the U.S.–Soviet partnership were sacrificed in the interests of placating "anti-imperialist" groups within the Soviet leadership and in the Middle East.

This analysis of the consequences of the Brezhnev consensual policy-making style suggests that at a number of critical junctures, interpersonal and institutional harmony within the Soviet leadership, a live and let-live attitude to ultimately incompatible policies and approaches, were given priority over or served to limit a consistent or coherent approach to what appeared to be the dominant Soviet policy objectives of the time, détente with the United States.

By the end of the Brezhnev regime, then, not only had the Brezhnev program of economic and technological renewal at home and realization of the privileges of great power status abroad based centrally on détente with the United States largely failed to be realized, but most of the assumptions of Brezhnev's approach had lost whatever political credibility they may have had among a leadership increasingly weighted toward Leninist-internationalist and nationalist perspectives. The way was well paved for the emergence of the kind of nationalist foreign policy articulated by Gorbachev.

[69] In a conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig in September 1981, Gromyko expressed total disbelief that Angola could ever be important enough to actually undermine U.S.–Soviet relations. Gromyko added, probably reflecting his own sense of Soviet priorities, "The Soviet Union has no interests in sub-Saharan Africa!" This conversation was reported in a private briefing with Secretary Haig in which this author participated.

[70] UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, November 1967 and December 1973 respectively.

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The U.S.-Soviet Summit: A Test of Gorbachev's Perspectives

The central thesis developed here is that, although Gorbachev smiles pleasantly and evokes images of the Brezhnev détente, his approach to U.S.-Soviet relations is based upon such different assumptions that to the extent these predispositions are reflected in actual Soviet policy and behavior, the United States should be very cautious in its expectations for revival of even the limited accommodations and compromises that made possible at least a temporary détente in the early 1970s. Moreover, the perspectives underlying Gorbachev's approach to U.S.-Soviet relations are neither transient nor simply tactical. We cannot be certain whether the views articulated by Gorbachev reflect his own personal preferences, or simply a program which he finds politically credible and useful. But the political appeal of the nationalist approach as an "explanation" for Soviet weaknesses and failures abroad and as a basis for sustaining vigilance and discipline at home suggests that this trend in Soviet foreign policy is likely to persist for some time. This view is reinforced by Gorbachev's image of the Soviet Union as at the threshold of a long period of reconstruction and rebuilding.

Now, nearly two months after the Geneva summit, it is possible to compare the actions of Soviet policy with the expectations created by Gorbachev's own perspectives. At the level of rhetoric and attention to issues, Gorbachev, it must be admitted, seems more similar to Brezhnev of the early 1970s than to the leader described here. Thus, the question of improving U.S.-Soviet relations across a broad front—from arms control to trade to cultural relations—has come to occupy the center stage in Gorbachev's foreign policy activities.[71] Moreover, Gorbachev seems to recognize more clearly than in the early months of his tenure the central "responsibility" of the United States and the Soviet Union for peace and the "nature of world development," as he put it in his report to the USSR Supreme Soviet shortly after Geneva.[72] On 11 December, Gorbachev spoke with eloquence about the mutual benefits of extensive U.S.-Soviet economic contacts to the Soviet-American Trade and Economics Council meeting in Moscow.[73] But, as Gorbachev himself is the first to admit, the real test of policy is in deeds, not words.[74]

At the level of actions there is little reason to believe that Gorbachev is prepared to make the hard choices that might make genuine compromise and agreement possible across the range of outstanding U.S.-Soviet issues. On the crucial issue of arms control, a question which Gorbachev identified as the central issue in U.S.-Soviet relations, there is little reason for optimism. While it is true that the Soviets have put forth a proposal envisaging reductions in strategic arms of 50 percent, not only do the Soviet definitions of the categories to be reduced ig-

[71] Two-thirds of his report to the Supreme Soviet was occupied with these issues. *Pravda*, 28 November 1985.

[72] Ibid.

[73] *FBIS*, 11 December 1985.

[74] See his comment to this effect in his Supreme Soviet speech, *Pravda*, 28 November 1985.

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nore many of the agreed positions in SALT II, but they revive previous one-sided positions long ago abandoned by the Soviet Union, thus making progress on strategic reductions even more difficult than in the past. Most critically, even though he must know that the United States can never accept this position, Gorbachev has become increasingly adamant that there will be no strategic reductions unless the U.S. agrees to "completely ban" the strategic defense initiative. In short, Gorbachev is holding out attractive promises but making them hostage to impossible demands on the U.S.

Gorbachev has offered substantial increases in U.S.-Soviet economic relations. However, as in his 1985 remarks in Britain, Gorbachev insists as a prior condition not only that all "obstacles" be eliminated by the U.S., including removal of restrictions on Most-Favored-Nation status and credits, but also guarantees against any future boycotts or embargoes and assurances of Soviet access to the latest American technology. In return, Gorbachev offers no concessions on Jewish emigration, human rights, or any other issue. The only positive incentive he creates is the suggestion that "new forms of production and scientific-technological cooperation are possible."[75]

The only improvement in Soviet human rights practice since the summit has been the reluctant Soviet follow-through on the promise to reunite up to ten Soviet citizens with their spouses and the granting of permission for Sakharov's wife, Yelena Bonner, to travel to the U.S. for needed heart surgery. Soviet emigration remains at pre-détente levels.

Consistent with Gorbachev's desire to avoid open-ended entanglements abroad, the General Secretary appears to be searching for means for an honorable withdrawal from Afghanistan. But here, as in other aspects of his foreign policy, Gorbachev seems unable or unwilling to make the kinds of commitments such a withdrawal would require. Gorbachev's aims appear to be nearly identical to those of Brezhnev in December 1979 when Soviet troops first entered Afghanistan: to secure guarantees from Pakistan and other nations, including the United States, that they will cease all support for Afghan freedom fighters in return for a stable, pro-Soviet regime in the country. In short, Gorbachev is willing to withdraw Soviet troops so long as he is not required to accept a genuine political settlement within Afghanistan.

I have argued that Gorbachev's preferred strategy in dealing with the United States is to utilize instruments of propaganda and mass mobilization to create a climate of public opinion sufficiently supportive of Soviet goals that the Soviet government can attain objectives not otherwise achievable through direct, official negotiations. It is not only the contrast between Gorbachev's soothing and even attractive rhetoric and his policy behavior that reinforces my view that most of the summit and its aftermath were designed more for public effect than for paving the way to mutually acceptable agreements. This view is reinforced by the fact that Gorbachev chose to fill two of the six principal positions in his delega-

[75] *FBIS*, 11 December 1985.

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tion to the summit with propaganda officials, rather than, for example, his arms control negotiators.

What kinds of evidence would create the necessity for a reassessment of Gorbachev's policy toward the United States? In the arms control area, indications of a willingness to seriously contemplate proposals, some of which already have been put forward privately, could provide the Soviet Union with meaningful assurances against space testing or rapid deployment of the Strategic Defense Initiative. This could make possible substantial reductions in existing nuclear arsenals. A Soviet willingness to renegotiate verification provisions of the Threshold Test Ban treaty, even along lines to which Gorbachev has given public support, and greater forthrightness in dealing with U.S. concern over SALT II violations would make Gorbachev's call for a complete nuclear test moratorium credible.

Greater Soviet responsiveness to deeply felt American concerns over human rights issues, demonstrated by substantial increases in emigration of many who have long been refused exit visas, would indicate Gorbachev has come to value U.S.–Soviet trade and understands the actual political requirements for a new opening in this arena. Similarly, signs of Soviet readiness to consider a settlement in Afghanistan in which all forces could participate in determining the political future of the country would provide evidence of a serious interest in withdrawal of Soviet troops from that nation. So far, the evidence suggests that Gorbachev's words may appear to be ushering in a new "era of negotiation." But his actions reflect an outlook more likely to evoke a new "era of confrontation."*

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Religion and the Future of American Politics

A. JAMES REICHLEY

Religion has always played an important part in American politics. The founders of the Republic drew on religious values and rhetoric in forming the new nation. Churches were active on both sides in the controversy over slavery and the Civil War that it produced. Religious groups were significant participants in campaigns for such diverse causes as prohibition of the sale of liquor, defense of the gold standard in the 1890s, enactment of women's suffrage, reform of the national economy under the New Deal, and passage of civil rights legislation in the 1960s. Perhaps most important, religion was the source of the so-called Protestant ethic, which has helped shape both the goals and the behavioral standards of American political life.

During the 1980s, some religious groups have become exceptionally visible and active in national politics. Some commentators and ordinary citizens regard these increases in political participation as dangerous to civil liberties, while others look to them as a source of moral renewal. Certainly shifts in the electoral behavior of such major groups as Roman Catholics and white evangelical Protestants hold the capacity for radically altering the national political balance. This seems a good time to examine some of these developments and to make some attempt at appraising their potential effects on American society.

In this article, I will discuss recent political trends and possible future directions among five major religious groups: Roman Catholics; mainline Protestants; white evangelical Protestants; black Protestants; and Jews. Together, these groups include all but about five percent of the more than ninety percent of all

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Americans who identify with some religious faith.[1] They do not include such important groups as Mormons, Orthodox Christians, Christian Scientists, Adventists, and Black Muslims. Some of these latter groups obviously have political as well as religious significance. But I think that assessment of behavior among the five major groups can fairly be said to give an adequate impression of the current impact of religion on American public life.

Evangelicals in Power

The most spectacular development among religious groups in politics during the 1980s has been the surge of political activity and the shift of partisan allegiance among white evangelical Protestants. (Many black Protestants are evangelical in their theological outlooks and their devotional practices and share many common social values with white evangelicals, but they have been for the most part separately organized and have followed different political paths.) Comprising about 20 percent of the national electorate, white evangelical Protestants traditionally tended to be politically passive. To the extent that they were active, in the South they overwhelmingly supported the regionally dominant Democratic party. Even in the North, they were more likely than other white Protestants to be Democrats, probably because they were drawn disproportionately from lower income groups.[2] In the 1980s, all of this has changed. White evangelical Protestants have risen to relatively high rates of registration and voting and have given their support overwhelmingly to conservative Republicans, not only for president but in 1984 in congressional races as well.

The former political passivity of evanglicals was to some extent rooted in religious conviction. The evangelical wing of Protestantism, defined by emphasis on the individual's experience of salvation and belief in the literal truth of the Bible, has practiced a highly personalist form of religion. Things of this world, including secular politics, have been viewed essentially as distractions from spiritual experience. The church, evangelicals have believed, has no business involving itself in the affairs of civil society. "We have very few ties to this earth," Jerry Falwell said in 1965. "We pay our taxes, cast our votes as a responsibility of citizenship, obey the laws of the land, and other things demanded of us by the society in which we live. But, at the same time, we are cognizant that our only purpose on this earth is to know Christ and to make Him known."[3]

There are several reasons for the shift of most white evangelicals away from this attitude of political passivity. The rise of Jimmy Carter, himself a born-again Baptist, to political prominence during the middle years of the 1970s attracted enthusiastic support among many of his co-religionists, somewhat as Catholics had rallied behind John F. Kennedy, the first Catholic president, in

[1] *Religion in America: 50 Years, 1935–1985*, Gallup Report no. 236, May 1985, 39, 56.

[2] James Davison Hunter, *American Evangelism: Conservative Religion and the Quandary of Modernity* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1983), 50–54.

[3] Frances Fitzgerald, "A Disciplined, Charging Army," *New Yorker*, 18 May 1981, 63.

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1960. In the close 1976 presidential election, evangelicals may fairly be said to have provided the margin of victory for Carter, not only in the South, but in such important northern industrial states with large rural populations as Pennsylvania and Ohio. Evangelicals ultimately were disenchanted with Carter, feeling he had abandoned their social agenda, but the taste of national politics they got in 1976 led many of them to hanker for more. Charismatic television preachers like Falwell and Pat Robertson, who had concluded that political passivity by the church yields social control to the ungodly, encouraged their followers to become politically involved and issued specific electoral recommendations in a way that earlier evangelists like Billy Graham had avoided.

Perhaps most important, evangelicals in the 1970s felt that their entire way of life, which they tended to identify as the American way of life, was threatened by such by-products of modernity as increase in divorce, rising crime, rapid increase in the percentage of children born out of wedlock, widespread use of recreational drugs, and virtually unrestricted availability of pornography. These symptoms of social decay, they were told by their preachers, were caused by the dominance of a philosophy called "secular humanism" in major universities, the national media, the federal government, and the federal courts. Secular humanism purportedly motivated a series of Supreme Court decisions, particularly the decision prohibiting organized prayer in the public schools in 1962 and the decision establishing a constitutional right to abortion in 1973, which evangelicals believed struck at the heart of traditional moral values. Devotees of secular humanism had achieved their social dominance in large part through their ability to influence national politics. The only way to displace secular humanism, therefore, was to organize politically to drive the secularists and their collaborators from the halls of power.

The proximate cause of the organization of what came to be called the religious new right was the decision by the Carter administration in 1978 to deny tax exemptions to predominantly white "Christian academies" that were springing up all across the South. These academies were founded partly in response to desegregation of the public schools but also as a reaction to growing insulation of public education from religion. A national organization was formed to defend the political interest of the Christian academies. In 1979, this organization was converted into a broader vehicle, titled the Moral Majority, with Falwell as its president, to advance the entire social agenda of conservative evangelicals.

In its early stages, the religious new right was tutored and even to some extent created by a cadre of secular conservative organizers and publicists who for some years had been seeking to mobilize a right-wing coalition in national politics. Foremost among the captains of the secular right in the latter part of the 1970s were Paul Weyrich, director of a conservative lobby in Washington; Howard Phillips, head of a national organization of grassroots conservatives; and Richard Viguerie, a wizard of direct mail fundraising who filled substantial warchests for a variety of conservative candidates and causes. Up to 1976, the chief preoccupations of the far right had been resistance against the growth of the welfare state and hardline opposition to the Soviet Union. After the 1976 election,

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Weyrich in particular spotted the social agenda of the religious right, with which he was in personal sympathy, as a new source of major electoral strength for a broad right-wing coalition. Weyrich, Phillips, and Viguerie introduced the leaders of the conservative evangelicals to modern techniques of direct-mail fundraising, media manipulation, and computerized grassroots political organization.

Ronald Reagan was not the first choice for president of the leaders of the religious right in 1980. But after their favored candidates, former governor John Connally of Texas and Representative Philip Crane of Illinois, began to fall by the wayside, the evangelical leaders lost no time in climbing aboard the Reagan bandwagon. The Moral Majority would mobilize voters for Reagan, Falwell said, "even if he has the devil running with him."[4] Reagan, for his part, worked hard at courting the evangelicals. "Religious America is awakening, perhaps just in time for our country's sake," he told an evangelical conclave in Dallas in the summer of 1980. "If *you* do not speak your mind and cast your ballots, then who will speak for ideals we cherish?"[5]

The impact of the religious right on the 1980 election has been warmly debated among scholars. Several studies have shown that in most states the Moral Majority was not much more than a letterhead organization, and that even in the South it was more unpopular than popular with the voters. Still, voter registration and turnout rose in the South, where the evangelicals were most active, while declining in all other regions. And on election day, exit polls showed that white evangelicals, who had favored Carter in 1976, gave Reagan a majority of more than 60 percent. The best scholarly estimate was that the religious right registered about two million new voters—an impressive achievement, though much less than the four to eight million claimed by the Moral Majority. White evangelicals would probably have swung to Reagan, or against Carter, in any case in 1980, but the active support given to the Republican candidate by many evangelical ministers reinforced a trend already in motion.[6]

In 1982, with the economy in deep decline, many white evangelicals returned to the political tradition in which they had been raised and the Democrats staged a modest recovery in congressional and state elections. Some journalists and

[4] James L. Guth, "The New Christian Right," in Robert C. Liebman and Robert Wuthnow, eds., *The New Christian Right*, (Hawthorne, N.Y.: Aldine, 1983), 36.

[5] Ronald Reagan, Roundtable of National Affairs briefing, Dallas, 22 August 1980.

[6] Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, "The Election and the Evangelicals," *Commentary* (March 1981): 25-31; Robert Zwier, "The Moral Majority in the 1980 Elections: The Cases of Iowa and South Dakota," paper delivered at the 1981 meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, N.Y.: Joseph B. Tanney and Stephen D. Johnson, "The Moral Majority in Middletown" *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* (June 1983): 150; James L. Guth, "The Politics of Preachers: Southern Baptist Ministers and the Christian Right," paper delivered at the 1982 Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics, Charleston, S.C.; Richard V. Pierard, "No Hoosier Hospitality for Humanism: The Moral Majority in Indiana," paper delivered at 1982 meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (SSR), Providence, R.I.; Anthony Oberschall and Steve Howell, "The Old and New Christian Right in North Carolina," paper delivered at 1982 meeting of SSR.

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scholarly observers concluded that the religious right had shot its bolt and that issues like abortion and school prayer would have little impact on future elections.

In 1984, however, the evangelical ministers and publicists were more active than ever, and the swing of evangelicals to Reagan and the Republicans became an avalanche. Registration drives launched by evangelical churches helped the Republicans win a clear victory in the battle between the parties for new registrants. In North Carolina, for example, registration among whites, many of them evangelicals, increased more than 300,000, while the competing drive among black church leaders, supporting first Jesse Jackson and then Walter Mondale, registered about 180,000 new black voters. A study by the nonpartisan Committee for the Study of the American Electorate found that new registrants supported Reagan over Mondale by a margin of 2 to 1.[7] Exit polls showed that white evangelicals gave Reagan an astounding 80 percent of their vote. Probably even more important, among white evangelicals who voted in contests for the House of Representatives, 77 percent favored Republican candidates. There was evidence, moreover, that the swing to the Republicans was becoming institutionally ingrained. James Guth has shown that Southern Baptist ministers, who in 1980 had considered themselves 41 percent Democratic and only 29 percent Republican, had by 1984 switched, when leaners are included, to 66 percent Republican and 25 percent Democratic. Guth's survey found that 79 percent of Southern Baptist ministers were against the proposed constitutional amendment to establish equal legal status for women, 76 percent favored a constitutional amendment to prohibit abortion, and 68 percent favored turning some services now supplied by government over to free enterprise.[8]

President Reagan has not repeated President Carter's mistake of denying evangelicals a share of the fruits of political victory. While few legislative successes have been won for the new right's social agenda since Reagan's election, and while some White House operatives have appeared visibly uncomfortable with important parts of the evangelicals' program, the President and the administration have appeared to make good faith efforts when issues like school prayer and abortion have been before Congress. The administration at first rescinded the Carter administration's ban against tax exemptions for church schools that appeared to be practicing racial discrimination; it then backtracked under fire from civil rights groups; and finally it supported the appeal of Bob Jones University against the ban before the Supreme Court—where the ban was upheld. Some evangelical leaders have received posts within the administration, and an in-

[7] Curtis B. Gans, *Non-Voter Study '84–'85* (Washington, D.C.: Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, 1985); Thomas B. Edsall, "More Bad News for Mondale," *Washington Post*, 21 October 1984.

[8] James L. Guth, "The Christian Right Revisited: Partisan Realignment Among Southern Baptist Ministers," paper delivered at the 1985 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill.

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formal personnel structure has been set up through which religious right networks are kept informed on federal job opportunities.

Some religious right leaders have been critical of the Reagan administration for not moving more forcefully on the right's social agenda. During the first term, they at times participated in the general attack by ideological conservatives against the so-called pragmatic wing of the White House staff led by former Chief-of-Staff James Baker. But the leaders of the religious right soon discovered that there was simply no way they could persuade most of their followers that Ronald Reagan had sold out to secular humanism. Partly for this reason, they have recently been very cautious in joining attacks by the ideological far right on the administration. At the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas, captains of the secular ideological conservative movement were startled to discover that the religious right no longer regarded their political tutelage as indispensable. Economic libertarians and hardline cold warriors found they could not always count on unquestioning support from their allies on the religious right. Even Vice President George Bush, who in 1980 was marked anathema by the right, has during the second term been winning more favorable acceptance from religious right leaders, partly no doubt because they recognize that he may turn out to be their ticket to staying close to the summit of national power. Falwell has already indicated that he is favorably disposed toward a Bush succession in 1989.

If white evangelicals should continue to support Republican candidates for president and Congress at the rate they did in 1984, and if this support should extend to backing Republicans for state and local offices, the Republican party will acquire an important asset in its drive to regain the majority status it lost in the 1930s. The evangelicals show some signs of becoming a solid block of reliable electoral support for the Republicans, of the kind that the Democrats for many years received from Catholics and Jews, and still receive from blacks. Almost tribal identification of this kind by a group with a party is of particular political value since it is relatively immune to ups and downs in the economy. There are several reasons, however, for questioning whether the political effectiveness achieved by the evangelicals in 1984 will turn out to be enduring.

The attitudinal orientation of the evangelical churches has always worked against their mobilization as a unified political force. Not only is evangelicalism inherently individualistic, but also it is organized around highly competitive charistmatic preachers who tend naturally to clash. Most evangelical churches are at the opposite end of the religious spectrum from hierarchical denominations like the Catholics and the Episcopalians. The Methodists almost alone have generally succeeded in combining evangelical enthusiasm with hierarchical structure. In 1980 and 1984, evangelical leaders, despite some internal bickering, were remarkably successful in suppressing their normal fractiousness to maintain political unity. There are now, however, some indications that this atypical harmony may be coming unstrung. Falwell, who remains the best known of the leaders of the religious right, has moved toward the political center, following a familiar pattern among leaders of extreme factions who, once they gain fame,

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recognize that responsible use of power in a pluralist democracy requires moderation. To put it more critically, they begin to crave acceptance within the moderate establishment. Seeking a broader agenda, early in 1986 Falwell folded the Moral Majority into his newly-formed Liberty Federation.[9]

As Falwell moves away from political extremism, some of his old comrades and some younger successors reaffirm their rejection of any form of moderation that they view as compromising with secular humanism. Television evangelist Pat Robertson, proposed by some leaders of the right as a possible presidential candidate in 1988, has emerged as a favorite among those who feel that Falwell is losing touch with the old-time religion. Even further to the right, some religious fundamentalists have never given up the traditional Baptists' scorn for political activism; they call for a return to social quietism.

On the left, small bands of evangelicals like the Sojourners group in Washington, D.C., who are conservative on social issues but promote radical populism on economic issues and a dovish approach to foreign policy, are reportedly attracting followers at evangelical colleges and seminaries. As yet they have made little statistical impact.

Whether the current enthusiasm among most evangelicals for political conservatism would survive a severe downturn in the economy remains uncertain. The 1982 recession clearly produced a pause and short-run reversal in the swing of evangelicals away from former Democratic moorings. But the religious right was not very politically active that year and had not yet achieved the level of political organization that it displayed in 1984. A true test of the durability of the bond between evangelicalism and Republicanism will probably have to wait until the next major economic decline, and perhaps until Reagan, who inspires evangelicals with a special kind of devotion, has left the political scene.

Even if the evangelicals remain politically united and loyal to the Republicans, they may over the long run be almost as much a burden as a support to the conservative coalition. Historically, evangelicals managed to keep themselves isolated from, and in fact much resented by, potential political allies in other religious groups. Anti-Catholicism, tracing all the way back to the Reformation, was a particular characteristic of American evangelicalism. Anti-Semitism and racism also found considerable acceptance within the evangelical community. Although evangelicals, recalling their own experiences of religious persecution, were always strong supporters of separation between church and state, they tended to favor imposition of moral and cultural prohibitions, such as those against sale of liquor or commercial activities on Sunday, that some other religious groups viewed as moving toward theocracy. As a result, conservative Catholics and Jews, and even many conservatives and moderates among the mainline Protestant denominations, regarded evangelicals, particularly of the fundamentalist variety, with a mixture of derision and distrust.

Falwell and his associates, such as Ronald Godwin, executive vice president of the Moral Majority, have taken pains to avoid this kind of isolation for the cur-

[9] *Washington Post*, 4 January 1986.

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rent religious right. On the abortion issue, the religious right has formed a political alliance with right-to-life Catholics. Through support for Israel, the founding of which evangelicals regard as a fulfilment of Biblical prophecy (and perhaps as a sign of the approach of the last days), the right has obtained the gratitude, usually wary, of many Jews. Though hardly in the forefront of the ongoing civil rights struggle, the current religious right has firmly rejected racism. As a result, the religious new right is politically more formidable than earlier attempts to rally fundamentalists in politics in the 1920s and the 1950s. It is also much more compatible with the spirit and values of democratic pluralism.

Despite all of this, right-wing fundamentalism is still viewed with suspicion by many Catholics and Jews, and by many persons of no strong religious persuasion. Insist though they may on their allegiance to the principle of separation between church and state (listed first among the commitments set forth in the platform of the Moral Majority), leaders of the religious right still inspire fears that their underlying objective is to convert the United States into a "Christian nation"—an aim that in fact has never been abandoned by some fundamentalist spellbinders at the second and third levels of leadership.

If the religious right succeeds in calming apprehension that its ultimate goal is theocracy, its moral platform may still collide with the values of the so-called yuppie contingent that in 1984 formed an important part of the conservative coalition, and of the youngest generation of voters who overwhelmingly, in defiance of all historic precedent, cast their first presidential ballots for Ronald Reagan. Yuppies, to the extent that they can be defined, are presumably affluent hedonists between the ages of 30 and 45 who are prepared to swallow their continued dovishness on foreign policy and their liberal social attitudes to support conservative politicans who promise to hold down their taxes and keep the government economically off their backs. The youngest generation of voters, too, is said to be drawn to the right primarily because of conservatism's current identification with economic opportunity.

So far, the conservative movement, largely through Reagan's magic, has succeeded in holding together moral traditionalists with libertarian hedonists. Soon, however, many commentators reason, the traditionalists are going to demand some actual victories, in the form of restrictions on abortion or restoration of school prayer or action against unrestricted pornography and deviant life styles. The conservative politicians will then have to choose between disappointing their supporters on the religious right, or curtailing the cherished pleasures and freedoms of the libertarians. Faced with actual denial of the right to abortion or deprivation of drugs or censorship of frank expressions of sadomasochism, it is argued, younger voters will switch back to economic moderates on the left.

I doubt that this analysis of the reasons for current conservatism among younger voters is entirely correct—there is, in my reading of the evidence, a good deal of *social* conservatism and rekindled patriotism at work in the amalgam of values that has drawn younger-age groups toward political conservatism. Still, there is no doubt that extreme reaction on issues like feminism, free speech, or tolerance of deviant lifestyles has little support among many of the young voters

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who cast ballots for Reagan in 1984. The question, really, is whether each of the disparate elements in the emerging conservative coalition will insist on unqualified adoption of its own priorities, or whether the various elements will be prepared to yield enough of their preferred goals to mollify each other, and even more important to avoid frightening away the great body of middle-of-the-road voters who still hold the balance of power in American politics. The question, that is, is whether the conservative coalition has the capacity to become a governing majority—on the order of the New Deal coalition, which certainly included elements bitterly hostile to each other but was held together electorally for more than thirty years by joint commitment to political success.

In any case, evangelical Protestantism is unlikely to return to its former status as the sleeping giant of American politics. This is partly because a group comprising about one-fifth of the electorate, and rapidly growing, is almost bound to be politically significant. But it is also because many of the concerns that drew the evangelicals to politics, such as alarm over increasing family instability, objection to the pervasiveness of hedonistic values in commercial entertainment and advertising, discontent with loss of social discipline, and disapproval of exclusion of religion from the "public square," are shared by many beyond the cohorts of the religious right. In a sense, the evangelicals have been acting as political surrogates for many mainline Protestants, and indeed for many Catholics and Jews, who are at least ambivalent toward many of the current effects of modernity. The evangelicals express a widespread and deeply-held sense of social unease; they have learned some of the routes to political effectiveness—and, it is my guess, they will be heard.

Catholics in Ferment

The other group that seems to be undergoing profound political change in the middle years of the 1980s is the membership of the Roman Catholic church, the nation's largest single denomination. Catholicism has been associated with the Democratic party, or its lineal predecessor the Democratic-Republicans, since the founding years of the Republic. Catholics voted by large majorities for Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson, and remained overwhelmingly loyal to the Democracy during the long years of Republican hegemony from the Civil War to the 1930s' Depression. Under the New Deal, Catholics came into their own, holding many high government positions, elective and appointive. The first Catholic major party candidate for president, Al Smith, and the first Catholic president, John Kennedy, were both Democrats. Before 1972, no Republican ever won a majority of the Catholic vote for president. Yet in 1984, 55 percent of Catholic voters chose Ronald Reagan over Walter Mondale, a classic New Deal Democrat. What has happened?

The close identification of Catholicism with the Democratic party, the more liberal of the two major parties, was always to some degree anomalous. International Catholicism since the time of the French Revolution has generally been hostile to the political left. In many countries of Europe and Latin America, the

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Catholic church has usually been allied with conservative political forces. In the United States, the church has been emphatically conservative on issues involving the family and sex, and has been almost jingoistic in its exuberant celebration of patriotism.

The chief reason for the traditional bond between Catholicism and the Democracy was that the Democrats claimed to be the party of the poor, and Catholics for much of the American history were disproprotionately poor. Beyond that, when the Republicans after the Civil War became effectively the party of Protestantism in the North, following the earlier example of the Whigs, Catholic loyalty to the only available alternative, the Democrats, was naturally reinforced. Until quite recently, the Catholic church in America regarded itself as an "immigrant church." The church, therefore, felt affinity for the Democratic party that acted as political advocate and broker for many of the immigrant groups that in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth poured into the United States. Finally, Catholic social philosophy, while conservative in the sense of favoring a hierarchical social order, viewed with deep suspicion the doctrine of economic laissez faire, which in the United States became closely associated with political conservatism. The welfare state promoted by liberal Democrats after the 1930s fit neatly with traditional Catholic doctrine holding government responsible for meeting many social and economic needs.

The Catholic hierarchy, while socially influential, up to the 1950s generally maintained a low profile in politics. The church directed most of its political resources toward advancing special Catholic concerns, such as state aid for Catholic schools and hospitals, and toward combating economic or social discrimination against Catholics.

In the 1950s, Catholic voters began to take a more conservative turn. Rising affluence among Catholics and movement of many Catholics away from working-class ethnic city neighborhoods into middle-class suburbs with no clear ethnic or religious identification caused many individual Catholics to adopt middle-class interests, which drew some of them toward the Republican party. The church's vigorous anticommunism in the 1950s, symbolized by figures like Cardinal Francis Spellman of New York, reinforced this trend toward conservatism. None of these social tendencies was sufficient to counteract Catholic enthusiasm for the election of John F. Kennedy, a moderately liberal Democrat, as president in 1960. But Kennedy's election in a way symbolized acceptance of Catholicism into the mainstream of American life. No longer regarding themselves as an underprivileged minority, many Catholics seem to have felt less reason to maintain loyalty to the Democrats as the party of outsiders.[10]

The rise of the new left and various kinds of social rebellion in the 1960s challenged many of the traditional moral values with which Catholicism was identified. Paradoxically, the liberalizing reforms within the church that followed the Second Vatican Council, concluded in 1965, produced a conservative reaction on

[10] James Hennessey, *American Catholics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 308.

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internal church matters among part of the laity, contributing to a further sense of cultural embattlement. In 1972, confronted with a choice between Richard Nixon, Kennedy's opponent in 1960, and George McGovern, champion of social and economic radicalism, Catholics for the first time gave the Republican candidate for president a bare majority of their vote.

In January 1973, the Supreme Court decision establishing a virtually unlimited constitutional right to abortion brought the church hierarchy openly and vigorously into national politics. Catholic leaders, supported on this issue by a substantial part of the laity, felt that the Supreme Court decision had in effect legalized destruction of a form of human life. Catholics also believed that the Court, acting while abortion reform measures were gradually being debated and passed in state legislatures, had broken the rules of the game: Catholic moral convictions had not been met or tested through accepted democratic processes, but simply crushed by judicial fiat. The church organized to pass a constitutional amendment that would not simply restore the prior right of the states to legislate on the subject, but would establish an outright nationwide prohibition of abortion. Catholics soon found themselves in uncomfortable alliance on the issue with their ancient antagonists, the evangelical Protestants.

Within the hierarchy, passions aroused by the abortion issue collided with a more general drift toward the left that rose in part from the extended effects of the Second Vatican Council. Relative liberalization of internal church administration encouraged more liberal attitudes on broad economic and social issues. Development of "liberation theology" among Latin American Catholics, also in part an effect of the Vatican Council, suggested the possibility of Catholicism embracing not merely moderate liberalism, but the program of the extreme left, which called for class war and eventual dismemberment of the capitalist system. Meditation on the horrors of nuclear war drew the American Catholic bishops toward increasingly severe strictures against the use, or perhaps even possession, of nuclear weapons. In 1983, the bishops issued a widely noticed and much quoted pastoral letter on nuclear arms that stopped just short of condemning deterrence strategies of the kind that have formed the core of national military policy for every American administration since World War II. In 1984, the bishops began work on a pastoral letter on economic policy, which in its first and second drafts, while accepting many features of market capitalism, endorses broad expansion of governmental authority and responsibility in direction of the economy.[11]

The abortion issue confronted the national Democratic party with a critical dilemma: whether to antagonize its traditional Catholic constituency by defending abortion, or to outrage its following among social liberals, particularly feminists, by seeking some accommodation with the Catholic position. In 1980, the Democratic platform endorsed legalized abortion. The Republicans, mean-

[11] "Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy," *Origins*, 15 November 1984; "Second Draft: Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy," National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 7 October 1985.

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while, were diligently seeking Catholic favor. The 1980 Republican platform promised support for "a constitutional amendment to restore protection to the right to life for unborn children," and also endorsed tax credits to help defray the costs of attending parochial schools—another issue on which the Democrats were failing to satisfy Catholic demands.[12] In November, Catholics, a majority of whom in 1976 had backed Jimmy Carter over Gerald Ford, supported Reagan by a solid margin of seven percent.

In 1984, Walter Mondale, apparently aiming to win credits simultaneously among feminists and Catholics, chose as his vice-presidential running mate Representative Geraldine Ferraro of New York, an Italian Catholic and the first woman included on a majority party's national ticket. But since Ferraro had defended the public right to abortion (though expressing a personal view that it is morally wrong), her presence on the ticket made the Democrats' Catholic problem more troublesome, not less. Several leaders of the hierarchy, particularly Cardinal John Krol of Philadelphia and Archbishops John O'Connor of New York and Bernard Law of Boston, indicated that abortion rather than disarmament or economic policy was the overriding issue of 1984. O'Connor and Law had recently been named to their posts, both jewels in the diadem of American Catholicism, and were raised by Pope John Paul II to the status of cardinal soon after the election. O'Connor had provided a conservative counterweight to Cardinal Joseph Bernardin of Chicago, the brightest star for Catholic liberals within the hierarchy, on the committee that drafted the bishops' letter on nuclear arms. Early in the fall campaign, O'Connor accused Ferraro, who had earlier signed a letter arguing that there was no one Catholic position on abortion, of misrepresenting the church's teaching. On election day, Catholics gave Reagan and Bush a lead of 11 percentage points over Mondale and Ferraro. In congressional elections, this pattern was reversed: among Catholics voting for candidates for the House of Representatives, 55 percent cast ballots for Democrats and 45 percent for Republicans—though even this majority was far below historic levels of Democratic support. Registration figures in 1984 showed a steady trend among Catholics, including Hispanics, the only rapidly growing Catholic ethnic group in the United States, toward the Republicans.

What appears to have happened is not that Catholics have swung massively to the Republicans, in the manner of white evangelicals, but that most of them no longer see much identification between being a Catholic and being a Democrat. Polls show that the abortion issue is decisive with about one-tenth of all Catholic voters. These are moving as a block toward the Republicans, whose position on the issue is much closer to the church's view than that of the Democrats. This movement by itself, affecting between two and three percent of the national electorate, is a significant factor in any close election. But the broader political effect of the abortion issue, and to a lesser extent the parochial school aid issue, is that most Catholics now feel free to cast their votes on considera-

[12] *Republican Platform, 1980* (Washington, D.C., Republican National Committee), 13, 14.

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tions other than tribal loyalty to the Democratic party. Survey evidence shows that on economic and foreign policy issues Catholics are still somewhat more liberal than Protestants, though more conservative than Jews.[13] Catholics who are economic or foreign policy liberals still tend to support the Democrats. But the substantial minority of Catholics who are conservative on economic matters or foreign policy are now moving increasingly to the Republicans. The Democrats have thus lost the solid bastion of reliable support that they used to enjoy from most Catholics in major industrial states of the Northeast and Midwest. Democrats may even be in the process of losing their role of dominance among Hispanics, which has been their only hope for keeping Texas, now the third most populous state in the United States, safely Democratic.

In the aftermath of the 1984 election, there appears to have been considerable soul-searching within the Catholic hierarchy. The question of the role of the church in national politics has become intertwined with the larger question of the relationship of the American church to the Vatican. Some among both liberals and conservatives have indicated concern that the church has been becoming too assertive in secular politics. Considerable support exists for the view that the church should act as a broad moral guide on civil government issues rather than as prescriber of detailed social or economic policies. Like the evangelicals, however, the Catholic church is not likely to go back to relative passivity in politics. Including within its membership about one-fourth of the national electorate, the church feels that it has both an opportunity and a responsibility to play a significant social role. The nature of that role is now in the process of evolving.[14]

Changing Jewish Identity

Jews have formed part of the dominant political majority in every extended era of American history. They participated in the liberal coalitions that supported Jefferson and Jackson. But during the Civil War most Jews switched to the newly created Republican party, attracted by both the Republicans' opposition to slavery and their identification with the system of market capitalism through which many Jews were prospering. Although some Jews were drawn during the early decades of the twentieth century to socialism, which many among the newly arrived wave of immigrants from eastern Europe had known as a political force combating social oppression, Jews remained predominantly Republican until the latter part of the 1920s. In 1928, many Jews backed the presidential candidacy of Al Smith, who had championed the cause of urban immigrants as governor of New York, and by 1932 Jews had become heavily Democratic. In 1944, more than 90 percent of Jews supported the reelection of Franklin Roosevelt for a fourth term.

[13] *Religion in America, 1982* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Religion Research Center, 1982), 164.

[14] Thomas M. Gannon, S.J., "The Vatican and the Catholic Church in the U.S.," *Woodstock Report*, May 1985.

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During the era of Roosevelt and Harry Truman, Jews had special reasons for backing the Democratic party. Jews in general approved the economic reforms of the New Deal and regarded Roosevelt as a hero for his leadership of the democracies in the international struggle against Nazi Germany. The Democrats were given credit for supporting the founding of Israel in 1948, even though most Republican leaders also strongly backed the new state. Beyond all of these factors, the philosophy of welfare state liberalism that the Democrats espoused in national politics became a key element in defining the identity of modern American Jews.

Jews could never be more than a small minority in the United States, but liberalism seemed to give them a political vehicle both for projecting the tradition of social justice inherited from Biblical Judaism and for maintaining strict separation between church and state, which many Jews regarded not simply as a moral principle but as a condition for survival. Jews differed among themselves over the degree to which their religious customs and religious separateness should be perserved. Most agreed, however, that liberalism carried on values that were integral to Jewishness. In the 1950s, many Jewish writers found social liberalism and support for Israel to be the defining characteristics of American Judaism.[15]

Though only about three percent of the national electorate, Jews made up an important segment in the New Deal Democratic coalition. In a few major urban states controlling large blocs of electoral votes in presidential elections, particularly New York and California, Jews were concentrated in sufficient numbers to be a significant factor in determing electoral outcomes. Even more important, Jews were well above the national average in economic affluence and were heavily represented in both higher education and the communications industry. Jews helped fill Democratic campaign coffers, designed Democratic programs, publicized Democratic candidates, and provided articulate arguments for the liberal Democratic side on political issues.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Jewish identification with liberalism did not really crumble, but some of its elements began to change. For one thing, liberalism and support for Israel were no longer so obviously complementary. Some groups within the liberal community, particularly those rooted in Catholic and mainline Protestant churches, began to take up the cause of the Palestinian Arabs, and to become increasingly critical of the military and security policies of the Israeli government. The religious-ethnic principle on which Israel had been founded was after all contrary to the cosmopolitan assumptions of contemporary liberalism. During the Vietnam war, liberalism became increasingly identified with dovishness in foreign policy. As a result, liberals were generally inclined to play down hostility toward the Soviet Union. Since the Soviet Union was both persecuting its Jewish population and courting Arab favor by attacking Israel in the United Nations, many Jews regarded this liberal tendency as decidedly misguided. "Jews have come to recognize," Hyman Bookbinder, director of the Washington office of the American Jewish Committee, has said, "that we cannot

[15] Lawrence H. Fuchs, *The Political Behavior of American Jews* (New York: Free Press, 1956), 63.

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show indifference to the whole question of defense of the West if we expect the defense of Israel to be supported by the United States."[16]

On domestic issues, too, part of the liberal agenda no longer seemed so congruent with Jewish values. Liberal support for "affirmitive action" to give preference to members of racial minorities for education and economic opportunities clashed with Jewish insistence, formed through earlier Jewish experience with dominant Gentile establishments, that advancement be based solely on merit. The device of quotas, to which some proponents of affirmative action were led, reminded many Jews of quota systems through which their own progress had been limited. Jewish teachers and principals in city schools feared and opposed liberal proposals for "community control" of public education, which they believed would result in their jobs being turned over to blacks. Jews living in poorer city neighborhoods, where the crime rate was high, had little patience with liberal efforts to set up civilian review boards to curb police brutality. "Jews began to ask themselves for the first time," Nathan Glazer has written, "whether they were still liberal."[17]

A new school of "neoconservative" intellectuals, composed mainly of Jews who came from liberal or leftist origins in the politics of New York in the 1940s, developed a comprehensive critique of liberal approaches in both domestic and foreign policy. As the ideological attraction of liberalism slackened, affluent Jews began to give more weight to the fact that their economic interests were in at least short-term conflict with the liberal commitments to high taxation and rising government spending on social programs. "Some Jews," one Jewish leader said, "are beginning to vote their pocketbooks." The shift to conservatism was strongest at opposite ends of the religious spectrum, among the most orthodox Jews and among completely secularized persons from Jewish origins—the first apparently because of affinity between religious and political conservatism, the second as a result of response to conservative trends in the larger society.[18]

Well into the 1970s, none of these developments did much to shake Jewish allegiance to the Democratic party. Declining support for liberalism for most Jews was still a matter of degree. Opinion polls still found Jews far more liberal than the national average on economic, social, and foreign policy issues. In 1972, about one-third of Jews, concerned over what they regarded as George McGovern's ultra-liberalism, voted for Richard Nixon for president. But Watergate, which Jews felt confirmed their worst fears about Republicans, helped draw them back to the Democratic standard to provide a majority of more than 80 percent for Jimmy Carter in 1976.

The Carter administration, from which Jews felt culturally distant and which they regarded as incompetent in its management and misguided in many of its policies, moved a majority of Jews to depart for the first time since the 1920s

[16] Interview with Hyman Bookbinder, 18 January 1982.

[17] Nathan Glazer, *American Judaism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 178–182.

[18] Interview with Bookbinder; Donald Feldstein, *The American Jewish Community in the 21st Century* (New York: American Jewish Congress, 1984), 23, 26.

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from loyalty to the Democratic party. In 1980, Carter and Reagan each won about 40 percent of the Jewish vote, with the remaining 20 percent going to the independent candidate, John Anderson. "It was a real experience for many Jews," said Nathan Perlmutter, director of the Anti-Defamation League, "to find that they could vote Republican without their hands freezing to the lever."[19]

Reagan during his first term failed to capitalize on the Republican opportunity for substantial gains among Jews. Most Jews found the administration's policy in the Middle East unsatisfactory, and many were pained by Reagan's drive to cut spending on liberal social programs. Still, the emergence of Jesse Jackson as an important factor in Democratic politics in 1984 led many Jews once more to reassess their allegiance to the Democratic party. Jackson was perceived by Jews as anti-Semitic. He certainly received support from a few anti-Semitic rabble-rousers. By the spring of 1984, Reagan seemed to have the capacity for improving on his 1980 showing among Jews, perhaps rising above 50 percent.

Reagan's determined courtship of the religious right during the Republican convention in Dallas, and the prominent places given to some new right leaders in the Reagan entourage, ended this possibility. Jews were the one group among whom Walter Mondale made significant headway with his charges early in the fall campaign that Reagan threatened to undermine separation between church and state. In the end, as was often said at the time, most Jews decided they were more frightened of Jerry Falwell than they were angered by Jesse Jackson. Mondale won about two-thirds of the Jewish vote—a solid majority, but less than Carter had received in 1976 and far below the levels won by Democrats in the heyday of the New Deal.

Under the circumstances, it is surprising that Mondale, a New Deal Democrat in the tradition of Roosevelt and Truman, did not in 1984 do better among Jews. The election results signify that Jews as a group are not now specially happy with either major party. Many Jews would probably feel comfortable supporting a moderately conservative party, but not a party in which Christian fundamentalists hold a powerful influence. Despite the backing given by Falwell and other evangelicals to Israel, and despite their professed acceptance of separation between church and state, most Jews suspect that the ultimate aim of the religious new right is close identification of religion with government, perhaps even revival of the old idea of making the United States a "Christian nation." Republican efforts to make massive inroads among evangelicals, therefore, will probably sharply limit the party's ability to win sizable support among Jews. For the present, therefore, most Jews will probably remain Democrats, though with less enthusiasm and perhaps with less willingness to provide financial underwriting for the party's operations than in the recent past. Whether some further shifts in alignments within the parties or major changes in domestic or international conditions could shake Jews into an entirely new political identity is unclear.

[19] Interview with Nathan Perlmutter, 21 January 1982.

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Black Activism

Among black Americans, churches, organized mainly in Baptist and Methodist denominations that departed parallel white churches because of racial discrimination, for many years exercised dominant political influence. Largely lacking other sources of natural leadership, blacks turned to their clergy for political direction. "The Preacher," W.E.B. DuBois wrote, "is the most unique personality developed by the Negro on American soil. A leader, a politician, a 'boss,' an intriguer, an idealist—all of these he is, and ever, too, the center of a group of men, now twenty, now a thousand."[20] The two most successful national black political leaders to date, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Jesse Jackson, both came from the ministry, as did other prominent elected and appointed black government officials such as Adam Clayton Powell, Andrew Young, Walter Fauntroy, and William H. Gray, III.

Up to the 1950s, black church leaders generally concentrated their political efforts on advancing black interests at the local level. Blacks, some commentators have observed, could not afford to expand their meager political resources on broad national or international issues. In the late 1950s, the black clergy, led by Martin Luther King, Jr., launched the civil rights movement that led finally to passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act in 1965. The Voting Rights Act enabled blacks to register and vote in many areas where they formerly had been virtually excluded from the rights of citizenship. As a result, political life in the South was significantly altered, and blacks became more of a force in national politics.

From the Civil War to the 1930s, blacks loyally supported the Republican party, which had ended slavery and which provided such political representation as existed for black interests at the national level. The avowedly segregationist administration of Woodrow Wilson crushed any inclination blacks may have felt to join the majority of working-class whites in the Democratic party. In the South, the Democrats continued to advertise themselves as the party for white supremacy until after World War II. In 1928, Al Smith made a fair showing among blacks. But four years later, blacks voted overwhelmingly for Herbert Hoover against Franklin Roosevelt. By 1936, blacks had swung strongly to Roosevelt and the Democrats—not because the New Deal had done much to advance civil rights, but because New Deal programs were aimed at helping the poor, and the majority of blacks were among the poorest of the poor. "The key to black electoral behavior," Nancy Weiss writes, "lay in economics rather than race."[21]

Blacks remained predominantly, but not monolithically, Democratic until 1964. The opposition of Senator Barry Goldwater, the 1964 Republican presidential candidate, to that year's Civil Rights Act (on the ground that it infringed

[20] W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folks* (New York: Fawcett, 1961), 141.

[21] Nancy J. Weiss, *Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 207–210.

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on states rights) virtually wiped out remaining black support for the Republicans. Since that time, blacks have been so overwhelmingly and reliably Democratic that Republicans have largely given up trying to compete for their backing, and the Democrats, in the view of many blacks at least, have tended to take them for granted.

Among those who argued in the late 1970s that blacks' electoral behavior helped deny them influence that was their due in national politics was the Reverend Jesse Jackson, a flamboyant young minister formerly associated with Martin Luther King, who had organized Operation PUSH (People United to Save Humanity), an organization dedicated to promoting black economic progress. At times, Jackson suggested that blacks should consider organizing as an independent political force, able to hold the balance of power between the two major parties in close elections. He experimented with endorsing progressive Republicans in states like Illinois (the home base of Operation PUSH) and Pennsylvania. The election of Ronald Reagan, regarded as Goldwater's heir, as president in 1980 seemed to cut off further opportunity for collaboration with the Republicans.

In the third year of Reagan's presidency, Jackson announced that he would seek the Democratic nomination for president in 1984 as the leader of a "religious crusade" to "save the soul" of America. Most members of the black political establishment, which by now included lawyers, labor leaders, and businessmen, as well as ministers, supported the Democratic front-runner, former Vice President Mondale.[22] But the black church establishment swung massively behind Jackson. "You would be surprised at the awesome power that a minister has," said the Reverend T.J. Jemison, president of the National Baptist Convention, the nation's largest black denomination, when he endorsed Jackson for president.[23] In many black churches, Sunday morning plate collections were taken to aid the Jackson campaign. Blacks voted overwhelmingly for Jackson in the Democratic presidential primaries.

Jackson entered the Democratic convention in July with the support of about one-tenth of the delegates, most of them blacks. He failed however, to win major concessions from Mondale, who by then was ducking identification with so-called special interest groups.

During the fall campaign, drives by black churches to increase black registration produced impressive results—though smaller in numbers than those achieved by conservative white evangelicals. Black ministers supporting Mondale in the general election were even more direct in their political appeals than were their white evangelical counterparts backing Reagan. In Alabama, for example, an election day poll by CBS found that 29 percent of all Mondale voters, more than half of whom were black, had been urged by their preachers to support the

[22] Thomas E. Cavanagh and Lorn S. Foster, *Jesse Jackson's Campaign: The Priorities and the Caucuses* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Center for Political Studies, 1984), 9–14; *United Methodist Reporter*, 23 March 1984; *The New Republic*, 20 February 1984.

[23] "Jackson Gets Backing of Black Church Heads," *Washington Post*, 2 December 1983.

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Democratic candidate, compared to only 9 percent of Reagan voters who reported direct appeals by their preachers to vote for the Republican.[24] On election day, blacks, casting 90 percent of their vote for Mondale, were the one group in the former New Deal coalition that maintained historic levels of support for the Democratic ticket.

After the election, the black leadership in general and Jackson in particular entered a period of reflection on the future role of the black community in politics. Overtures by the Reagan administration to win a significant minority of blacks to the Republicans seemed to have little immediate effect. Most black politicians continue to believe that the Democratic party, despite its faults, remains the best political vehicle for black interests. Elevation of Congressman William Gray, a black clergyman from Philadelphia, to the chairmanship of the powerful House Budget Committee early in 1985 has given blacks an influential spokesman within the Democratic national leadership. But among the younger generation of blacks who supported Jackson in the presidential primaries, there has been renewed talk, encouraged by Jackson, about the option of organizing blacks as a political third force.

Future party alignment apart, the politically active black churches appeared to take from their 1984 experience a renewed zest for politics and a conviction that the churches should if anything extend their political involvements. Though some of the black churches seem to have approached or passed the limits on political action set by the Internal Revenue Code, none of the other major participants in national politics appear anxious to challenge them on the tax exemption issue—partly because conservatives, too, have in recent campaigns been benefiting from clerical support.

Mainline Protestants in Crisis

The distinction between "evangelical Protestants" and "mainline Protestants" is at best fuzzy. In general, the mainline denominations are those that have been more formal in their rituals and more inclined to promote social activism. Methodists, Presbyterians, Lutherans, Episcopalians, and the United Church of Christ (a fusion of Congregationalists and some smaller denominations from Calvinist traditions) are generally considered to be mainline, though each of these maintains significant differences from the others, and most contain a sizable evangelical component.

Before the Civil War, most of the denominations now considered mainline in-

[24] Gans, *Non-Voter Study;* Everett Carll Ladd, "Secular and Religious America," paper delivered at conference of Center on Religion and Society, 24 January 1985, tab. 27; *New York Times*, 8 November 1984. Other states in which relatively large portions of Mondale voters reported Democratic recommendations by their preachers included Mississippi, 24 percent; Texas, 19 percent; North Carolina, 15 percent; Michigan, 11 percent; and Illinois, 9 percent. In all of these states, the share of Reagan voters reporting Republican endorsements by their preachers was substantially smaller. Only seventeen states, nationally distributed, were polled on the question.

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clined toward the Whigs, partly as an expression of anti-Catholicism, but some, particularly the Methodists, the largest in membership, included large Democratic contingents. After the Civil War, the mainline churches in the North became overwhelmingly Republican, partly because the Republican party was regarded as a bulwark against growing Catholic influence, but also because Republicanism seemed to be the political embodiment of traditional Protestant virtues like industry, sobriety, fidelity, and thrift. In the South, where the evangelical influence was strong even in mainline churches, mainline Protestants for the most part adhered to the regionally dominant Democratic party.[25]

From the 1860s to the 1930s, northern mainline Protestants formed the core of the Republican party. During the Depression, some working-class Protestants switched to the Democrats, but working-class Protestants continued to be far more likely to be Republicans than were working-class Catholics. Predominant alignment of the memberships of mainline Protestant churches, making up about 30 percent of the national electorate, with the Republicans has been maintained into the 1980s. In 1980, for example, the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Reseach (ISR) found major mainline denominations voting for president as follows:[26]

	Reagan	*Carter*	*Anderson*
Episcopalians	69	25	6
Lutherans	56	31	12
Methodists	53	40	5
Presbyterians	67	24	7
United Church of Christ	57	24	4

The relatively low majority for Reagan among Methodists was probably chiefly the result of two factors: the high numbers of black Methodists, most of whom are organized in three independently organized black Methodist denominations; and the large proportion of Methodists in the South, where Carter retained some of his regional favorite-son popularity. Among northern members of the predominantly white United Methodist Church, the vote for Reagan was probably at least as high as among members of the United Church of Christ.

In 1984, a national exit poll by the *Los Angeles Times* found voting for Reagan by members of one mainline denomination, the Episcopalians, somewhat lower than had been shown by the ISR survey in 1980. Among Presbyterians, Reagan's

[25] Paul Kleppner, *The Evolution of American Electoral Systems* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1981), 124; Kleppner, *Parties, Voters, and Political Cultures* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 146.

[26] Data supplied by Institute for Social Research (ISR), University of Michigan. Persons who identified themselves as Congregationalists were included with the United Church of Christ, although there is a small Association of Congregational Christian Churches that did not join the merger with the Evangelical and Reformed Church in 1957. The samples for some denominations were small, and therefore present only the general contours of political preferences.

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support stayed about the same, though some 1980 voters for John Anderson apparently swung in 1984 to Walter Mondale. But among Methodists and Lutherans, backing for Reagan in 1984 substantially increased.[27]

	Reagan	*Mondale*
Episcopalians	60	40
Lutherans	66	34
Methodists	65	35
Presbyterians	68	32

Economic, regional, and secular ideological interests, and inherited loyalties to the Republican party, were important factors in moving substantial majorities of mainline Protestants to vote for Ronald Reagan in 1980 and 1984. But traditional Protestant values probably also played a part. The theme words of the 1980 Republican platform, "Family, Neighborhood, Work, Peace, Freedom," were practically a litany of the Protestant ethic. When Reagan called for return of "voluntary, non-denominational prayer" to the public schools and promised that under a Reagan administration "traditional moral values" would be "reflected in public policy," he appealed not only to fundamentalists, but also to many members of mainline denominations who remained loyal to conservative moral values they had learned in Protestant Sunday Schools.[28]

Surveys taken by some of the mainline denominations of their own memberships have found the laities to be moderately conservative on most social issues.[29] In 1982, the Gallup Poll questioned church members on whether they favored "increasing the amount of government spending for social programs." Among members of Protestant denominations regarded by Gallup as "mainline," 59 percent said they were opposed to such increases, and only 38 percent were in favor. Interestingly, mainline Protestants were considerably more conservative in their responses to this question than were either evangelical Protestants (49 percent favorable, 47 percent opposed), or Catholics (56 percent favorable, 43 percent opposed).[30]

The national leaderships of most of the mainline Protestant denominations, in contrast, have moved well to the left not only of the mainstream of the Republic party, which majorities among their laities support, but also of the mainstream of the more liberal Democratic party. Drawing on the tradition of the social gospel, which developed within American Protestantism around the

[27] Cited by Ladd, "Secular and Religious America," tab. 28. Differences in polling methods may account for some of the differences found by this poll and the one taken by the ISR in 1980.

[28] A. James Reichley, "A Change in Direction," in Joseph A. Pechman, ed., *Setting National Priorities: The 1982 Budget* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution), 257.

[29] *Presbyterian Panel*, March, 1976, 25; Carl F. Reuss, *Profiles of Lutherans in the U.S.A.* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1982), 49; James Foyle Miller, *A Study of United Methodists and Social Issues* (Dayton, Ohio: General Council on Ministries, United Methodist Church, 1983), 8–9.

[30] *Religion in America, 1982*, 164.

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turn of the century, and also on the more radical liberation theology originated among Catholics in Latin America in the 1960s, the national leaderships of many of the mainline denominations have undertaken a comprehensive critique of current social, economic, and political systems in the United States and of American foreign policy. In the 1960s, the Washington offices of the mainline churches, most of which had been opened only a few years before, played crucial roles in the passage of major civil rights legislation. The success of the churches on civil rights helped induce some of them to develop broader social agendas.

Since the election of Reagan in 1980, the Washington offices of the mainline churches have steadily opposed virtually all aspects of the administration's program. In May 1981, the governing board of the National Council of Churches (NCC), representing most mainline denominations, issued a manifesto charging that the Reagan administration's policies represented "a reversal of direction for this country as a whole, and threaten the vision of America as a model and embodiment of a just and humane society." The administration's philosophy, the NCC maintained, was "not just to cut back on human services, but to deny that people are entitled to them." In foreign policy, the administration "would shore up repressive regimes around the world by military assistance." The administration, the NCC's broadside concluded, represented a vision of "America as private opportunity and empire." The NCC offered an alternative vision of "America as public responsibility and compassionate neighbor."[31]

During Reagan's second term, Washington offices of many of the mainline denominations have been particularly active in opposing the administration's efforts to aid the so-called contras seeking to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. While some of the administration's right-wing allies clearly welcome combat with the church lobbies, administration leaders and spokesmen, many of whom are themselves members of mainline churches, appear uncomfortable dealing with the churches as a hostile interest group. Some administration strategists have indicated that they have not found effective means for responding to the churches' opposition.

The impact of the church lobbies on Congress is difficult to measure. In an effort to get some impression of how members of Congress perceive the church lobbies, my assistants and I contacted the offices of the thirty-four members of the House of Representatives (twenty-seven Democrats and seven Republicans) who voted against humanitarian aid to the contras on 24 April 1985, when it was defeated, and then switched to vote in favor of humanitarian aid on 12 June, when it passed (there were no switches the other way) on the theory that these would be among the offices most likely to be targeted by groups opposing aid. Since all of the members whose offices we contacted ultimately voted against the position favored by the churches, they cannot be regarded as giving a balanced impression of the church lobbies' effectiveness. But since these members as a group must have been among those most open to persuasion, the church lobbies'

[31] "The Re-Making of America: A Message to the Churches from the Governing Board of the NCC in the U.S.A.," adopted 15 May 1981.

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treatment of them, we reasoned, should provide useful insights. All of the offices contacted reported being lobbied by some church groups opposing aid to the contras, particularly Methodists, Catholics, Presbyterians, and representatives of the United Church of Christ. Only three offices reported being lobbied by any of the conservative evangelical church groups favoring aid to the contras, which the administration had encouraged to become active on the issue. Most offices reported being heavily lobbied by the administration itself.[32]

Most offices had been visited several times by Washington representatives of the churches. Only a few had been visited or called directly by persons from churches in the member's home district, but most reported moderate to heavy church-inspired mail from home district constituents. Most of the congressional assistants we talked with said the church lobbyists had made able presentations of their arguments, but only a few thought that these presentations had had much effect on how their bosses voted. Daniel Ortega's visit to Moscow soon after the April vote was frequently cited as the triggering event that had caused the representative to change to the side supporting aid to the contras in June. Some assistants working for Democratic representatives mentioned concern that the Democratic party should not appear to be weak on national defense. "The boss was interested by what the church people had to say," said one assistant, "but after awhile he felt he had got their message."

A few said their representative had been impressed by the ability of the churches to rally political support on the issue, particularly among Catholic groups, but most did not attach much political significance to the churches' opposition. In a few cases, the activities of the church lobbies were regarded as counter-productive. One assistant reported that his representative was influenced to switch to supporting aid for the contras because he resented "a demonstration that one church group staged as a media event." Ironically, another representative changed sides, according to his assistant, because "after he voted against the contras in April, for the first time in his life people began coming up to him in his Presbyterian church back home and saying they thought he had gone soft on communism."

Most mainline leaders now feel closer to the positions taken by the Democratic party than those of the Republicans, but regard both major parties with a good deal of disdain. Some church activists, particularly those working in Washington offices, would like the mainline churches to go beyond lobbying on specific issues to providing the core for a noncommunist left-wing political movement. Political goals promoted by the mainline churches, which are set forth in church pronouncements, include broad expansion of the welfare state, extension of controls on industry to protect the natural environment, elimination of role differences between the sexes, unilateral steps by the United States toward nuclear disarmament, a more conciliatory approach to the Soviet Union, cessation of opposition to leftist regimes or insurgencies in Third World countries, and mas-

[32] Interviews conducted by author, Washington, D.C., 15 July and 2 August 1985.

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sive transfer of wealth from the West to the Third World.[33] Some mainline leaders favor a vague kind of socialism, perhaps modeled on the systems they believe exist in Sweden or Cuba or Tanzania, but most maintain that the church should not be linked too closely to any systematic ideology. The role that appeals most to many of the activists is something like that played by the Greens in West Germany—a politics that rejects participation in the existing party system and seeks for the present to serve as witness for the emergence of a utopian social order sometime in the not-too-distant future.

The political activities of the churches have recently produced controversies within some of the mainline denominations, particularly the Methodists and the Presbyterians, which have been among the most active in promoting political involvement. Conservative groups have formed in some of the denominations to try to change the church's political direction. The systems of governance under which most mainline denominations function make challenges to dominant establishments difficult. But declines in membership among most mainline denominations, while some evangelical churches are experiencing rapid growth, have provided ammunition for critics demanding change.

Some of the leaders of the mainline denominations themselves have expressed concern over the evident gap separating the leaderships, and particularly the Washington offices, from the laities on political issues. Church leaders who are convinced that Christian ethics dictate political action to move the nation well to the left of current policies are faced with a painful dilemma. On the one hand, most of them adhere to the Protestant tradition that the church should be broadly representative of the convictions of all its members, laity as well as clergy, local clergy as well as national leadership. But on the other, they feel bound by their interpretation of the values and principles that attracted them to religious vocations in the first place. "The leadership of the church tries to be in tune with its constituencies," Joyce Hamlin, director of the Washington office of the Methodist Women's Division, said in an interview. "But it is much more important to be in tune with Jesus Christ than with the person in the pew."[34]

Some leaders on both sides of the debate within the mainline churches are seeking to promote reconciliation and compromise. Internal reforms have been proposed and in some cases instituted to make systems of governance in the separate denominations and in the National Council of Churches more accountable. But differences in some mainline denominations seem to go deeper than any since those that caused several churches to split at the time of the Civil War. (The Methodists were not reunited as a single church until 1939, and the Presbyterians not until 1983.) The passage immediately ahead for several mainline denominations appears difficult, and large amounts of good will and common sense among all participants will be needed to achieve successful crossings.

[33] See as examples, *Social Principles of the United Methodist Church* (General Board of Church and Society, the United Methodist Church, 1984); *Church and Society* (The Program Agency, Presbyterian Church U.S.A., July/August, 1983); *Together On the Way* (National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., 1985).

[34] Interview with Joyce Hamlin, 13 January 1982.

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Religion and Democracy

This article so far has discussed the political activities of the churches as distinct groups, pursuing separate and sometimes conflicting social objectives. But there is a sense in which religion may be viewed as a singular entity with regard to its effect on American public life. Religion, conveying the broad tenets of the Judeo-Christian tradition, has underlain the moral foundations on which democracy and republican government in the United States have been built. I have just written a book that tries to support this assertion and I will not provide further evidence or documentation for it here—except to point out that all of the principal Founding Fathers, including Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin, believed that it was true.[35] If this view of American history is at least provisionally accepted, its meaning for the future of American democracy is obviously profound.

Religion has been the underlying thread of moral unity that has held together all of our social and economic diversity. This is not to say that we have had a "civil religion," as some recently have suggested. Religion itself in the United States has been pluralist, springing from sources in belief and historic experience that far transcend the significance of the United States. But in their pluralism, the main threads of our religious tradition have fostered shared commitment to a broadly common moral perspective, expressing belief in, among other things, the sanctity of each human life, the individual's responsibility and need to establish caring relationships with other human beings, and the presence in the universe of transcendent moral authority and purpose.

If the continued viability of our political system depends on wide acceptance of these beliefs, the most important *social* function of the churches—going beyond the concerns of particular churches with abortion or economic justice or maintenance of the traditional family or support for church schools or even nuclear disarmament—is to breed and nurture the values out of which democracy grows. In a pluralist society, churches and religious groups, like all other groups, have the right and the responsibility to promote the particular social causes that coincide with their moral convictions. But if the churches become too deeply involved in the details of politics, or in the rough-and-tumble of political campaigns, they will inevitably imperil their more fundamental role as source for objective spiritual and moral values. It is part of the essence of pluralist democracy that each church or religious group must decide for itself how far it should go in promoting particular political causes. All Americans, including those who follow no religious faith, however, have a stake in the churches' keeping their directly political activities within limits that enable them to carry out their more general value-breeding function.*

[35] A. James Reichley, *Religion in American Public Life* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985).

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Cities as Partners in the Federal System

ROBERT D. THOMAS

American cities may be described by the proverbial "good news-bad news" adage. The good news is that they embody the best of our accomplishments in insitutional and commercial developments, the arts, architecture, and culture. They are the focal point of most American lives: even if we do not live in cities, we work and play in them. The bad news is that American cities house the worst of our excesses as evidenced by congestion, deterioration, pollution, crime, and poverty. Not unexpectedly, therefore, public programs for cities are mixed. Some are aimed at city growth and development, while others deal with deteriorating conditions and the increasing number of city poor.

The national public policy agenda for cities is characterized by a knowledge that "something" must be done about city problems, but lack of agreement or direction about what that "something" should be. This is not due to indifference or neglect. Every postwar administration has established programs to aid American cities generally, or central cities specifically. Many of these efforts have been enormously successful; others have not met expectations; and still others have not proceeded beyond the deliberation stage. The legacy of four postwar decades of urban programs is that national, state, and local officials are still trying to decide what's wrong, what should be done, and who (meaning national, state, and local governments, or all) should do it.

A growing consensus has emerged in recent years that city problems, now so complex and interwoven into the national fabric, cannot be solved locally. Many experts conclude, therefore, that national initiatives should direct action on city problems. Urban economists, for example, are certain that the amelioration of city conditions (whether they are social service ones such as unemployment and

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poverty, or developmental ones such as rebuilding deteriorated infrastructures) must be linked to broader national economic conditions such as deficit spending, high interest rates, and inflation.[1]

From a different perspective, a debate has ensued recently about the current state of the American federal system. Questions are raised about the system's viability: whether it is still discernibly federal, if Washington is now so dominant that the states and their localities are mere puppets controlled by dictates and directions from above. There are scholars who argue that "the system works" or "centralization is fine because it is a pragmatic response to changing needs and conditions."[2] However, many observers conclude that the federal system is becoming increasingly nationalized, and states and their localities are continously relegated to a second class political position by a bevy of national programs that direct their priorities through conditions, regulations, and mandates.[3]

The interest in cities of late has come from a national perspective. Both the urban economists and other observers of the federal system view the national scene to understand city problems. For the urban economist, city problems are defined as national problems. By implications, solutions must come from national policy makers in Congress and the executive. In a similar vein, even when they generate different conclusions about the state of the federal system, federal commentators focus on what has occurred nationally.

The latter group's assessments are about how the mercurial rise in domestic federal aid—and the policies, programs, procedures, requirements, and mandates it spawns—has altered, if at all, the nation's constitutional design. This is not to imply that there are not evaluations of what impact federal programs are having in localities. There are many, but they are almost always based on how federal programs alter or influence localities.[4] The debate centers around what has emanated from Washington. Has Congress let the system get out of control? Have Supreme Court decisions usurped state authority where states and their lo-

[1] Royce Hanson, ed., *Rethinking Urban Policy: Urban Development in an Advanced Economy* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1983).

[2] See Thomas J. Anton, "Decay and Reconstruction in the Study of American Intergovernmental Relations," *Publius* 15 (Winter 1985): 65–98; and James L. Sundquist, "In Defense of Pragmatism," *Publius* 11 (Spring 1981): 31–37.

[3] Among these are David B. Walker, *Toward a Functioning Federalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1981); David B. Bean, Timothy J. Conlan, and David B. Walker, "Federalism: The Challenge of Conflicting Theories and Contemporary Practice," in Ada W. Finifter, ed., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline* (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1983), 247–282; Daniel J. Elazar, "Is Federalism Compatible with Perfectorial Administration?" *Publius* 11 (Spring 1981): 3–22; Catherine Lowell, "Mandating: Operational Domination," *Publius* 11 (Spring 1981): 59–78; Samuel Beer, "The Modernization of American Federalism," *Publius* 3 (Fall 1973): 87–108; Samuel Beer, "Federalism, Nationalism, and Democracy in America," *American Political Science Review* 72 (March 1977): 9–21; and the following reports by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *The Federal Role in the Federal System*, Reports A-77 (July 1980), A-78 (August 1981), and A-87 (October 1980), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office).

[4] The most impressive among these are the studies started at the Brookings Institution, which include Richard P. Nathan and Charles F. Adams, Jr., *Revenue Sharing: The Second Round* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977); Nathan, Robert F. Cook, and V. Lane Rawlins,

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calities are now mere administrative subdivisions? Are federal programs now so intricate a part of the local landscape in areas ranging from welfare services, housing location, wastewater plant construction, to community development that localities are without authority to decide for themselves?

If the position and participation of localities, especially cities, is analyzed, a more complete perspective is attained about current economic and political conditions in the American federal system. Therefore, the following kinds of questions must be raised: What is the foundation of localism in the American federal system, and how does it influence current intergovernmental relations? What problems must be resolved in cities? How are these problems addressed locally and intergovernmentally? How do city problems shape national policies, programs, and resulting requirements?

The main thesis presented here is that the American federal system is wed to local socio-economic and political conditions. As these conditions shape the core issues confronting the nation's central cities today, the policies and programs designed to deal with them are structured by conflicting ends to which American federalism is directed: to mitigate the excesses of individualism through local self-government, on the one hand, but still provide for individual rights and freedoms through the larger republic, on the other hand.[5] The tendency is toward harmoniously balancing these ends, and the operations of the American federal system are directed to accomplishing cooperation among diverse and often conflicting individuals and groups.[6] Yet, conflict between these ends is inherent in the philosophical and constitutional design of the American federal system, which requires a continuous effort to attain a balance. Thus, an understanding of the conditions of the American system of intergovernmental relations is approached by an examination of how the ends of federalism are balanced. The purpose of this article is to concentrate on how that balance is or is not attained in cities to provide both a theoretical justification for studying cities and a benchmark for rethinking and evaluating current notions about American federalism.[7]

Public Service Employment: A Field Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981); and Nathan, Fred C. Doolittle and Associates, *The Consequences of Cuts: The Effects of the Reagan Domestic Program on State and Local Governments* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Urban and Regional Research Center, 1983).

[5] Martin Diamond, "The Ends of Federalism," in Daniel J. Elazar, ed., *The Federal Polity* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1974); also see Anwar Syed, *The Political Theory of American Local Government* (New York: Random House, 1968).

[6] Elazar, "Is Federalism Compatible with Perfectorial Administration?" 3–22.

[7] There is not only an assumed crisis of federal conditions, but also a crisis of thinking. We have been admonished to rethink and, possibly, reformulate our thinking about federal principles. See, for example, Daniel J. Elazar, "Federalism vs. Decentralization: The Drift from Authenticity," *Publius* 6 (Fall 1976): 9–19; and Bean, Conlan, and Walker, "Federalism." An assessment of the American federal system requires thinking about the building blocks (principles) that are the foundation of current activities. My purpose here is to make a modest beginning in heeding the call for rethinking some old ideas by giving a new perspective on old principles that structure American local governments.

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The contours of the argument presented in this article are: First, central cities confront a dilemma that is becoming increasingly more intense and difficult to resolve between a pursuit of corporate ends (the maximization of land, labor, and capital) and responding to citizens' needs that are increasingly more at odds with city elements of corporativism. Second, cities occupy a contradictory and enigmatic place in the American federal system. That reality, coupled with a federal system that encourages cross-institutional policy responses, insures that the city's dilemma becomes an intergovernmental policy problem. Third, in the process of the city's dilemma being transferred to the broader governmental arena, and as it becomes more difficult to decide how national responses should be made, an inherent philosophical conflict of American federalism intensifies: how best to guarantee individual rights? Should individual rights be provided and protected through the community (the Jeffersonian view) or through the larger political republic (the Madisonian view)? Fourth, there is evidence to suggest that efforts to reconcile individual needs (rights) with community needs (rights) are a critical condition of American federalism with consequences for current conditions. Fifth, that conflict, moreover, provides the seeds for further theory development by being empirically descriptive and suggesting a normative perspective justifying American federalism.

The City's Economic Dilemma

The Corporate Side

In their origin and development, cities are corporate enterprises. A city's economic health is driven by capital investments, jobs, and territorial expansion.[8] Growth and development is thus vital to a city in its embryonic stage and throughout its evolution. Residential, commercial, and industrial developments provide jobs, capital accumulation, and generate revenues for governmental services. Not surprisingly, therefore, a city's leadership is motivated by a chamber of commerce attitude that growth and development is the city's lifeblood.

The city's ability to maximize its corporate ends are influenced by its political authority and its governing structures and processes. For example, the maximization (or lack thereof) of land and the control or capture of labor and capital are directly affected by a city's annexation authority and the propensity of city officials to use that authority. In the nineteenth century, the availability of liberal state annexation laws and their aggressive use stimulated the growth and development of northeastern and midwestern cities.[9] In the twentieth century, these

[8] Paul E. Peterson, "A Unitary Model of Local Taxation and Expenditure Policy," *British Journal of Political Science* 9 (July 1979): 281–314; Paul E. Peterson, *City Limits* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); and Dennis R. Judd, *The Politics of American Cities*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), 1–9.

[9] Jon C. Teaford, *City and Suburbs: The Political Fragmentation of Metropolitan America, 1850–1970* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).

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same cities experienced population losses and economic decline because of their inability to expand outward.[10]

By pursuing its corporate ends (land, labor, and capital), a city generates for itself a logical pattern of growth that spreads across its boundaries and becomes metropolitan growth. That pattern of growth, moreover, places into context much of what has happened and is happening in city and metropolitan areas today.[11] The combined impact of three imperatives (demographic, technological, and economic) fuels growth and development that emanates centrifugally from a core city area outward into the metropolitan area. The demographic imperative dictates: the more people, the more the city must expand. Expansion is outward rather than upward mainly because transportation technology allows rapid access to and from the city. Economic disparities result from the first two imperatives. The "well-off" increasingly migrate or settle outside the central city and the "not well-off" are left behind.

The Reservation Side

Another socio-economic condition emerges in a city's evolution that competes with its corporativism: the city becomes a kind of reservation for a dependent underclass.[12] Cities have always been places where socio-economic contrasts are most pronounced: new-old, rich-poor, sick-well, and so forth. These differences are easily masked when a city is young; however, the reservation aspect of city growth emerges subtly as a city ages.[13] This does not occur because cities fail in their corporate endeavors but, paradoxically, because they successfully follow their logical growth patterns.

The logic of city and metropolitan growth (spreading, sprawling, and spawning new developments) leaves in its wake residuals of poverty and deterioration. The trend is most apparent in the older, industrial cities of the Northeast and Midwest. Yet, since World War II, central cities across the nation have had declining populations accompanied by a panoply of problems. In varying degrees, these problems include: fiscal weaknesses, loss of factories and businesses to the suburbs and other regions, shrinking employment, relocation of af-

[10] Kenneth T. Jackson, "Metropolitan Government Versus Suburban Autonomy: Politics on the Crabgrass Frontier" in Kenneth T. Jackson and Steven K. Schultz, eds., *Cities in American History* (New York: Knopf, 1972), 442–462. Also see Susan A. MacManus and Robert D. Thomas, "Expanding the Tax Base: Does Annexation Make a Difference?" *The Urban Interest* 1 (Fall 1979): 15–29.

[11] Edward C. Banfield, *The Unheavenly City Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 25–51.

[12] For the last decade and a half, the reservation characteristics of cities have been described by Norton Long, "The City as a Reservation," *The Public Interest* 25 (Fall 1971): 22–38; George Sternlieb, "The City as a Sandbox," *The Public Interest* 25 (Fall 1971); R. D. Norton, *City Life-Cycles and American Urban Policy* (New York: Academic Press, 1979); and President's Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties, *Urban America in the Eighties* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980).

[13] Norton, *City Life-Cycles*, 18–21.

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fluent households to the suburbs, and a growing number of poorer ones in the central city (gentrification, notwithstanding), deteriorating infrastructures, and a general reduction in the quality of life as reflected in higher crime rates.[14]

The Dilemma

The patterns are by no means uniform across the nation, yet data show that city officials are finding it more difficult to maximize the city's corporate conditions. This is illustrated by city-suburban comparisons. There are no significant impediments to the movement of capital and labor across city boundaries so long as suburban social and economic incentives are more compelling than city ones. However, some city-suburban equalization can be attained through expansion of the city's territorial boundaries. In the post-Depression years that has been the general trend. Central cities in the South and West continued to expand throughout these years, with central cities in the Northeast and to a less degree in the Midwest having no area growth in recent years. Without the option to expand, the ability to control or capture capital and labor becomes more precarious. Thus, the "money" disparity between the central city and its suburbs is intensified. There are losses in absolute employment levels for jobs, generally, and for manufacturing jobs, specifically. Central cities end up charging more (per capita taxes in 1977 were 25 percent higher in central cities than in the suburbs) and paying more (per capita expenditures of central cities exceeded those of suburbs by 35 percent) with less resources. Taxable wealth and personal income gained faster in the suburbs than in central cities.[15]

When a city's citizens are unable to pay in a ratio higher than their demands for services, then officials are faced with a dilemma that becomes increasingly difficult to resolve: reconciling the city's corporate raison d'etre with citizens' needs arising out of the city's reservation characteristics that are increasingly antagonistic to corporativism. City officials are not prepared to deal politically with an ever-increasing number of city residents who are poorer, less skilled, minority, and older. Each of these groups has needs that drain developmental resources or require that city officials focus on issues that are antagonistic to developmental pursuits such as racial tensions, crime, poverty, poor schools, residential segregation, and rising welfare rolls.

States and their localities have not shown that they are institutionally or politically equal to the task of resolving the city's dilemma. The array of institutional and structural constraints are well documented. Among the limitations on state and local governments are tax structures, forms of government, and restrictive annexation laws.[16]

[14] R. J. Vaughan, A. H. Pascal, and M. E. Vaiana, *The Urban Impacts of Federal Policies,* vol. 1 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1980).

[15] U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, *Data Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), Tables 3, a-4, and 24.

[16] Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *State and Local Roles in the Federal System, Report A-88* (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982).

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Cities as Enigmatic Political Partners

The resolution of the city's dilemma is complicated by the place of cities in the American federal system. Cities are engimatic political partners with states and the national government. Enigmatic because they are limited (and dependent) partners, yet they also enjoy a measure of independence by being the essential building blocks of a territorially-based republic.[17] Since the city's place in the American federal system has historical and philosophical roots that are embedded in the American constitutional design, it is necessary to step back momentarily and reflect on that base because it has consequences for current political practices.

Theories of Local Government

Through a long colonial history, American local governments were structured as civil communities.[18] The philosophical foundation for the civil community aspects of cities is a marriage between Thomas Jefferson's concept of local self-government and John Locke's social contract theory. Jefferson's theory asserts that individual rights are best protected in small communities. Locke's social contact theory embellished Jefferson's concept by asserting that individuals relinquished their sovereignty to the community (civil community) through a social contract. Thus, the civil community is sovereign, not the individual.[19]

As put into practice, the expression of individual rights through the community plays an important function in representative government: local governments are the protectors against the potential (or for Alexis de Tocqueville, inevitable) centralization of democratic individualism in a national government.[20] In an eloquent analysis of Tocqueville's concept of administrative decentralization, Martin Diamond shows that the Frenchman was certain that without local self-government as the "first line of defense against the 'effects of individualism,'" democratic despotism will ensue and "will be more terrible and enduring than any despotism hitherto."[21]

The constitutional design of the American polity produces a competing principle contradictory to the Jeffersonian-Lockean formulation. To insure the ex-

[17] Daniel J. Elazar, *The American Federal System: A View from the States*, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 47, 50; Russell Kirk, "The Prospects for Territorial Democracy in America," in Robert Goldwin, ed., *A Nation of States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1962); Robert D. Thomas, "Implementing Federal Programs at the Local Level," *Political Science Quarterly* 94 (Fall 1979): 419–435; and Robert D. Thomas and Vincent L. Marando, "Local Governmental Reform and Territorial Democracy," *Publius* 11 (Winter 1981): 49–64.

[18] Daniel J. Elazar, *Cities of the Prairie: The Metropolitan Frontier and American Politics* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 367–369.

[19] Syed, *Political Theory of American Local Government*, 5, 42, and 45, gives an excellent analysis of this relationship.

[20] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Schocken Books, 1972).

[21] See Diamond, "Ends of Federalism," 145.

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pression of popular sovereignty throughout the republic, the local community may be circumvented by individuals, groups, and associations who may be unable to influence the provisions of local governmental services or the politics of disbursing those services. Furthermore, representative structures and processes at the state and national levels insure that their demands are heard and responded to outside the local community. This circumvention of local political processes directly challenges local self-government. Indeed, as a guiding philosophical principle with practical (constitutional) moorings, it not only challenges but also contradicts and competes with the civil community concept of the expression of sovereignty.

The competing philosophical view of the place of localities in the American federal system finds its expression in James Madison's concept of representation. In *The Federalist*, Number 10, Madison stood the Jeffersonian-Lockean notion of local self-government on its head. He argued for an "extensive republicanism." Individuals should be able, through their representatives, to extend republicanism beyond the civil community to the civil society. They should be able to take their case outside the confines of local biases to the state legislature, Congress, or White House to overcome the potential invasion of their rights by local majorities. For Madison, individual rights are protected and selfish special interests avoided by debate and participation throughout the political system.[22] Like the Jeffersonian-Lockean concept, Madison's formulation plays an important function in representative government: local majorities are the potential invaders of the rights of citizens; thus, for Madison, individual rights must be protected in the debate processes of the larger republic.

The two sides stand in opposition not just for what they provide, but more importantly for their adherents, for what they protect against. Tocqueville's embellishment of Jefferson's local self-government concept rests on the assumption that local self-government prevents the creation of an equality of conditions. For him, an equality of conditons would emerge from an open system like the one advocated by Madison. The civil community provides for equality of opportunity and prevents democratic despotism that Tocqueville was certain would occur without local self-government as a check.[23] On the other hand, Madison warned against abuses that he was certain would occur in small communities, and called for a republicanism that was broader. "Extend the sphere," Madison contended, "and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other."[24]

The American federal system provides means for both theories of local government to exist and to compete. The openness of the system encourages the expres-

[22] *The Federalist Papers* (New York: Mentor Books, 1961), 77–84.
[23] See Tocqueville, *Democracy in America,* 113–134; and Diamond, "Ends of Federalism," 143.
[24] *The Federalist Papers*, 83.

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sion of individual rights through various levels of government. The system enjoins debate in and across levels, thus facilitating Madison's "extensive republicism." On the other hand, as important actors in the formulation and implementation of policy, local governments may check the excesses of individualism. A territorial-based federal system insures that intergovernmetnal structures and processes are wed to local governments and aid in the assertion of a community bias, as Jefferson would have liked.

Moreover, the continued existence and competition between the Jeffersonian and Madisonian theories of local government contribute to a competitive, but healthy federalism. Martin Landau provides insight into why this is true. The American federal system, he argues, is based on a theory of redundancy which "accepts the obvious limitations of any social structure . . . by treating any and all parts, no matter how perfect, as risky actors."[25] As a redundant system, it is based on competing theories of local government to arrive at the same end. While protection of individual rights is the end of both the Jefferson and Madison formulations, they differ on the means to accomplish that end: through local governments or through debate in political processes outside the local arena. The means of each produces a check on what is thought to be the risky actors and the adverse consequences of the other. For the Jeffersonian-Lockean view as extended by de Tocqueville, local self-government checks democratic despotism. For Madison's view, the individual's ability to participate directly in governmental arenas outside the community checks local majorities from excluding any individual or group from political participation.

Urban Research

As evidenced by its research output, a substantial block of urban scholarship has not understood the philosophical place of local governments in the American federal system or how the inherent conflict between the two local theories influences current political conditions. For almost two decades conclusions about urban politics have been drawn from policy outputs (expenditures in most cases).[26] The implicit assumption underlying this research is that cities are autonomous entities, a Jeffersonian-Lockean view. Given the realities of the city's place in the federal system, this is a rather myopic view. What has urban research told us about the basic political end of cities? How are cities meeting citizens' needs? Who among the citizenry benefits and loses?

A similar criticism can be leveled at many recent studies of federal grant impacts on cities. These studies begin with the assumption that increased federal aid to cities makes them more dependent, and their findings vary according to

[25] Martin Landau, "Federalism, Redundancy and System Reliability," in Daniel J. Elazar, eds., *The Federal Polity* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974), 187.

[26] This literature is reviewed by R. C. Fried, "Comparative Urban Policy and Performance," in Frederick Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science,* vol. 6, (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975).

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the degree of city dependency or independency. Again, they are based on Jeffersonian-Lockean assumptions. To be dependent, cities must lose some independence. If one accepts the Madisonian view, then dependency (regardless of federal dollars or control) is rendered moot. Individuals have simply overcome local power structures to entice national majorities to impose solutions to their problems by requiring local governments to act on them.

Research about urban areas has not adequately accounted for the political place of cities in the federal system, or the inherent conflict that centers around that position: whether individual rights should or can be best protected in the community or by the representative processes of the larger political system. A few isolated voices have attempted to persuade urban researchers that they are neglecting an important area of scholarship. Willis D. Hawley and Michael Lipsky, for example, admonish urban researchers to understand city political processes within the larger political context of which they are a part. "Ironically," they tell us, "the more political scientists recognize the need to determine the relationship between political processes and the impact of these processes on people, the more aware we become of how difficult it is to separate urban processes from the influences of other governments." What is required, Hawley and Lipsky argue, is for scholars of federalism and intergovernmental relations to provide "research on the political consequences of intergovernmental relations [and] to conceptualize the nature of these relationships so that a framework in which they might be analyzed parsimoniously can be developed." They conclude, however, that current theory fails to provide much more than a description of interjurisdictional politics.[27]

Paul E. Peterson has accepted Hawley and Lipsky's challenge by establishing a theoretical perspective on the city's policy place in the American federal system. Since cities do not have the same authority as the states and the national government, Peterson argues, "there are crucial kinds of public policies that [they] simply cannot execute." City powers are "exercised within very noticeable constraints [which means] their political processes take on a shape very different from that taken by national political processes." Therefore, urban public policy must be explained within the socio-economic and political context of the larger political system. Peterson then shows that cities actively encourage developmental policies that enhance the local economy, tolerate allocational policies that are necessary for housekeeping purposes, and reject redistributive policies because they negatively affect the local economy.[28]

Peterson has taken an important first step in sorting out the policy dimensions of cities as they are a part of the larger political system. Implicit in his formula-

[27] Willis D. Hawley and Michael Lipsky, et al., *Theoretical Perspectives on Urban Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), 3. For a much earlier argument that the funding for city problems such as urban poverty had to be transferred to the national arena and that cities could not save themselves, see Demetrios Caraley, "Is the Large City Becoming Ungovernable?" in Robert E. Connery and Demetrios Caraley, eds., *Governing the City* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), 206–223.

[28] Peterson, *City Limits*, 13–15, 41–50, and 66–92.

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tion is a perspective on who benefits and loses in the local and national political arenas, and how city demographics have outstripped city capabilities. It is especially important to assess, in light of Peterson's framework, how cities influence redistributive programs, which are anathema to their corporate raison d'etre in their formulation and implementation.

While Peterson's initial work should be embellished to consider how city problems and capabilities mold the national domestic policy agenda, his inferential leap into the prescription that "once the particular limits on local government are defined, one can establish a theory of government structure that assigns certain functions to the central government and others to local governments" ignores the fundamental political position of cities and their citizens in the federal system. Since the politics of the system attempt to mesh the Jefferson and Madison theories of local government, Peterson's conceptual premise about the city's limits deals with only half the issue. The place of the city in the federal system fundamentally affects the policy choices that are made in other arenas of government. Therefore, to prescribe a mechanistic, dual federal system, one which is predicted on efficiency, does not account for the underlying political end to which the federal system is aimed. Peterson alerts us to the fact that redistributive programs are anathema to the city's corporate pursuits, but he does not account for the political influence of cities and their citizens in structuring these programs or the ultimate political consequences of that influence.

What is argued below is that city politics are part of national politics and are influential in the formulation and implementation of national policy. This fact means political issues that emerge from local conditions are debated in national institutions. Thus, when city problems (for my purposes, the city's dilemma) are transferred to other levels of government, conflict between the two means of expressing individual rights is inevitable. The effort to provide for individual rights either through the community (a Jeffersonian response) or through representative processes outside the community (a Madisonian response) largely structures national solutions to urban problems. An examination of how the two responses are reconciled aids in explaining current conditions of the American federal system, on the one hand, and evaluating current assessments, on the other hand.

The City's Dilemma as an Intergovernmental Problem

The evidence is overwhelming that the national government's role in almost all spheres of domestic programs has grown enormously in the last fifty years. Significant structural changes such as the Sixteenth Amendment, which puts dollars in the federal treasury, and the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, which oriented Congress to special interests, have institutionalized national involvement by providing Congress with the resources and propensity to aid cities.[29]

[29] See, for example, Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1969); and Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Report A-78, 60–70.

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TABLE 1

Federal Aid for Fifty-One Largest U.S. Cities: 1967, 1972, 1977

	All Cities		
Federal Aid[a]	*1967*	*1972*	*1977*
1. Per Capita	7.68	21.06	102.20
2. Percentage Own Sources	9.30	17.00	56.70

[a] Federal aid for these cities includes only direct receipts from the federal government.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. *Classification Manual, Government Finances* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 27.

While various forms of city assistance from both the state and national governments have historically been the norm, direct federal assistance to cities is a recent phenomenon.[30] As shown in Table 1, per capita federal aid for the nation's fifty-one largest cities was thirteen times higher in 1977 than in 1967, rising from $7.68 to $102.20, with the greatest increase coming between 1972 and 1977. The "intergovernmentalization" of city finances was complete by 1977, when federal dollars had grown to 57 percent of local revenue sources.

These figures reveal the rapid growth of federal fiscal involvement in cities; however, they do not show the charactersitics of that involvement. First, the present array of city programs grew out of efforts to aid cities in their corporate (private economic) endeavors. The underlying theory guiding that aid was that if cities pursued their natural course (corporativism), then the spoils would "trickle down" and provide for all citizens.[31] The "big buck" programs of federal aid for cities over the years have provided funds to construct projects that enhance growth and development such as drainage, flood control, sewage treatment, and transportation.

Second, capital-intense programs have not revitalized cities to stem the tide of an ever-increasing underclass.[32] What has evolved, growing largely out of and aimed at perpetuating the private sector's economic pursuits, are national responses to the reservation side of the dilemma. In some cases, programs recently developed are directed specifically at needy people. The longer-running trend, however, has been to deal with the city's reservation problems through capital intensive programs. For example, general policy or procedural conditions to protect minorities, the disadvantaged, and the elderly, as well as others, are attached to building programs designed to stimulate a city's economy. In this way, federal assistance programs are used to entice cities to deal with problems that are usually perceived to be antagonistic to their corporate pursuits.

Third, the results are less than neat and tidy. To understand these results and their ramifications requires not only an analysis of national growth, but a per-

[30] Daniel J. Elazar, *The American Partnership* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

[31] Judd, *Politics of American Cities*, 2–9.

[32] See footnote 12 above.

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spective on local activities as well. For example, when viewed as a response to the city's dilemma, there is evidence that on early federal programs to aid the economic development of cities, the national government responded to specific grassroots needs, as they were defined by local elites. After World War II, the national government responded to changing socio-economic conditions and hardships in cities by considering problems such as sewage treatment, economic development, airport construction, and housing as national in scope. However, local officials could select these programs if their local economic and political conditions allowed them, or they could reject them. If chosen, local officials also accepted federal conditions. The stage was then set for tying crosscutting requirements to aid individuals (for example, civil rights and affirmative action) to programs for economic development.[33] Consequently, these programs now blend both corporate and reservation objectives. For example, programs directed to developmental problems of the inner cities are presumably coupled with reservation benefits. The evolution of urban renewal to model cities to community development depicts this trend.

The nationalization of the city's dilemma suggests that the city, as a political jurisdiction, is not a barrier to programs addressed specifically to city problems being decided in the national political arena. Neither does the city impede its citizens from circumventing local jurisdictions to attain what they desire from the national government, if it suits their purposes. In recent years, representatives of the underclass, lower income groups, and those locked out politically in cities have with increased frequency by-passed local political processes to mount campaigns to form national coalitions to have programs enacted that address their local conditions and give them more political clout in local political processes.[34] From the local perspective, the increased successes that these groups have had in attaining national assistance suggests that Madison's "extensive republicanism" is alive and well in allowing these groups to overcome local inertia, capabilities, and biases.

But Madison's "extensive republicanism" is not exclusionary. When lower-income groups, minorities, women, and welfare clients, among others, journey

[33] This general evolution and its consequences is discussed by Deil S. Wright, *Understanding Intergovernmental Relations,* 2nd ed. (Monterey, Calif.: Brooks-Cole, 1982), 43–82. The trends in Houston, Texas are examined by Robert D. Thomas and Richard Murray, *Growth and Governance in Houston* (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming).

[34] Several reasons have been suggested for increased national activities among various groups. Deil S. Wright, *Federal Grants-in-Aid: Perspectives and Alternatives* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1968), 32, argues that it is simply a practical matter of maximizing group efforts. Why pursue minor victories in numerous localities when there is a potential to achieve a national policy with across-the-nation consequences? Kenneth V. Green, "Some Institutional Considerations in Federal-State Fiscal Relations," in James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison, eds., *The Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of Economics,* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), 236–254, contends that lower-income groups are motivated by economics. For them, it is better to shift the fiscal burden to the national level and equalize costs rather than fund programs out of regressive local revenue sources that burden lower income groups the most.

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to Washington more frequently and with more success, they inevitably find economic interests such as business well entrenched. They also find well-organized public interest groups representing practically all local officials, from mayors to budget officials. What this presumes is that the values and prejudices of the community and its economic interests stand side by side with the values and prejudices of individuals and groups not represented adequately in the community. At the core of the debate in the national arena, therefore, is competition between a community definition of priorities and a more general, expanded group definition within the framework of "extensive republicanism."

The implication is that the city's dilemma is transferred to the national arena, and there is the opportunity for both sides to be represented. But even if a community bias is not fully asserted into national programs, the politics of implementation require that national program priorities conform to local ones through negotiations and bargaining. Studies have shown that there is a reassertion of state and local priorities in the implementation of national programs that have clearly defined national goals.[35] Thomas Anton asserts, further, that although national programs have clearly had an impact on state and local government structures and the processes of state and local politics, we should not conclude that federal assistance has completely altered state or local program priorities. He explains:

> It is far less clear that the activities stimulated by federal assistance have represented federal, rather than state or local, priorities. For one thing, federal program priorities are seldom very clear: Congressional coalitions strong enough to pass programs are far easier to build if goals remain vague rather than precise. For another, most (two-thirds) grants are distributed according to some formula, usually one that includes population among its terms, which discourages strict application of program performance criteria in fund distribution. Block grants, whose generally-loose definitions of multiple-purposes are designed to maximize state and local discretion, not only discourage strict performance criteria but render the use of such criteria virtually impossible. Significant enough, both formula-based and block grants expanded much more rapidly during the 1970s than did the more tightly-constrained category of project grants. Recent dramatic increases in federal grants to state and local governments, in short, have been accompanied by the growing utilization of program instruments that reduce federal programmatic requirements.[36]

What is being suggested here is that the policy-making process, which is a reflection of the federal system, encourages a *politics of inclusion* as a means of finding a balance between a Jeffersonian concept of local self-government and a Madisonian one. This process is built on the premise that various interests

[35] See, for example, Charles O. Jones, *Clean Air* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975); Robert D. Thomas, "Intergovernmental Coordination in the Implementation of National Air and Water Pollution Policies," in Charles O. Jones and Robert D. Thomas, eds., *Public Policy Making in a Federal System* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1976); and Helen Ingram, "Policy Implementation Through Bargaining: The Case of Federal Grant-In-Aid," *Public Policy* 25 (Fall 1977): 499–520.

[36] Anton, "Decay and Reconstruction," 77.

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should not only get a piece of the action but also can complicate the process by thwarting the actions of other interests. In order to attain compromise at the national level, which by definition means accepting less than what is considered optimal, there must be accommodation among a network of factions whose complexity is far greater than those that exist at the local level. Yet the process also requires that these general, national compromises undergo a second round when they are implemented in local areas. The politics of inclusion lead to compromises that are drawn in generalities rather than in specifics. These generalities rarely mesh with circumstances of specific local problems. Thus, throughout the policy-making process, there is an inherent conflict between a community definition of needs and a national one. The federal system insures that there are policy processes that check each other.

Conclusion

From a local vantage point, the federal system produces avenues for securing individual rights that are pointed in contrary directions. One is a Jeffersonian-Lockean view that a community definition of needs is optimal, while the other accepts the Madisonian doctrine that the political processes of the larger republic will insure a more equitable definition of needs. Both perspectives are woven into the fabric of American politics in such a way that each is intended to mitigate the excesses of the other. The ultimate political purpose of the federal system is to produce a balance between the two competing ends.

What complicates that effort is the intensification over time of socio-economic and demographic problems that are beyond the resource capabilities and political propensities of cities to resolve. These problems, associated with the reservation characteristics of cities, are nuisances to be dealt with so they do not interfere with the city's corporate purpose. Yet, as these problems engulf increasing numbers of city residents, they cannot be ignored.

The federal system, operating in competing directions, provides the forum through which the politics of the city's dilemma is played out. On the one hand, the federal system operates as an escape valve to relieve pressure on the city's dilemma. City political processes are circumvented largely because they are not responsive to a growing portion of their residents. On the other hand, the federal system remains wed to localities. When problems outside the city's capabilities or purpose are addressed in the national arena, policy solutions do not radically change cities. Rather, they are specifically formulated to strengthen city capabilities, stimulate the development of new capabilities, or superimpose new structures and responsibilities on cities without usurping their powers. A politics of inclusion operates in the federal system to make local biases important in national policy-making processes.

Public policy is not driven solely be either a local or national definition of need. It is the outcome of compromises between the two. The result is a somewhat confused pattern of functional responsibilities between and among governments in the American federal system. Yet, a neat division of functions, even for

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those reservation problems that are antagonistic to the city's corporate pursuits, cannot and should not be expected. The underlying philosophy driving policy making for American cities is to protect individual rights through competing processes to mitigate what Martin Landau refers to as the risky actors of each side. The American federal system, from a local perspective, is geared to reject a division of responsibilities, especially under the complex socio-economic circumstances that confront American cities in the 1980s.

The message in this article, in short, is that the inherent political conflict between a Jeffersonian-Lockean definition of individual needs and a Madisonian one, and how it is resolved in the intergovernmental process provides both a normative ideal and an empirical referent by which the operations of the American federal system may be evaluated.*

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The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Reappraisal

JOHN J. SBREGA

Throughout his years as a wartime leader and diplomat, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to arrange an enduring peace that would last long into the postwar era. With Europe exploding in September 1939, Roosevelt announced that "the influence of America should be consistent in seeking for humanity a final peace, which will eliminate . . . the continued use of force between nations."[1]

Despite the immediate domestic and international demands of the war, some historians have criticized Roosevelt for being generally uninterested in postwar planning.[2] Nevertheless, whenever he allowed himself to think about the *postwar* world, he did so frequently in terms of the problems of the *prewar* world. In other words, he wanted to remove permanently the conditions that had blighted international affairs during his lifetime.

Colonialism was foremost in his mind among the obstructions to international comity, peace, and justice. For example, at the Casablanca conference in January

[1] Samuel I. Rosenman, comp., *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York: Macmillan, 1941), VIII, 460–64.

[2] See, for example, Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 358–59; Wm. Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 439–40; Francis Lowenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, eds., *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1975), 75.

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1943, Roosevelt lectured one of his sons, "Don't think for a moment, Elliot, that Americans would be dying in the Pacific tonight, if it hadn't been for the short-sighted greed of the French and the British and the Dutch. Shall we allow them to do it all, all over again?" The President relied on his intuitive conviction that a restoration of imperial systems after the war would lead inevitably to other, more horrible wars. Historians seeking to penetrate Roosevelt's "heavily forested interior" travel uncertain ground. He rarely revealed his *exact* thoughts to anyone, but his wartime diplomacy, whenever addressing the postwar era, seems constant in opposition to colonialism and support for dependent peoples to achieve independence. The President's direction, however, proved fraught with diplomatic dangers, and one contemporary critic, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, felt that Roosevelt, in molding his postwar vision, was "juggling balls of dynamite, whose nature he failed to understand."[3]

American Suspicions of British Colonialism

A projected international organization after the war complemented not only Roosevelt's general scheme of the United States playing a leading role in global affairs but also his specific ideas about promoting dependent peoples toward the goal of independence. In August 1941, Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill produced (or at least announced) the Atlantic Charter. In calling for "the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security," the two statesmen alluded to the eventual creation of an international organization. It is significant to note that the Atlantic Charter, in Point Three, affirmed "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." The language of Point Three would cause much mischief in the Roosevelt-Churchill "special relationship" during World War II. Roosevelt interpreted Point Three as a distinct preliminary phase in the dismantling of colonial empires, but Churchill believed the language was compatible with the existing British imperial system.[4]

[3] Elliott Roosevelt, *As He Saw It* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), 114–15; Anthony Eden, *The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Lord of Avon: The Reckoning* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), II, 433. For more on the President's view of colonialism as a cause of war, see Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*, 3, 222, 538; Foster Rhea Dulles and Gerald Ridinger, "The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," *Political Science Quarterly* 70 (March 1955): 1. The "heavily forested interior" phrase may be found in Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), 882.

[4] See, for example, E. Roosevelt, *As He Saw It*, 38; Christopher Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan, 1941–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 102–3, 214–15; diary entry, 14 August 1941, Joseph C. Grew Papers, Diary, folder 3, Items 5522-23, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. See also the text of Churchill's remarks to the House of Commons on 9 September 1941 in Great Britain, Parliament, *Parliamentary Debates* (House of Commons) 5th ser., vol. 374 (9 Sept.-11 Nov. 1941), cols. 67–74; also see Leo Amery, Secretary of State for India and Burma, memorandum, "Interpretation of Point III of Atlantic Declaration in Respect of the British Empire," WP(G)(41)85, 29 August 1941, CAB 67/9,

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During the war numerous episodes served to disrupt Anglo-American cooperation by feeding American suspicions that narrow imperial interests, not total victory, motivated the British war effort. To cite just two early examples of this underlying Anglo-American friction: the circumstances surrounding the military collapse of the American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command[5] and the alleged British seizure at Rangoon of lend-lease goods destined for China[6] both reinforced American perceptions that the British were maneuvering to ensure the postwar restoration of the Empire rather than the quickest possible defeat of the enemy. But these episodes comprised only part—the specific British variety—of the more general pattern of Roosevelt's anticolonial thinking.

In 1942 another problem involving British colonialism led Roosevelt and his administration to a broad examination of the postwar status of all dependent peoples. Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his wife visited India in February. After talking with Mahatma Gandhi, who assured his visitors that the Allies would never treat China as an equal partner, Chiang tried to enlist the aid of Roosevelt for a joint offer of mediation designed, in effect, to pressure the British to grant the demands of Gandhi's Congress Party. Churchill, however, remained obdurate. He lectured the Generalissimo that "the best rule for Allies to follow is not to interfere in each other's internal affairs . . . . I should like to

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Public Record Office, London (henceforth referred to as PRO); Lord Moyne, Colonial Secretary, memorandum, "Interpretation of Point III of Atlantic Declaration in Respect of the British Colonies," WP(G)(41)89, 2 September 1941, CAB 67/9, PRO.

[5] For information on the ill-fated ABDA Command and the alleged refusal by the British Commander, General Archibald Wavell, to accept assistance from the Chinese, see Lord Wavell, *Despatch by the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the South-West Pacific: 15 January 1942 to 25 February 1942* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO), 1948); also United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), IV, 755 (henceforth referred to as *FRUS*); *FRUS, 1941*, V, 531; Foreign Office (FO) to Lord Halifax, British Ambassador in Washington, 11 July 1942, FO 371.31811, F. 4740/4/23, PRO; see the three telegrams dated 12 February 1942: General Sir John Dill, Head of British Joint Service Mission in Washington, to Churchill, Churchill to Dill, Churchill to Roosevelt, in General the Lord Ismay Papers, folder "PM's tels.—1942," Liddel Hart Military Center, King's College, London (henceforth referred to as Ismay Papers); WM(42)130, 28 September 1942, CAB 65/27, PRO; WM(42)136, 8 October 1942, CAB 65/28, PRO; Wavell to British Chiefs of Staff, 27 October 1942, FO 371.31811, F 7443/4/23, PRO; COS(43)127(0), 17 June 1943, CAB 69/71, PRO.

[6] For information on Chinese and American suspicions that the British were confiscating lend-lease goods at Rangoon destined for China (especially aboard the USS *Tulsa* in December 1941), see FE(41)125, 25 June 1941, CAB 96/4, PRO; *FRUS, 1941* V, 729–35; Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to Lord Halifax, 7 January 1942, PREM 3-90/2, PRO; Lord Beaverbrook-Harry Hopkins correspondence, December 1941, in Lord Beaverbrook Papers, folder D/28 (formerly in Beaverbrook Library), House of Lords, London (henceforth referred to as Beaverbrook Papers); Governor of Burma to Amery, 29 December 1941, PREM 3-90/2, PRO; Clarence Gauss, American Ambassador to China, to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, State Department Files, RG 59 (henceforth referred to as SD), 893.24/1236, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (henceforth referred to as NA); Hull to Gauss, 31 December 1941, SD 893.24/1246, NA; Eden to Halifax, 7 January 1942, PREM 3-90/2, PRO; Maxwell Hamilton memorandum, 15 January 1942, SD 893.24/1266, NA.

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place on record the fact that no British Government of which I am the head, or a member, will ever be prepared to accept such mediation on a matter affecting the sovereign rights of His Majesty, The King Emperor."[7]

Roosevelt clearly sympathized with the approach suggested by Chiang. In fact, the President had previously toyed with the notion of asking the British to elevate India to the status of a dominion, but he deferred to the arguments presented by the State Department against interfering in this British imperial issue. Although he withdrew from further embroilment over India, Roosevelt, nonetheless, assured Chiang of "the deep interest of this Government, both under its longstanding policy and especially under the provisions of the Atlantic Charter, in independence for those who aspire to independence."[8]

The fallout from this diplomatic eruption over India carried two important by-products for Roosevelt in his handling of colonial questions. The first revealed the unyielding resolve of Churchill to brook no outside interference in British imperial arrangements. The President probably already had no doubts on this point, but the Prime Minister reinforced the impression that he would remain a determined foe to any attempt by the President to dismantle colonial systems after the war. The second came as a warning from Laughlin Currie, in Asia as Roosevelt's personal adviser, that the United States was becoming identified in Asian eyes with British imperialism.[9] Currie's report held far-reaching implications for Roosevelt's views about decolonization. The colonial powers were benefiting from the apparent American indifference, despite the President's protest to the contrary concerning American attitudes.

One of the major stumbling blocks to Roosevelt pursuing a more vigorous internationalist (including anticolonial) diplomacy stemmed from his impression that a sizable number of Americans still embraced the noninterventionism-isolationism of the interwar years. As late as the 1945 Yalta Conference, Roosevelt declared, "I can get the people and Congress to cooperate fully for peace but not to keep an army in Europe a long time. Two years would be the limit." Two years earlier, he decided to propose the projected "Four Power Pact" in the form of a declaration in order to avoid the need for ratification by the Senate. Roosevelt has been criticized for overestimating the strength of isolationism among the American people, but he undoubtedly saw himself as the leader in shaping American internationalist attitudes.[10]

[7] Churchill to Chiang Kai-shek, 26 August 1942, Ismay Papers; see also Chiang Kai-shek to Roosevelt, 30 July 1942, enclosed in Roosevelt to Churchill, 30 July 1942, PREM 4-45/4, PRO; Chiang Kai-shek to Churchill, 27 February 1942, PREM 3-167/1, PRO; Chiang Kai-shek to T.V. Soong, 19 April 1942, OPD Executive File 10, Item 196, Modern Military Branch, NA; Churchill to Viceroy of India and Churchill to Chiang Kai-shek, both 3 February 1942, Ismay Papers, and related correspondence in PREM 4-45/4, PRO; and *FRUS, 1942*, I, 593–750.

[8] *FRUS, 1941*, III, 179–81; *FRUS, 1942*, I, 715–17.

[9] Currie to Roosevelt, 11 August 1942, SD 740.0011PW/2718, NA.

[10] For a noteworthy example of the criticism, see Gaddis Smith, *American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941–1945* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), 9–10; *FRUS, The Confer-*

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Were American criticisms of colonialism genuine or merely a ruse to conceal intentions in Washington to supplant prewar European imperialism with a postwar American version? Roosevelt had to consider—and juggle—conflicting pressures that reached his desk. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff clearly desired to gain sovereignty over the Japanese mandated islands, (the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana island groups of Micronesia) when the war ended. The Joint Chiefs arranged to eliminate the subject of trusteeship from the agenda of the Anglo-American conference on postwar planning at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944, and a retired admiral subsequently warned Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet, that the question of trusteeship "will require considerable vigilance on the part of our military people to counter the utopian ideas of the International Welfare Group." Officials and associates in the State Department represented the bulk of these utopian dreamers.[11]

The President's cabinet, too, was divided. Secretary of State Cordell Hull voiced the State Department dreams, but Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson adopted a somewhat less idealistic approach. "They are not colonies," Stimson explained, as he described the Japanese mandated islands, "they are outposts, and their acquisiton [by the U.S.] is appropriate under the general doctrine of self-defense by the power which guarantees the safety of that area of the world." Even the self-proclaimed curmudgeon, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, entered this particular fray. He argued with Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal about whether civilian or naval administrators would govern postwar trusts—if or when (they argued about that too) such territories were acquired.[12]

As always, opinions in Congress reflected the usual mix across the political spectrum. The old isolationist spirit persisted, especially under the leadership of influential people like Senator Arthur Vandenberg. It should be noted, however, that the powerful chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Tom Connally, held strong views about the postwar security requirements of the United States. "I don't want to be morally in the wrong," he declared during a

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ences at Malta and Yalta, 617; Harley A. Notter memorandum, "Notes January 1942-December 1943," RG 59, Harley Notter Files, folder "Recollections," box 1, NA (henceforth referred to as Notter Files).

[11] See Minutes of Inter Divisional Area Committee Meeting #176, 21 December 1944, Notter Files, folder "CAC Reports," box 54; 1945 memorandum, "Pacific Bases," George Blakeslee Papers, Clark University, Worcester, Mass., Blakeslee memorandum, "Japan: United States: Disposition of the Mandated Islands," 29 January 1945, Notter Files, folder "CAC Docs Und.," box 53; General George C. Marshall to Hull, 3 August 1944, *FRUS, 1944*, I, 699–703; Russell Willson (Vice-Admiral, Retired) to Ernest J. King, 13 March 1945, Notter Files, folder "Drafting Book of Trusteeship at San Francisco," Book III, box 275; author's interview with General Sir E.I.C. Jacob, 29 June 1973, Woodbridge, England.

[12] See, for example, Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), I, 1706–7; *FRUS, Yalta*, 78–81, 793; Ickes to James Forrestal, 1 November 1944, RG 48, Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior, folder "Territories—General," NA.

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discussion about the Japanese mandated islands, "but I want those islands." Congress foreshadowed American involvement in a world organization by passing resolutions offered by Senator Tom Connally and Representative J. William Fulbright that called for "the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and maintain a just and lasting peace."[13]

From London, His Majesty's Government also joined the chorus of advocates for a greater measure of American participation in postwar international arrangements. On several occasions, for instance, the Churchill cabinet urged the United States to take over blocks of ex-enemy territory that were either desirable or strategically important. Once again, the Japanese mandated islands received prominent attention. Rather than fret over possible imperialist tendencies and acquisitive instincts in the United States after the war, most British officials expressed quite an opposite concern: the probability that Americans would lapse into the same isolationism that the British thought had paralyzed American policy in the interwar period. The British wanted the United States to stay actively involved in international affairs and to assume the global responsibilities befitting a superpower. This would not only ease the anticipated postwar burdens on the strained resources of the Empire, but the British hoped it would position the United States around the globe in ways that would buttress British interests. The "special relationship," consequently, would continue as a benefit to His Majesty's Government. Therefore, most British policymakers—even the skeptical Colonial Secretary Oliver Stanley—encouraged American participation on the postwar global scene. Churchill promoted this spirit when he advised the Dominion prime ministers: "We should do well not to resent but rather to welcome American interest in the British Colonial Empire, and there would be advantages in so arranging our affairs that the United States joins in public acceptance of a line of policy towards Colonial peoples and their development." Where British criticism or ill-feeling against Americans existed, it was not out of suspicions of United States imperialism (as is argued by some contemporary historians) but rather out of such motives as blind frustration because of the war and the malevolent influence of notable American Anglophobes such as Leo Crowley (Lend-Lease administrator), Frances J. Spellman (Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of New York), and the connection between Laughlin Currie (an aide to Roosevelt) and Owen Lattimore (a Johns Hopkins expert in Asian affairs).[14]

[13] For the texts of the two resolutions, see House Concurrent Resolution #25, *Congressional Record*, 78th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 89, 7729 (21 September 1943); Senate Resolution no. 192, ibid., 9222 (5 November 1943). See also Arthur Vandenberg to Hull, 29 August 1944, Notter Files, folder "I.O.—Int'l. Discussions," box 168; Minutes of American Delegation Meeting, 1 June 1945, Notter Files, "Stettinius Diary," vol. II, box 283.

[14] On Currie-Lattimore, see Sir Ronald I. Campbell (British Embassy, Washington) to Foreign Office, 5 September 1943, FO 371.35994, Z 9726/2/17, PRO; on Monsignor Spellman, see Sir D'Arcy Osborne, British Minister to the Vatican, to Foreign Office, 1 March 1943, FO 371.37543, R 2044/912/57, PRO; on Crowley, see Ray Atherton to H. Freeman Matthews, 10 February 1944, RG 59, Files of H. Freeman Matthews, folder "A," box 1, NA. Also see B. O. Gerig memorandum of

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Roosevelt's General Views

In the face of all these pressures, Roosevelt moved cautiously within his general design. He was not insensitive to the apparent conflict between political ideals and military realities. Nevertheless, he managed to remain fairly firm. En route to the Cairo Conference in November 1943, he lectured the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the benefits of his trusteeship scheme. He later told State Department officials that the military views ran counter to the Atlantic Charter. Nor did Roosevelt believe that outright American control of ex-enemy territory or important strategic locations was necessary; he cautioned, "All that we would accomplish by that would be to provide jobs as governors . . . for inefficient Army and Navy officers or members of the civilian career service." Yet by the time of the Yalta Conference in early 1945 Roosevelt admitted that, "from the point of view of military security alone," the United States might have to assume administrative responsibility for some areas. He insisted, however, that the United Nations Organization must retain overall supervisory authority.[15]

In fact, there is a direct connection between the President's support for a postwar world organization and his designs for decolonization. Cautiously, and hoping to avoid the troubles Woodrow Wilson encountered in advocating American membership in the League of Nations, he prepared the American people for an active role in international affairs through the projected world organization. Talking with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in March 1943, the President envisaged a world organization with three parts: a General Assembly of all nations (to "blow off steam"); an Executive Council of the Big Four Powers (U.S., Britain, Soviet Union, and China); and an Advisory Council made up of the Big Four plus six or eight other nations. Roosevelt insisted that China be included in the Big Four as part of a worldwide concept as opposed to regional groupings, which he said the American people would oppose. Eden relayed his impression to Churchill that "it is through their feelings for China that the President is seeking to lead his people to accept international responsibilities."[16]

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conversation with Stanley, P. Gore-Booth, L. Pasvolsky, and C. Taussig, 18 January 1945, Notter Files, folder "A Docs," box 3; also Churchill circular message, 11 December 1942, PREM 4-42/9, PRO; Great Britain, Parliament, *Parlimentary Debates* (House of Commons), 5th ser., vol. 379 (8 January-19 February 1942), cols. 82–174; T.C. Achilles to Secretary of State, 9 January 1942, SD 711.41/523, NA. On 8 January 1942, the House of Commons erupted in an outburst of anti-American rhetoric which Achilles, a State Department analyst, described as "a blowing off of steam after two years of British restraint with respect to the United States." For more examples of British war frustration, see Victor Cavendish-Bentinck (Foreign Office) memoranda: 15 September 1943, FO 371.35921, F 4871/1422/61, PRO, and 30 October 1943, FO 371.35921, F 5608/1422/61, PRO.

[15] Halifax (reporting Roosevelt's views) to the Foreign Office, 24 December 1944, FE(45)2, 11 January 1945, CAB 96/5, PRO; *FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran*, 197; War Department memorandum, "U.S. Post-War Pacific Bases," n.d., George Marshall Papers, George C. Marshall Foundation, Lexington, Va., folder 38, box 81; FE(45)1, 17 January 1945, CAB 96/5, PRO.

[16] Eden to Churchill, WP(43)130, 28 March 1943, CAB 66/35, PRO. See also WM(43) 53, SSF, 13 April 1943, CAB 65/38, PRO; Ralph Bunche memorandum, 7 April 1945, RG 59, Leo Pasvolsky Files, folder "1945," box 7, NA; John Hickerson to Fred Mallon, 24 March 1943, RG 59, John Hick-

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Through the international organization, in turn, Roosevelt hoped to facilitate the process of decolonization. The organization, reflecting American predominance, would develop machinery to supervise dependent areas—including the prewar colonies of the western powers. Within the context of his anticolonial impulse it is possible to identify two main and interrelated threads of presidential action. First, Roosevelt worked for the creation of a world organization; and second, he developed the concept of territorial trusteeship for dependent areas.

At first, the President spoke of a trusteeship system run entirely by the Big Four. During his conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov on 1 June 1942, Roosevelt asserted that the "white nations" could not expect to hold on to their colonies. To overcome the harsh fact, at least in his mind, that some dependent peoples were simply not ready for independence, Roosevelt proposed an international territorial trusteeship for these areas. Under the supervision of the Big Four, the dependent peoples would be guided to eventual independence. Later, however, Roosevelt shifted his concept of trusteeship to the international organization instead of the Big Four. He may well have been brought to this change when it became evident that China was in no position to assume responsibilities as one of the Big Four global policemen. In addition, officials from the State Department and the British Foreign and Colonial Offices opened discussions in August 1942 concerning the formulation of a general policy to apply to dependent areas, whether through international trusteeship—as the Americans preferred—or through the British proposals to retain, with slight modifications, the prewar colonial systems. Given the wide gulf in Anglo-American perceptions of the issue, these continuing exchanges of ideas had produced a surprising amount of consensus by the time of the Yalta Conference.[17]

Although the President received regular reports on the progress of these Anglo-American conversations, he allowed Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the State Department to take the lead in developing the American position and limited himself to the role of a senior consultant. Nevertheless, the President seized several opportunities to reemphasize his strong feelings against colonialism. During his conversations in 1942 with Molotov, Roosevelt brought up the

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erson Files, folder "M," box 5, NA; Roosevelt to Clark Eichelberger, 11 January 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Official File, 4351, Container 5, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY (henceforth referred to as FDRL); John MacMurray memorandum of conversation with Roosevelt, 18 June 1942, John MacMurray Papers, film 549, reel 47, Sterling Library, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.; Akira Iriye, *Power and Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 53–54, 72–82.

[17] For a convenient summary, see the unsigned State Department memorandum, 25 August 1943, Charles Taussig Papers, folder "Trusteeship—Background Material Before San Francisco," box 59, FDRL (henceforth referred to as Taussig Papers); Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*. For an optimistic report on the Anglo-American conversations, see Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., undersecretary of state, to Cordell Hull, 22 May 1944, Notter Files, Black Binder "Report," box 7, NA. See also, Smith, *American Diplomacy*, 14; *FRUS, 1942* III, 578–83; Julius Pratt, "Anticolonialism in United States Policy" in Robert Strausz-Hupe and Harry W. Hazard, eds., *The Idea of Colonialism* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), 114–51.

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idea of trusteeship for dependent peoples. The President mentioned Indochina, the Malay States, Siam [*sic*: an independent country], and the Dutch East Indies and noted that "a palpable surge toward independence" existed in each of these areas. Invoking one of his favorite anticolonial examples, the Philippines, Roosevelt suggested that "trustees might endeavor to accomplish what we accomplished in the Philippines in forty-two years."[18]

At the Casablanca Conference, Roosevelt hinted at the broad implications of his anticolonial attitudes. Emphasizing to his son Elliot that all the colonies in Southeast Asia were interrelated, the President declared, "If one gets its freedom, the others will get ideas." Moreover, when Anthony Eden visited the United States in March 1943, Roosevelt mentioned more specific dependent areas that he considered eligible for postwar international trusteeship. These areas included French Indochina, Portuguese Timor, Korea, the Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific, as well as certain strategic points like Bizerte and Dakar in Africa. The President brushed aside Eden's ploy of inviting the United States to take over the Japanese mandated islands and made clear that he did not want an advance commitment that all colonies would be returned to the prewar imperial powers.[19]

It is a measure of the importance the concept of trusteeship had in Roosevelt's postwar thinking that, shortly after talking with Eden, the President confided to a trusted aide, "the policy of policing the world was not insurmountable." At a White House briefing in October 1943, Roosevelt broadened his ideas on trusteeship, which he felt could be applied to "all sorts of situations." He told Hull to stress the concept of international trusteeship at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow later that month.[20]

At the 1943 Cairo and Teheran Conferences, Roosevelt exerted American influence concerning the postwar status of dependent territories. To the considerable excitement of the British, the Cairo communique mentioned nothing about restoring prewar colonies to their former owners except returning Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores to China. Churchill confessed to his anxious war cabinet that the wording of the communique, while troublesome, was much better than the language in the original American draft. The Prime Minister reported, "we did the best we could."[21]

[18] *FRUS, 1942*, III, 580–81.

[19] *FRUS, 1943*, III, 28–39; Eden to Churchill, 28 March 1943, PREM 4-42/9, PRO; WM(43)53, SSF, 13 April 1943, PRO; Elliot Roosevelt and James Brough, *A Rendezvous With Destiny* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1975), 332–33; Iriye has described the American position regarding trusteeship as "quintessentially Wilsonian." (*Power and Culture*, 130–33.)

[20] *FRUS, 1943*, I, 541–43. See also William D. Hassett, *Off the Record With F.D.R., 1942–1945* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1960), 166–67.

[21] See Churchill to Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee, 30 November 1943, PREM 4-74/2, pt. 2, PRO; also Attlee to Churchill, 29 November 1943, Beaverbrook Papers, folder 3/C. The War Cabinet's discussion of the communique may be found in WM(43)163, SSF, 29 November 1943, CAB 65/40; PRO; for the text of the Cairo Communique, see *FRUS, Cairo and Tehran*, 448–49.

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Later, at Teheran, Roosevelt pressed his anticolonial views upon Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin at their first meeting. The President elicited a mild endorsement of trusteeship from Stalin, who most probably had his own ideas about postwar territorial dispositions. Both agreed that Indochina should not be returned to the French, but when Roosevelt explained his idea to have an international committee "visit every year the colonies of all nations and through use of instrumentalities of public opinion to correct any abuse that they find," Stalin merely stated that there was "merit" in the proposal. Stalin proved similarly noncommittal when Roosevelt talked of India and the need for "reform from the bottom." The Soviet Premier pointed out that India was a complicated subject and that reform from the bottom would mean revolution. During the course of his conversations at Teheran, the President made clear his intentions to propose trusteeship not only for dependent areas (including prewar colonies) but also for ex-enemy territories and certain strategic points around the world. For example, he mentioned control of islands near Japan and the straits in the approach to Vladivostok. He also announced that he spoke in behalf of twenty-one American nations when he stated that the African seaport, Dakar, in unfriendly hands posed "a direct threat to the Americas." Back in Washington, Roosevelt summarized both the territorial discussions at Teheran and his own ideas during a meeting of the Pacific War Council in December 1943.[22]

Despite the purported "special relationship" between Britain and the United States, the complex issues touching on the general question of colonialism afflicted the alliance between the two countries. Indeed, the close affinity of the British and Americans—from the Churchill-Roosevelt relationship on down—simply afforded more opportunities for playful teasing and for the most part harsh criticism by Americans about the British Empire. To their credit, the British suffered both the teasing and the abuse in private. Churchill sounded a general warning in late 1942. He pointed out that, "It is clearly important that we should encourage the United States to look outwards rather than inwards and to be a world power rather than a hemispheric power." One year later, Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, in the Foreign Office, advised his colleagues not to become too upset with the anticolonial statements of the President, "Who, in a year's time, may be merely a historical figure."[23]

[22] "Memorandum of Conversations," 28 November 1943, RG 43, folder "The Tehran Conference," box 1, NA; *FRUS, Cairo and Tehran*, 376, 509, 532, 567, 868–70; see also the report by Halifax of Roosevelt's comments about the postwar status of dependent areas to a group of diplomats on 16 December 1943, in Halifax to Foreign Office, 19 December 1943, FO 371.35921, F 6656/1422/61, PRO.

[23] Victor Cavendish-Bentinck memorandum, 22 December 1943, FO 371.35921, F 6656/1422/61, PRO; Churchill to Dominion Prime Ministers, 11 December 1942, PREM 4-42/9, PRO. For examples of Anglo-American friction on the question of colonialism, see OSS public opinion survey, 3 July 1942, OSS 22759-C, Modern Military Branch, NA; Charles Taussig memorandum of conversation with Roosevelt, 24 June 1943, Taussig Papers, folder "Miscellaneous 1939–1944," box 52, FDRL; Harry Dexter White (Treasury) memorandum, 15 September 1944, SD 711.61/9-1344, NA. The direct connection between Roosevelt's anti-colonialism and the wartime Anglo-American con-

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Nevertheless, British frustration at American meddling in imperial affairs, even if largely confined to private circles, occasionally revealed sharp edges. For example, in 1942 Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee reported to Churchill that the Dominion High Commissioners were "considerably exercised" over statements by prominent Americans directed against British colonialism. Attlee observed, "It will be well for Americans . . . to be aware that the British Colonial Empire is not a kind of private possession of the old country." Similarly, in January 1945, the following exchange took place during a discussion of colonialism between the President and Colonial Secretary Oliver Stanley:

Roosevelt: I do not want to be unkind or rude to the British but in 1841, when you acquired Hong Kong, you did not acquire it by purchase.
Stanley: Let me see, Mr. President, that was about the time of the Mexican War.[24]

Stanley's quick-witted retort not only illustrated His Majesty's Government's determination to resist outside interference in British imperial interests but also reflected, on the eve of the Yalta Conference, the sharp contrast between well-intentioned American generalizations about colonialism and the crisp, specific approach of the British to that subject. Moreover, the British could take comfort from the presence of their ultimate diplomatic weapon whenever the Empire was threatened: Churchill. Statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic recognized the pervasive influence of the Prime Minister, particularly upon the President. One close aide to Churchill has written, "It is fair to say that Churchill felt that he could convince the President of the wisdom of any course he wanted to pursue by written memoranda and by conversation." In fact, during his preparations for the 1945 Yalta Conference, the Prime Minister showed that he was in the best of form. Reviewing the progress of the continuing Anglo-American conversations regarding a general colonial policy for the postwar era, and noting the American insistence on international trusteeship, Churchill took up the challenge. He told Eden:

> How does this matter stand? There must be no question of our being hustled or seduced into declarations affecting British sovereignty in any of the Dominions or the Colonies. Pray remember my declaration against liquidating the British Empire. If the Americans want to take Japanese islands which they have conquered, let them do so with our blessing and any form of words that may be agreeable to them. But "Hands

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versations regarding postwar economic structures is not generally recognized. See Roosevelt to Former Naval Person, 11 February 1942, Beaverbrook Papers, folder "Lord Privy Seal"; Beaverbrook to Churchill, 19 January 1945, ibid.; unsigned British Treasury memorandum, n.d., CAB 21-985-14/13/15/4, PRO; also David Reynolds, *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance: A Study in Competitive Cooperation* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); Robert M. Hathaway, *Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

[24] Charles Taussig memorandum of conversation, 16 January 1945, Taussig Papers, folder "1945 – January-June," box 52, FDRL; Attlee to Churchill, 16 June 1942, PREM 4-42/9, PRO; WM(44)24, SSF, 23 Feburary 1944, CAB 65/45, PRO.

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Off the British Empire" is our maxim and it must not be weakened or smirched to please sob-stuff merchants at home or foreigners of any hue.[25]

At Yalta, the issue of international trusteeship, which had seemed a potential powder keg, sailed through to unanimous agreement with surprising ease—save for one brief explosion by the Prime Minister. The flare-up occurred on 9 February as Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. was reading a draft proposal that the Big Five should consult on territorial trusteeships and dependent areas in preparation for the forthcoming United Nations Conference. Churchill interrupted Stettinius to say that he would never consent to "forty or fifty nations thrusting interfering fingers into the life's existence of the British Empire." The Prime Minister jumped up and shouted that he would never agree to have a British representative placed in the dock to defend the Empire, and he repeated the words: "never, never, never." Presidential aide Harry Hopkins said later that he could hardly follow the excited and rapid speech of the Prime Minister. Even after sitting down, Churchill continued to mutter "never, never, never." He suddenly turned to Stalin and inquired how the Marshal would feel about a suggestion to internationalize the Crimea for use as a summer resort. Stalin calmly responded that he would be delighted to give the Crimea as a place to be used for meetings of the Big Three. Fortunately, there was a brief recess at this point.[26]

In fact, it was during this intermission that the sweeping idealism of Roosevelt's concept of trusteeship shattered. With Alger Hiss of the State Department playing the leading role, American and British officials reached a compromise that affirmed that trusteeship would be applied only to existing mandates of the League of Nations; any territories detached from the enemy; and "any other territory that may *voluntarily* be placed under trusteeship." The compromise left to subsequent agreements the task of identifying which territories within the three categories would be placed under trusteeship. The wording of this hastily written compromise was subsequently embodied in the final "Protocol of Proceedings."[27]

[25] Churchill to Eden, 31 December 1944, PREM 4-31/4, PRO; Charles Taussig memorandum of conversation with Churchill and Stanley, 17 December 1942, Taussig Papers, folder "1941-1943 Inclusive," box 52, FDRL; General Sir E.I.C. Jacob memoir-essay in Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, ed., *Action This Day: Working With Churchill* (London: Macmillan, 1968), 207–8; Jacob interview with the author, 29 June 1973, Woodbridge, England; Stimson diary entry, 4 November 1943, Henry L. Stimson Papers, Sterling Library, Yale University, New Haven, Conn., vol. 45 (henceforth referred to as Stimson Papers); Sir Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War* (London: HMSO, 1962), xxxvi-xxxvii; William D. Leahy, *I Was There* (New York: Whitlesey House, 1950), 138.

[26] *FRUS, Yalta*, 844–59, 935–77; James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), ix-x; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins,* 865–66; Lord Moran, *Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival*, 1940–1965 (London: Constable, 1966), 228–29; Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1949), 238–39; Woodward, *British Foreign Policy*, 536; Eden, *The Reckoning,* 595; Louis, *Imperialism at Bay*; Thorne, *Allies of a Kind;* Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy;* Leahy, *I Was There*, 313.

[27] FRUS, Yalta, 858–59.

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It is a measure of the buoyant optimism with which the President approached the question of the postwar status of dependent peoples that he would accept this compromise at Yalta as compatible with his ultimate objectives. Yet, by acquiescing in the idea of voluntary submission to trusteeship authority, Roosevelt virtually insured that all colonial powers would retain control over their prewar possessions. Nevertheless, Roosevelt clearly indicated during the remaining weeks of his life after Yalta that he confidently expected to win the day over his imperial antagonists within the United Nations coalition. Aboard the ship taking him home from the Crimea, the President, almost paternalistically, told reporters that "dear old Winston will never learn" to understand the political aspirations of dependent peoples. On 9 March, he reaffirmed to the cabinet his concept of international trusteeship, and a week later, he insisted to one of his closest advisers on colonial affairs, Charles Taussig, that "independence" and not "self-government" or "dominion status" should remain the ultimate political goal for all dependent peoples. When Taussig mentioned that the army and navy wanted some trusteeship areas (likely to be placed under the responsibility of the United States) closed from international scrutiny, the President stated firmly that neither had any business administering the civilian government of any territory. On 9 April, after Stettinius too had complained about the attitude of the military-naval leaders, Roosevelt sided with the secretary of state in insisting that trusteeship be placed on the agenda of the forthcoming United Nations Conference in San Francisco. Finally, at his last press conference on 5 April, the President once again emphasized his support for the concept of international trusteeship. Responding to a specific question about who would govern the Japanese mandated islands, Roosevelt's answer implied the general framework he had in mind for dependent peoples. "I would say the United Nations. Or—it might be called—the world, which has been much abused now, will have a chance to prevent any more abuses."[28]

Roosevelt undoubtedly died believing dependent peoples everywhere were already on the path to independence in the sense that his leadership had marked out the inevitability of that political process for the postwar era. Some historians, too, have written in this vein. For instance, Foster Rhea Dulles and Gerald Ridinger concluded in their pioneering study that "An important phase of the foreign policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt was *a vigorous and persistent opposition to colonialism*." An examination thus far of Roosevelt's general pattern of thinking about trusteeship and imperialism substantiates a conclusion that he opposed colonialism,[29] but to determine the vigor and the persistance of his an-

[28] Rosenman, *Public Papers and Addresses*, XIII, 563–64, 607–11; Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking, 1951), 33; Taussig memorandum of conversation with Roosevelt, 15 March 1945, Taussig Papers, folder "1945—January-June," box 52, FDRL; *FRUS, 1945*, I, 23–27, 311–21; Stettinius to President Harry S. Truman, 13 April 1945, *FRUS, 1945*, I, 282–83; Leo Pasvolsky memorandum of conversation with Roosevelt, 15 November 1944, Notter Files, folder "Int'l. Org. Membership," box 246, NA; *FRUS, 1944*, I, 700.

[29] Dulles and Ridinger, "Anti-Colonial Policies," 1. Yet, Thomas G. Paterson has argued persuasively even against the general conclusion that Roosevelt was necessarily opposed to colonialism.

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ticolonialism, it is necessary to turn to a specific case study. The dependent area of French Indochina provides an opportunity to analyze Roosevelt's wartime anticolonial attitudes—and carries the added attraction of being outside the special context of issues restricted only to British and American involvement.

French Indochina[30]

On several occasions between 1941 and 1943, the United States actually undertook binding commitments to restore the French Empire after the war. Roosevelt himself asserted the American guarantee in letters to Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain in December 1941 and on the day of the North African invasion (Operation TORCH). Robert Murphy, the President's personal representative, gave perhaps the most explicit statement of American intentions in two letters to French General Henri Giraud. Murphy pledged:

> I am able to assure you that the restoration of France in its complete independence, in all its grandeur and the extent it possessed before the war, in Europe as well as overseas, is one of the war aims of the United Nations. It is understood that French sovereignty will be re-established, as soon as possible, in all the territories, continental and colonial, over which the French flag flew in 1939.[31]

Yet, as the war progressed and the President formulated his concept of international trusteeship, the spirit of these early American assurances eroded. At the Casablanca Conference, Roosevelt reproached Murphy for going too far with the French. Murphy later stated, "That was the first indication to me that Roosevelt

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Paterson explained his view in remarks at the American Historical Association convention, 29 December 1978, in San Francisco; see also his book, *On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979), 33-68. (Emphasis added.)

[30] A detailed analysis of the relatively minor role Indochina played in Anglo-American relations from 1940 to 1945 is beyond the scope of this study. For differing views on this topic, see Gary R. Hess, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and Indochina," *Journal of American History* 59 (September 1972): 353-68; Walter LaFeber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina," *American Historical Review* 80 (December 1975): 1,277-95; Christopher Thorne, "The Indochina Issue Between Britain and the United States, 1942-1945," *Pacific Historical Review* 45 (February 1976): 73-96; George C. Herring, "The Truman Administration and the Restoration of French Sovereignty in Indochina," *Diplomatic History* (Spring 1977): 97-117; John J. Sbrega, "'First catch your hare': Anglo-American Perspectives on Indochina During the Second World War," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 14 (March 1983): 63-78.

[31] See the text of the two Murphy letters to Giraud, n.d., enclosed in Eden to Churchill, 4 February 1943, FO 371.36427, L 1487/1266/69, PRO. Murphy forwarded copies of these letters carrying dates of 26-27 October 1942 in a letter to Cordell Hull, 22 March 1943 (Notter Files, folder "S France," box 78, NA), but he warned of discrepancies in the dates because the undated draft copies were shown to Giraud while the general was secretly in France. See also Roosevelt to Petain, 27 December 1941, Roosevelt Papers, PSF, folder "France," box 41, FDRL; Roosevelt to Petain, 8 November 1942; Rosenman, *Public Papers and Addresses,* XI, 455-57; *FRUS, 1944*, III, 769-84; *FRUS, 1942*, II, 561; WM(43)53, SSF, 13 April 1943, CAB 65/38, PRO; Eden to Halifax, 29 December 1943, FO 371.35921, F 6056/1622/61, PRO; General Mark Clark to Admiral Jean Darlan, 22 November 1942, Mark Clark Papers, Archives-Museum, The Citadel, Charleston, SC, box 1.

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was planning to encourage extensive reductions in the French Empire." The President's motives in planning a trusteeship for Indochina flowed from several sources, including a personal dislike for Charles de Gaulle and an intuitive feeling that France would plunge into civil war after the Allied liberation. Of course, Roosevelt's general anticolonial attitude fit this specific case; he especially criticized the record of French colonial rule in Indochina. For example, the President told Cordell Hull that, after "nearly one hundred years" under French control, the people of Indochina "are worse off than they were at the beginning." Despite his strong humanitarian and anticolonial impulses, however, Roosevelt never brought his fuzzy postwar concept into focus. In general, he envisioned some sort of international trusteeship in Indochina, "which would have the task of preparing the people for independence within a definite period of time, perhaps twenty to thirty years." At the Cairo Conference, the President described for American General Joseph W. Stilwell a three-member supervisory commission (American-British-Chinese); later, at Yalta, however, Roosevelt talked about an international trustee agency involving "a Frenchman, one or two Indo-Chinese, and a Chinese and a Russian, because they are on the coast, and maybe a Filipino and an American—to educate them for self-government."[32]

The President kept a stony silence on Indochina and refused to develop specific planks for his general anticolonial platform. Despite inquiries throughout 1944 from Lord Mountbatten (Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command), the British Chiefs of Staff, the Foreign Office, and the State Department about matters affecting Indochina, Roosevelt provided no response except a curt comment in late August that he would discuss the matter with Churchill at the Second Quebec Conference (OCTAGON). Yet even there the two leaders remained strangely silent about both French participation in the war against Japan and the postwar status of Indochina. On five separate occasions American officials in Ceylon (Max Bishop and Robert L. Buell) requested instructions on how to deal with the French military staff invited for a "temporary" visit to

[32] Rosenman, *Public Papers and Addresses*, XIII, 562–63; see also E. Roosevelt, *As He Saw It*, 114–16; E. Roosevelt and J. Brough, *Rendezvous*, 327–33; Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964), 168; Stimson memorandum, 29 December 1942, Stimson Papers, box 171. For examples of Roosevelt's dislike for de Gaulle, see the comments of Brendan Bracken, minister of information, in an interview with William R. Crozier, 1 July 1943, Crozier Papers, folder "B. Bracken," box 1 (formerly Beaverbrook Library), House of Lords, London; also Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors*, 102, Moran, *Churchill*, 224. Hull, too, held strong views about de Gaulle, whom he called "a little squirt" built up by the British. This quote may be found in Michael Wright to Nevile Butler, 19 July 1943, FO 371.35994, Z 8293/2/17, PRO; author's interview with Sir Nevile Butler, 4 June 1973, London. Roosevelt frankly described his concern about a French civil war to Henri Hoppenot. See Charles de Gaulle, *War Memoirs: Salvation, 1944–1946: Documents*, translated by Joyce Murchie and Hamish Erskine (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1960), 48–49. For Stimson's efforts to dissuade Roosevelt of this idea, see Stimson diary, 25 August 1944, vol. 48, no. 62, Stimson Papers. See also Roosevelt to Hull, 24 January 1944, in Elliott Roosevelt, ed., *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), III, 1,489–90; *FRUS, Cairo and Tehran*, 485; Theodore H. White, ed., *The Stilwell Papers* (New York: W. Sloan Associates, 1948), 251–54.

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Mountbatten's headquarters at Kandy, Ceylon; each inquiry went unanswered from the White House. The frustrated State Department could only advise doing and saying nothing about the French presence in Southeast Asia.[33] Events clearly were overtaking the President's notions about not returning Indochina to the French.

In late 1944, William Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services, and Stettinius both warned the President about potential problems in Southeast Asia. Donovan suggested that the British, French, and Dutch were combining and "foreclosing the Americans from any voice on policy matters" in the region. Stettinius called attention to the increasing French military presence at Ceylon and the accumulation of French and British requests for greater French participation in "preoccupational activities" planned for Indochina. But the President's response failed to go beyond generalities. He wanted no Americans in the Far East making policy decisions with anyone ("especially the French"), and he added, "We have made no final decisions on the future of Indo-China." A few weeks later, Roosevelt instructed Stettinius (the new Secretary of State):

> It should be called to the attention of our British friends that Mr. Churchill and I did not officially recognize the French Military Mission at SEAC, and furthermore, I have made no agreement, definite or otherwise, with the British, French, or Dutch to retain their Far Eastern colonial possessions.[34]

Thus, by early 1945, Roosevelt still had failed to pursue the issue of Indochina either vigorously or persistently. An episode that occurred during Anthony Eden's visit to the United States in 1943 illustrates the confusion in the President's anticolonial thinking about Indochina. As Roosevelt was describing his version of the poor French colonial record and his sketchy ideas for an interna-

[33] Abbott Low Moffat memorandum, 10 November 1944, SD 740.0011PW/11-1044, NA; John Sterndale Bennett memorandum, COS(45)320(0), 8 May 1945, CAB 80/94, PRO; K. Landon to Roosevelt, 7 July 1944, SD 740.0011PW/7-744, NA; State Department memorandum, 12 January 1945, RG 43, folder "Vincent," tab "Indo-China," box 8, NA; Murphy (enclosing a copy of the French request to the British) to Hull, 10 June 1944, SD 740.0011PW/3967, NA: Matthews to Roosevelt, n.d., H. Freeman Matthews Files, folder "Memoranda for the President, 1943-1944," box 1, NA; State Department memorandum, 29 March 1944, Notter Files, folder "PC," box 15, NA; testimony of Abbott Low Moffat, in United States, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Causes, Origins, and Lessons of the Vietnam War, May 9, 10, and 11, 1972* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), 161–205.

[34] Stettinius to Roosevelt, 23 November 1944, and Roosevelt to Stettinius, 24 November 1944, both in SD 740.0011PW/11-2444, NA; Halifax to Stettinius, 23 November 1944, Roosevelt Papers, PSF, folder "Indo-China," box 55, FDRL: Roosevelt to Stettinius, 1 January 1945, SD 740.0011PW/1-145, NA; vol. III, Sect. V, 2, 21–22, RG 59, Stettinius Diaries: December 1, 1944–July 3, 1945, 8 vols., NA. Iriye (*Power and Culture*) argues that Roosevelt's refusal to get involved in the military operations to liberate Indochina is proof that the President had already decided that the imperial powers would return to their prewar colonies. See also Stettinius to Roosevelt, 2 November 1944, Roosevelt Papers, PSF, folder "Indo-China," box 55, FDRL; Roosevelt to Stettinius, 3 November 1944, SD 740.0011PW/11-2444, NA; *FRUS, 1944*, V, 1206; Roosevelt to Elmer Davis, 17 November 1944, Roosevelt Papers, PSF, folder "Indo-China," box 55, FDRL; Donovan to Roosevelt, 10 July 1944, Roosevelt Papers, PSF, folder "OSS Reports, July 1944," box 168, FDRL.

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tional trusteeship in Indochina, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles interrupted with a reminder about the American commitments to restore the French Empire. The President, somewhat surprised at this news, indicated his own impression that the pledges applied only to French possessions in Africa.[35]

By the time of the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt had not made any progress in rallying international support for his concept of trusteeship beyond the superficial generalities of 1943 summit meetings at Cairo and Teheran. Even then, in his informal conversations with Chiang Kai-shek (23 November) and Stalin (28 November), Roosevelt contented himself with eliciting from these two leaders at least what he considered preliminary endorsements of his own unformulated soundings about a trusteeship for postwar Indochina. In addition, changes on the international scene, especially the strengthening of the French position under de Gaulle and a developing coalescence among the colonial powers within the United Nations coalition, further undermined any hope that Indochina would be stripped from French imperial control. At home, the State Department tried to clarify the President's vague ideas about Indochina, but the department, itself, was divided over the broad issue of restoring prewar colonies to the imperial powers.[36]

Throughout 1945, Roosevelt did little to sharpen his views on the postwar status of Indochina. In January he refused to rule on whether or not the French and SEAC could launch pre-occupational activities in Indochina. At Yalta, he merely made a passing reference during a private conversation with Stalin on 8 February on the desirability of preventing the French from returning to Indochina. The next day participants at the plenary session virtually eliminated any chance of that by deciding that imperial powers could voluntarily choose trusteeship for their colonies but would not be forced to do so. In March, the President ordered the State Department to pigeonhole a French request for authority over civil affairs in Indochina after liberation and postponed until too late his decision to aid the French resistance in Indochina after the Japanese seized full control of Indochina on 9 March. To complicate matters even further, Roosevelt told Charles Taussig that French control could possibly resume if the French promoted eventual "independence" (not "self-government" or dominion status) for Indochina.[37]

[35] Eden to Churchill, 29 March 1943, PREM 4-42/9, PRO.

[36] Moffat testimony in 1972 *Hearings*, 161–65; *FRUS, Cairo and Tehran*, 325, 485–86; also Ralph Bunche memorandum, n.d., Notter Files, folder "Dependent Territories," box 273, NA; minutes of Commission II meeting, 20 June 1945, Notter Files, folder "Drafting Book – II," box 275, NA; Hull, *Memoirs*, II, 1,599. Hull pointed out that "We could not alienate them [imperial powers] in the orient and expect to work with them in Europe."

[37] Taussig memorandum of conversation with Roosevelt, 15 March 1945, Taussig Papers, folder "1945 – January-June," box 52, FDRL; Taussig to Stettinius, 16 March 1945, Stettinius Diaries, vol. IV, sect. VII, 50, NA; Roosevelt to Edwin C. Wilson, 5 January 1944, Roosevelt Papers, PSF, folder "France 1944–1945," box 42, FDRL; Joseph C. Grew to Roosevelt, 19 January 1945, Roosevelt Papers, PSF, folder "Indo-China," box 55, FDRL; Stettinius to Jefferson Caffrey, 10 April 1945, SD 740.0011PW/3-1245, NA; Matthews to Francis Lacoste (French Consul), 19 April 1945, SD

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Whatever specific plans Roosevelt had for Indochina in the postwar era died with him. He never made a serious attempt to go beyond vague generalities in his approach to the question. Exactly how he would maneuver around French hostility and the combined resistance of his imperial allies in arranging an international trusteeship for Indochina after the war remains a mystery. Stettinius set a better epitaph for Roosevelt's efforts when the Secretary of State, less than two months after the President's death, assured the French that "the record is entirely innocent of any official statement of this government questioning, even by implication, French sovereignty over Indo-China."[38]

Conclusion

The Yalta Protocol marked the virtual demise of any hopes for a progressive postwar readjustment in the treatment of dependent peoples. Presidential procrastination and indecision served to erode liberal and humane aspirations concerning colonialism. Roosevelt pursued what might be called a "non-policy of determined drift," and, to the extent he did so, he unwittingly contributed to the gradual bastardization of his original concept of a comprehensive system of international trusteeship to promote independence for all dependent peoples. But what had caused this retreat from high idealism?

Actually, several complicated and interconnected reasons shaped the President's policies regarding postwar treatment of dependent peoples. These ranged from highly personal factors, such as ill health,[39] personal judgments, pragmatism, racism,[40] and a desire not to complicate further the normal turmoil of

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740.0011PW/3-1945, NA. For more on the Japanese coup, see Matthews to State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 23 May 1945, SD 740.0011PW/5-2345, NA; COS(45)320(0), 8 May 1945, CAB 80/94, PRO; COS(45)352(0), 22 May 1945, CAB 80/94, PRO; COS(45)135, 24 May 1945, CAB 79/80, PRO; Grew memoranda of conversations with Henri Bonnet, 13 June 1945 (SD 740.0011PW/1345, NA) and 19 May 1945 (Grew Papers, vol. 7, folder 16); Sino-American Staff Meeting #73 (Chungking), 15 August 1945, RG 332, Files of General Albert C. Wedemeyer, folder "G-mo's Mins, vol. II," Washington National Records Center, Suitland, MD: Patrick J. Hurley to Truman, 10 August 1945, SD 740.0011PW/8-1045, NA; author's interview with Lord Mountbatten, 2 August 1973, London.

[38] As quoted in Grew to Caffrey, 9 May 1945, *FRUS, 1945*, VI, 307.

[39] Moran, *Churchill,* 242–49; Herman Bateman, "Observations on President Roosevelt's Health During World War II," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 40 (June 1956): 82–102; James McGregor Burns, "FDR: The Untold Story of His Last Year," *Saturday Review,* 11 April 1970, 12–15, 39; Howard G. Bruenn, "Clinical Notes on the Illness and Death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt," *Annals of Internal Medicine* 72 (April 1970): 579–91.

[40] In considering the moral attitude of Roosevelt with regard to decolonization, it might be well to keep in mind his strong racist views. Also, it seems fair to add that his views about the innate inferiority of non-whites put him squarely in line with the mainstream attitudes of his contemporary white Americans. See, for example, his views on racial mixing, described in Sir Ronald I. Campbell to Sir Alexander Cadogan, 6 August 1942, PREM 4-42/9, PRO. The text of this letter may be found in John J. Sbrega, *Anglo-American Relations and Colonialism in East Asia, 1941–1945* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1983), 285. See also Thorne, *Allies of a Kind*, 6, 8–9, 158–59, 167–68, 539, 695; also the many racist remarks by Roosevelt recorded in Hassett, *Off the Record.*

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domestic politics.[41] as well as conditions beyond Roosevelt's immediate control. For example, British historian D. C. Watt concluded that "where American policy-makers did not succeed in forcing their views through, it was much less, as some 'revisionist' historians have argued, from their fear of communism and consequent need for the friendship of the European powers, but simply that their power to act turned out in practice to be illusory."[42] Finally, and perhaps most important, Roosevelt nourished a buoyant optimism that led him on occasion not only to an innocent naiveté, despite his rigorous experience in the rough-and-tumble world of American politics, but also to an exaggerated self-confidence, which sometimes bordered on the dangerous. This supreme sense of optimism occasionally led Roosevelt to naiveté in expecting the imperial powers to accede to his own impression that the era of colonial systems had ended. It sometimes led him to potential danger in miscalculating his ability to manage both Stalin and the course of Soviet-American relations.[43] Also, it led him to what Stimson called, "an impulsive nature and a mind which revolts against the dry facts.[44] It led him to overemphasise the personal equation in diplomacy; it led him to substitute idle chatter in place of hard, realistic decision making; and it led him to a blind faith in the efficacy of international trusteeship to establish stability and equity in postwar relations among the "developed" and the "developing" where formerly instability and exploitation had characterized those relationships. If ever the term "Happy Warrior" described anyone, it described Roosevelt.

To be sure, the President was no caricature of witless joy. Merely to cite his political achievements and the military victory of the United Nations coalition is to indicate his considerable abilities and to deny any intention to oversimplify or distort his personality and record. Often neglected in assessing the diplomacy of World War II is the one dominant fact that the United Nations successfully accomplished the fundamental purpose that had brought them together. Once the coalition formed, the only hope for the Axis powers lay in its disunion. Roosevelt must receive great credit for his efforts, sometimes heroic, to keep the alliance intact and on track. He astutely recognized that world peace and the security of the United States depended in part on the successful resolution of the aspirations of colonial peoples. Roosevelt also perceived, with slight exagger-

[41] Roosevelt once confessed that he had consented to too many things with which he disagreed for the sake of harmony. See Nigel Nicolson, ed., *Harold Nicolson Diaries and Letters: The Later Years, 1945–1962* (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 52; also D. C. Watt, "American Anti-Colonial Policy and the End of the European Colonial Empires, 1941–1962," in A.N.J. den Hollander, ed., *Contagious Conflict: The Impact of American Dissent on European Life* (Leiden: Brill, 1973), 106–7.

[42] Watt, "American Anti-Colonial Policy," 124–25; see also Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), 111.

[43] Roosevelt is quoted as saying "Stalin would play ball if approached right" in Taussig memorandum of conversation with Eleanor Roosevelt, 27 August 1945, Taussig Papers, folder "1945 – July to December incl.," box 52, FDRL; see also Roosevelt's confident air in his ability to handle the Russians in his last telegram to Churchill, 12 April 1945, Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence, FDRL.

[44] Stimson diary, 4 November 1943, Stimson Papers, vol. 45, no. 59.

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ation, that some imperial powers had mishandled some of their dependencies. Above all, he foresaw—perhaps better than any of his contemporaries—the postwar explosions of nationalism and decolonization that shattered the old order. His earnest anticolonial attitude flowed in large part from his determination to defuse those mighty forces.

Rather, Roosevelt can be criticized for letting slip from his grasp the chance to use his position and tremendous influence to make qualitative changes in postwar international affairs. By refusing to discuss urgent political problems and detailed postwar arrangements until the last shot was fired, Roosevelt virtually forfeited his powerful diplomatic leverage in a way that others, like Stalin and de Gaulle, did not. "We expect to be consulted with regard to any arrangements applicable to the future of Southeast Asia,"[45] Roosevelt insisted. But he took no concrete measures to insure such consultation—save to repeat vague, almost ritualistic, political incantations about "independence" and "international cooperation" as if his wishes, expressed often enough, would come true.

The passivity that plagued American policy had not sprung from misunderstandings or distracting preoccupations, but—and here lies the real tragedy—had been consciously cultivated by the President. In the absence of purposeful, clear leadership from the White House, American wartime policy concerning dependent areas floated aimlessly. The original sweeping vision, born of the highest idealism and crippled by the lack of bold formulation, could not long endure—especially after the death of its creator. Thus, while entertaining idealistic hopes of peacefully resolving the political aspirations of dependent peoples, Roosevelt had ironically contributed to the undermining of those aspirations. The ill effects of his uncertainty and hesitancy proved even more harmful in the face of resolute action by the colonial powers to protect their imagined imperial interests. How prophetic was Churchill's remark in 1942 that Americans "were not above learning from us, provided that we did not set out to teach them."[46] Ironically, in a tragic postwar twist, the United States gradually became identified with the other western colonial powers as suppressors of the political aspirations of dependent peoples for independence. The praiseworthy objectives and good intentions that marked American postwar planning early in World War II drowned in Roosevelt's "non-policy of determined drift."

[45] Roosevelt to Stettinius, 17 November 1944, Roosevelt Papers, folder "Indo-China," box 55, FDRL.

[46] WM(42)8, SSF, 17 January 1942, CAB 65/29, PRO.

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The Jacksonian Integration of Parties into the Constitutional System

DOUGLAS W. JAENICKE

The United States has bequeathed two enduring political creations to the world: written constitutions and mass political parties. Students of American politics agree that mass political parties originated and gained acceptance and respectability in antebellum America and that the Jacksonian Democrats were primarily responsible for that innovation.[1] In creating their political organization, Jacksonian Democrats and especially Martin Van Buren and his New York State party known as the Albany Regency eschewed the old revolutionary model of a temporary political movement organized to respond to a particular crisis. Instead, under their aegis, political parties and regularized partisan competition were transformed into permanent constitutional establishments.

A daunting challenge confronted these political innovators. Not only were they engaged in the novel experiment of creating new political institutions, but also the Constitution's and the political culture's general antipartyism threatened to abort any attempt to legitimate political parties. Relying on the large territory and population of the United States and auxiliary institutional arrangements to prevent any one faction or party from controlling all branches of the government, the founders had created a Constitution against political parties.[2] A mass

[1] Richard Hofstadter, *The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of a Legitimate Opposition, 1780–1840* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970); Michael L. Wallace, *Ideologies of Party in the Antebellum Republic* (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1973); and Michael L. Wallace, "Changing Concepts of Party in the United States: New York, 1815–1828," *American Historical Review 74* (December 1968): 453–491.

[2] Hofstadter, *Idea of a Party System*, chap. 2.

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political party appears to be equivalent to the majority faction that the founders and *The Federalist* had feared and sought to prevent. In addition, the traditional republican ideal postulated a statesman who exercised independent judgment to determine the public interest and the best method for its attainment;[3] but an institutionalized political party imposes partisan discipline upon its members, who are required to subordinate personal judgment to the party's position.

Despite this antiparty tradition, Democratic politicians broke new ground and accepted political parties as constitutional establishments necessary for the proper working of the Constitution. Martin Van Buren and other Democratic party thinkers defended national political parties as solutions to two crises in presidential selection: the malfunctioning of the electoral college and the dangerous character of presidential campaigns.[4] Furthermore, for Van Buren and like-minded others, regular partisan competition for office checked governmental power more effectively than did the formal constitutional system of separate institutions sharing power.[5] Such ideas about the constitutional role of political parties were so contagious that by the end of the second party system in the 1850s, Senator Stephen Douglas—author of the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act and the 1860 Democratic presidential nominee—interpreted the endorsement of territorial popular sovereignty by both major parties as the authoritative final settlement of the perplexing slavery extension issue.[6]

As novel political phenomena apparently anathematized by the Constitution and political culture, mass political parties and a competitive party system required a defense of their constitutionality. Surpassing a minimalist defense that accepted parties as the unavoidable accompaniments of political liberty, the first exponents of mass parties claimed that they improved the political processes of the Constitution. To integrate parties successfully into the constitutional order, Jacksonian Democrats expounded a procedural understanding of political parties and partisan competition that complemented the Constitution's own proceduralism. The Jacksonian Democrats developed both the idea and reality of an institutionalized mass political party as a coalition of heterogeneous groups bound together by procedural norms. The emphasis on social heterogeneity, interest, decision-making procedures, expediency, and compromise found in *The Federalist*, especially numbers Ten and Fifty-one, echoed in the Democrats' twin ideas of an institutionalized political party and regularized partisan competition. Although neither *The Federalist* nor the Democrats' idea of a political party and

[3] Wallace, *Ideologies of Party*, chaps. 1, 2; and Edward L. Mayo, "Republicanism, Anti-Partyism and Jacksonian Party Politics: A View from the Nation's Capital," *American Quarterly* 31 (Spring 1979): 3–20.

[4] James Ceaser, *Presidential Selection: Theory and Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), chap. 3.

[5] Martin Van Buren, *The Autobiography of Martin Van Buren* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1920), 125. Also see Wallace, *Ideologies of Party*, 348–358, and "Changing Concepts of Party," 486–488.

[6] Harry V. Jaffa, *Crisis of the House Divided: An Interpretation of the Lincoln-Douglas Debates* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1959), 165.

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party system wholly eliminated the need for statesmanship, both reduced the scope for leadership and treated it as secondary to procedural and institutional arrangements.

The Democratic Principles of Strict Construction and Limited Government

Martin Van Buren insisted that all political parties rested upon some fundamental political principle.[7] Defining the Democratic party's essential purpose, the party's principle of strict constitutional construction upheld heterogeneity within both the society and the party, since the doctrine of limited national government is a negative teaching. The 1835 "Statement by Democratic Republicans" explained the Democratic principle of strict construction:

> True Republicanism not only guarantees to each State the full enjoyment of its reserved rights but it guarantees to each State protection from the molestation of other States . . . . [T]he people of the large and small States of this vast empire [are] all dwelling under the Republican system of our fathers in tranquility and security; all under different local and state laws and domestic regulations; all pursuing happiness and prosperity in their own way . . . .[8]

According to this account, strict construction permitted the inhabitants of the different states to pursue their own interests without interference from the center and from each other; strict construction mandated not only limited national government but also a secularized politics divorced from questions of ultimate value. Yet, as finally disclosed by the slavery controversy, the Civil War, and the Democratic party's North-South split in 1860, the diverse interests protected by strict construction divided, rather than united, the party and the country.

In 1840, John C. Calhoun's return to the Democratic fold catalyzed the party's adoption of the first national party platform. As a precondition for rejoining, Calhoun had insisted that the party explicitly state the terms of Democratic union. A masterpiece of negativism, the 1840 platform prescribed limits to the power of the national government without stating any unifying positive purpose.[9] Expressing the Democratic party's negative community, this and later platforms manifested that the Democrats did not share a common way of life, although as a party they were committed to the political value of limited government.

[7] Martin Van Buren, *An Inquiry into the Origin and Course of Political Parties in the United States* (New York: Hurd and Houghton, 1867), 10, 71, 153, 180–181, 237, 266–268; and Ceaser, *Presidential Selection*, 158.

[8] "Statement by the Democratic Republicans of the United States" in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., ed., *History of American Presidential Elections* (New York: Chelsea House, 1971), I:624.

[9] Roy F. Nichols, *The Invention of American Political Parties: A Study of Political Improvisation* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 336; and Donald B. Johnson and Kirk H. Porter, eds., *National Party Platforms, 1840–1972*, 5th ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975), 2.

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Divided by ultimate values and purposes, Democrats rallied around the political principles of strict construction, limited government, and a secularized politics. But at heart, these shared Democratic principles were "negative" because they upheld the "negative liberty" of the individual, group, state, or section to be "free from" the external interference and control of the national government and coercive public opinion.[10]

United in cultural defense but defending a variety of cultures, the Democrats molded their idea of a political party around equality of opportunity and cultural diversity. Adhering to equal opportunity's negative theory of community, the party functioned as an umbrella organization that embraced a plethora of groups with conflicting ultimate purposes. Van Buren's description of the Democratic party as composed of "the planters of the South and the plain Republicans of the North"[11] underscored the partners' antagonistic particular purposes. Maintenance of the Democratic coalition required adherence to strict construction to realize the partners' shared negative desire to be left alone in their separate pursuits and to avoid any debate concerning their actual ways of life.

The Democratic party's endorsement of strict construction translated into an acceptance of heterogeneity within the party and reflected a common desire among Democrats for *freedom from* the national government and other groups. For example, southern Democrats sought the protection of slavery in freedom from the national government and from the free states, northern Democrats often endorsed the principle of limited national power in order to open up the economic opportunity structure, and Catholics wished to protect themselves from the cultural imperialism of evangelical Protestants. Opposing both the centralizing tendencies of statesmen amalgamationists like Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and James Monroe and the homogeneous visions of evangelical cultural imperialists such as abolitionists, Sabbatarians, and temperance advocates, first Van Buren's Albany Regency and later the entire Democratic party upheld strict construction's espousal of heterogeneity as a social and political good. Tolerating wide differences of belief and purpose, the Democratic party's political doctrines of limited government and strict construction averred that an individual's most important beliefs and values lay outside the party's, the government's, and indeed public opinion's purview.

The *Democratic Review* summarized the Democratic position as adherence to the "voluntary principle," which encompassed a reliance on individual initiative and effort and a concomitant desire for impartial limited government.[12] For

[10] Major L. Wilson, *Space, Time and Freedom: The Quest for National Unity and the Irrepressible Conflict, 1815–1861* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1974) analyzes the Democrats' adherence to "federative freedom" or negative liberty with its emphasis on freeing the individual for the pursuit of interest.

[11] Richard H. Brown, "The Missouri Crisis, Slavery and Politics of Jacksonianism," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 65 (Winter 1966): 69.

[12] "An Introductory Statement of the Democratic Principle" in Joseph L. Blau, ed., *Social Theories of Jacksonian Democracy: Representative Writings of the Period, 1825–1850* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1954), 28.

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Democrats, neither expediency nor convenience, but only social necessity legitimated government action and a turning away from the individualism of the voluntary principle. A national bank, a protective tariff, national internal improvements, exclusive corporate charters, and Sabbatarian and temperance legislation failed this strict test. Under the laissez faire[13] banner of the voluntary principle, the anti-aristocratic Democrats[14] assaulted privilege in its various guises and expanded opportunities for the individual pursuit of interest.

Van Buren claimed four major achievements for Andrew Jackson's administration: his veto of the recharter bill for the Second Bank of the United States (BUS), the replacement of the protective tariff with a revenue tariff, the discontinuance of national internal improvements such as the Maysville Road veto, and Indian removal.[15] In the name of limited government, the first three dismantled legislated or aristocratic privileges that were seen as constricting economic opportunity; those privileges had vitiated equal rights by conferring benefits on particular individuals at the expense of others and, more broadly, represented the imposition of centralized control over the pace and direction of economic development, which should have been left to the impersonal workings of the market. For example, Democrats did not object to how the BUS employed its power but to its government-conferred power over other banks, monetary policy, and hence the general economy.[16] Similarly, as exemplified by the Supreme Court's *Charles River Bridge* decision, Democrats condemned exclusive corporate charters that unfairly created special privileges and constricted economic opportunity. To complement the expansion and equalization of opportunity wrought by the destruction of legislated privilege, the Democrats embraced territorial expansion to provide free white Americans with additional opportunities.[17]

Hostile to any ruling institution or group, the anti-aristocratic Democrats liberated individuals to pursue their self-chosen economic, cultural, and religious interests untrammelled by artificial constraints and unmolested by meddlesome cultural aristocrats. For the Democrats, aristocracy and laissez faire were multidimensional concepts with cultural as well as economic connotations.[18] Demo-

[13] For the Democrats' attachment to laissez faire or the negative liberal state, see the selections for William Leggett, the *Democratic Review*, and Frederick Robinson in Blau, *Social Theories;* Rush Welter, *The Mind of America, 1820–1860* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 94–95, 185, 188; William R. Brock, *Parties and Political Conscience: American Dilemmas, 1840–1850* (Millwood, N.Y.: KTO Press, 1971), 23, 40, 57, 59–61; and Lee Benson, *The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), chap. 5.

[14] Marvin Meyers, *The Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960) notes the Democrats' hostility to aristocracy.

[15] Van Buren, *Autobiography*, 275.

[16] Welter, *Mind of America*, 166.

[17] Wilson, *Space, Time and Freedom.* Although Democrats agreed on territorial expansion, they disagreed whether the new territory should serve freedom or slavery.

[18] Ronald P. Formisano, *The Birth of Mass Political Parties: Michigan, 1827–1861* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), chap. 6, esp. 100; and Welter, *Mind of America*, 340–341, 383.

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crats attacked not only authoritative laws and institutions that constricted economic opportunity, but also assailed evangelical reformers who sought to impose authoritative ways of life. In their eyes, abolitionists, Sabbatarians, and temperance advocates were just as aristocratic as the BUS, its president Nicholas Biddle, and the protective tariff. The full meaning of the Democrats' anti-aristocratic rhetoric was only manifested when they attached the pejorative aristocratic label to moral philanthropists and pressed for the secularization of politics. Thus Democrats not only fought against Sabbatarian and temperance legislation but also opposed Thanksgiving Day proclamations,[19] which lacked legal status, and abolitionists who initially preferred moral suasion to legislation. Hostile to the intrusion of religious or other fundamental values into politics, Democrats embraced not only limited government but also a limited politics. They sought to sunder politics from ostensibly private belief and censured those who moralized politics or politicized religion.[20] Democrats resisted importunate cultural aristocrats and moral philanthropists who illegitimately used politics and sometimes government to impose their reputedly superior ways of life upon others.

Juxtaposing the Democratic values of self-government, individual autonomy, and laissez faire to nativism, temperance, and antislavery, Horatio Seymour, a leading Democratic politician from New York, applied the classic Democratic faith in limited government to the religious and cultural realm: "We reject legislative legerdemain. We have but one petition to our legislators—it is to be let alone."[21] Against the evangelical anti-Jacksonians who flooded the state and national legislatures with moralistic petitions, Democrats offered their voluntary principle with its demand for government impartiality in the religious-cultural domain. In his official reply to the Sabbatarians' petition to Congress to stop the Sunday mail, Democratic Senator Richard Johnson argued that any such legislation would illegitimately identify the national government with the controversial religious belief that Sunday was a holy day; hence Johnson, who later served as Van Buren's Vice-President, linked cultural laissez faire to strict constitutional construction.[22] Similarly, the Democratic spokesman Orestes Brownson later condemned the anti-extension Republicans and temperance advocates for seeking governmental recognition of what were essentially private beliefs. Their desire for moral legislation violated the political norm that private values, even when true, should never take legal form.[23]

Concurring with the earlier 1835 "Statement" by his party, Andrew Jackson's farewell address insisted that strict constitutional construction freed a state not merely from national government interference but also from "all efforts on the

[19] Leggett, "Thanksgiving Day" in Blau, *Social Theories*, 78–81.

[20] Paul Johnson, *A Shopkeeper's Millennium: Society and Revivals in Rochester, New York, 1815–1837* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), 132.

[21] Welter, *Mind of America*, 341.

[22] Johnson, "Sunday Observance and the Mail," in Blau, *Social Theories*, 274–281.

[23] Welter, *Mind of America*, 340–341.

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part of people of other states to cast odium upon their institutions. . . ."[24] Hence Jackson opposed aristocratic abolitionists like William Lloyd Garrison who avowed the right and responsibility "of the free states to remonstrate against the continuance and to assist in the overthrow of slavery."[25] For Jackson, abolitionist attempts to convert slaveholders to antislavery by shaming them and attacking their way of life as loathsome were "in direct opposition to the spirit in which the Union was formed." According to Democrats like Jackson, the Constitution's spirit of compromise proscribed not just national antislavery legislation, but also all northern criticism of southern slaveholding. Even while the Civil War raged, a northern Democratic editor echoed Jackson: "[T]he evil in our system was not slavery but unwarranted meddlesome attacks upon slavery."[26]

Replying to John C. Calhoun's novel claim that the advancement of slavery constituted a national purpose, John O'Sullivan, editor of the *Democratic Review*, mollified the party's northern wing by identifying slavery as a local institution and also conciliated southern Democrats by abjuring any negative judgment of slave society. Fulfilling Jackson's commandment of cultural toleration, O'Sullivan declared that slavery's sectional character indicated only its difference from, not its inferiority to, free labor.[27]

Beginning from the premise that the Constitution was nothing more than a "compromise of interests,"[28] Van Buren interdicted abolitionist agitation against slavery. His contractual interpretation assumed that the southern slaveholding states had agreed to the Constitution as an effective means for protecting their interest in slavery; hence any nonsouthern criticism of slavery was illegitimate because "security to their slave property was one of the principal benefits promised them [slaveholders] by its [the Constitution's] adoption."[29] Acting upon Van Buren's and Jackson's arguments, the Democratic party became the anti-antislavery party, which enacted the "gag" resolution, excluded abolitionist literature from the southern mail, opposed abolition in the District of Columbia, and endorsed territorial popular sovereignty to shield southern slavery and honor from external reproach.

The Jacksonians' ideal was a party and society without any recognized values except the procedural equality and negative liberty of strict constitutional construction. Their party served as an engine of equal opportunity, which defended

[24] Blau, *Social Theories*, 4–9.

[25] William Lloyd Garrison, "From the Letters," in Lorman Ratner, ed., *Pre-Civil War Reform: The Variety of Principles and Programs* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 22.

[26] Joel Silbey, *A Respectable Minority: The Democratic Party in the Civil War Era, 1860–1868* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), 51.

[27] Brock, *Parties and Political Conscience*, 147.

[28] Letter of 6 March 1836 in Schlesinger, *Presidential Elections*, I:604, also see 602.

[29] Van Buren, *Autobiography*, 137 and also see 132–134. During the Civil War, northern Democrats maintained that an amendment that abolished slavery would abrogate the constitutional compact since such an amendment threatened the interest that slaveholders had originally sought to protect when they had agreed to the Constitution. Silbey, *Respectable Minority*, 80.

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the political and economic order necessary for the pursuit of individual interest. Although united in their effort to increase opportunities, Democrats still remained divided by their particular private interests.

A Politics-of-Interest and Its Associated Problems

Whereas David Hume had differentiated a party of principle from a party of interest,[30] Democrats conjoined the two; the Democratic principles of equal opportunity, limited government, and strict construction necessarily engendered a politics of competitive self-interest. Since equal opportunity postulates the primacy of self-interest in human life, Democrats appealed to the interest of voters and party workers to attach them to the party.

As interpreted and applied by the Democratic party, strict construction protected the southern interest in slavery. Without compunction, northern Democratic politicians accepted the legitimacy of the quid pro quo, which exchanged a defense of southern slavery for southern Democratic votes. At times the Democrats also overtly encouraged northern voters to sacrifice the liberty of others to their own economic interests. When challenged by the Republican party, which was against the extension of slavery, Pennsylvania Democrats emphasized that antislavery agitation endangered commercial relations with the South and urged: "To save their southern markets, merchants and manufacturers should repudiate the Republicans and sustain the Democracy."[31]

Within the party, the spoils doctrine appealed to the interest of party activists. Accepting the primacy of interest in political motivation, William L. Marcy, a leading New York Democrat, declared:

> It may be that the politicians of the United States are not so fastidious as some gentlemen are, as to disclosing the principles on which they act. They boldly preach what they practice. When they are contending for victory, they avow their intention of enjoying the fruits of it. If they are defeated, they expect to retire from office. If they are successful, they claim, as a matter of right, the advantages of success. They see nothing wrong in the rule, that to the victor belong the spoils of the enemy.[32]

The desire for and use of government office as patronage had antedated the Democratic party, but never before had politicians so frankly embraced and extolled the spoils. To encourage campaign work in the party's behalf, Martin Van Buren offered loyal party workers government patronage:

> You may hold out to them the hope, that if they are active in organizing and training the party, they will probably receive the appointment to take in the census, and efficient

[30] David Hume, "Of Parties in General," Essay VIII, in *Essays Moral, Political and Literary* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 130.

[31] Michael F. Holt, *Forging a Majority: The Formation of the Republican Party in Pittsburgh, 1848–1860* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 281.

[32] Hofstadter, *Idea of a Party System*, 250.

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means must be taken to reserve it to them, thus proving that fidelity to the cause shall not go without its reward.[33]

According to Marcy, self-interest motivated *all* American politicans, not just Democrats. Since all politicians engaged in politics in order to reap the rewards of office, no politician had true philanthropic purposes to impose upon others. The Democrats' reduction of politics to interest discredited the disinterested claims of evangelical reformers and conservative Whigs. Later, the Democrats denounced Republican espousal of anti-extension as nothing more than an expedient tactic to win votes; the same pedestrian desire for votes and political office motivated Republicans as other politicans.[34]

Although effective in rallying electoral support and in attacking philanthropic pretensions, self-interest still posed a serious difficulty for the Democrats, since an unbounded pursuit of interest inexorably degenerates into a Hobbesian state of war. Indeed, the Democrats' acceptance of self-interest as the driving human motive occasionally assumed demonic form: brutal Indian wars, cruel Indian removal, and a complacent indifference to slavery. If the party system and the Democratic party were to survive, the potential ruthlessness of self-interest had to be contained at both the inter- and intra-party levels.

Organizational Values

To moderate the pursuit of self-interest within the party, the Democrats relied upon loyalty to the party organization. The Democratic party necessarily accepted self-interested competition within the organization but simultaneously required the subordination of self-interest to the party and its decision-making process. The party's general role of defending equal opportunity supposedly enjoyed precedence over any particular interest. Sharing nothing but a commitment to strict construction and equal opportunity, Democrats could remain united only if they transcended their different particular interests by granting allegiance to the party. Respect for intra-party norms sustained the cooperation of heterogenous groups within the Democratic Party.

Encompassing more than the party's teaching of limited national government and strict construction, party principle also included organizational norms such as the ethic of party unity and discipline. Michigan Democrats urged: "Union, harmony, self-denial, concession, everything for CAUSE, nothing for men—should be the watchword of the Democratic party."[35] After losing the party's presidential nomination to James Polk in 1844, Van Buren avowed his dedication to the institutional party: "Those, therefore, who think as I do cannot . . . fail to merge all *minor considerations* in sincere and undisguised efforts to promote

[33] Robert V. Remini, *The Election of Andrew Jackson* (New York: Lippincott, 1963), 93.

[34] Holt, *Forging a Majority*, 200; and *Proceedings of the Pennsylvania Democratic State Convention held at Harrisburg, 4 March 1856*, 60.

[35] Formisano, *Birth of Mass Political Parties*, 70. (Original emphasis.)

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the candidates of the Democratic party."[36] Earlier, Van Buren's Albany Regency had declared its adherence to the norm of party unity: "Individual partialities and local attachments are secondary and quite unimportant compared . . . with the INTERESTS AND PERMANENCY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY."[37] The New York party appealed to Democrats to ignore objections to particular candidates and policies and to unite around their common interest in the well-being of the Democratic organization.[38] The 1835 "Statement by Democratic Republicans" advised: "Above all, let our counsels be unmingled with personal preferences and local prejudices. In this way, and this way only, can we expect to conquer."[39] Disappointed minorities had to lay aside their personal preferences and support the party's regular nominees so that a united Democratic party could defend equal opportunity for all.

Keeping the organizational faith became the watchword of Democrats. For example, in 1824 Van Buren's Albany Regency exacted party discipline among its state legislators to defeat a proposal for popular election of presidential electors, since their selection by the Regency-controlled legislature served party strategy.[40] For his opposition to Van Buren's Democratic presidential candidacy in 1836, the party expelled a Jackson man who supported the Whig Hugh White. This Jackson man complained bitterly: "Does it follow because I support Judge White I must consequently oppose the measures of our beloved President [Jackson]?"[41] Neither ideological nor policy agreement made a Democrat; loyalty to the practices that preserved the party organization were the acid test. Democracy became identified with the organization that protected equal opportunity. Accordingly, a democrat was defined as a loyal Democrat.[42]

In 1844, a group of leading New York Democrats circulated a letter criticizing Polk's and the national party's endorsement of the annexation of Texas and the state party's acquiescence in what they considered a proslavery measure. However, they still pledged support for Polk's candidacy, and in the end only one of the signatories failed to back him wholeheartedly.[43] At the level of the party-in-the-electorate, the New Yorkers' unhappiness over Polk's endorsement did not translate into Democratic defections.[44] Hence at both the organizational and electoral levels, party loyalty prevailed over anti-extension preferences.

Despite Van Buren's preference for another candidate and his dislike for De Witt Clinton, Van Buren in 1817 switched from opposition to the gubernatorial

[36] Letter to Gainesworth Melville, 3 June 1844, reprinted in the *Pittsburgh Daily Gazette*, 4 September 1848. (Emphasis added.)

[37] Wallace, "Changing Concepts of Party," 461. (Original emphasis.)

[38] Hofstadter, *Idea of a Party System*, 246; and Wallace, "Changing Concepts of Party," 470.

[39] "Statement by Democratic Republicans," I:636.

[40] Wallace, "Changing Concepts of Party," 465; and Robert V. Remini, *Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1955), 39–40.

[41] Robert W. Johannsen, *Stephen A. Douglas* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 40.

[42] Wallace, "Changing Concepts of Party," 469–471.

[43] Benson, *Concept of Jacksonian Democracy*, 230–232, fn. 14, 263.

[44] Ibid., chap. 12; see the election figures for the 1844 New York vote.

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candidacy of Clinton to enthusiastic support once Clinton had won the endorsement of the party. Van Buren's abrupt switch nonplussed the New York *Evening Post*:

> We are at a loss to account, upon any principle of honor or fair play [how Van Buren], after representing Mr. Clinton in one speech made at 8 o'clock in the evening, as the most unworthy and dangerous man in the state, could afterwards, in another, at 12, the same night, represent him as the great republican citizen who ought to unite all hearts in his elevation.[45]

However, Van Buren's behavior can be readily accounted for: he clearly thought that a united party provided the best hope for securing equal opportunity; his procedural understanding of political obligation committed him to accepting the final decision as he had taken part in the decision-making process; and he went along with the majority in the expectation that he would benefit from similar forbearance when the situation was reversed at some future date. Commenting on this event, Michael Wallace noted: ". . . for the first time therefore a strong body of dissenters was led by a man who felt that his responsibility to the institution transcended his differences with the dominant faction."[46]

Political Virtue and Procedural Obligation

Van Buren's Albany Regency and later the Democratic party perceived steadfast dedication to the party and long party service as the proper criteria for political advancement.[47] Only by consistently subordinating personal preferences to the party's decisions can an individual continue to serve the party for many years; hence such devoted service indicates that an individual places the party before his own particular purposes that might divide a heterogenous coalition. This attitude excluded from the party's trust those who did not accept the party's authority or those who entered politics only to further a particular cause. "We hold it a principle, that every man should sacrifice his own private opinions and feelings to the good of his party—and the man who will not do it is unworthy to be supported by a party, for any post of honor or profit."[48]

Repudiating the Federalists' elitist emphasis on education, wealth, and status as proper credentials for holding office, Democrats substituted a more democratic "works" criterion of party service. The party would reward those Democrats whose support for the party's policies and candidates visibly demonstrated virtuous acceptance of the norm that no individual be so strongly attached to his preferences and interest that he places them above "the rules of the game."

The 1835 "Statement by the Democratic Republicans" commended the presi-

[45] Wallace, "Changing Concepts of Party," fn. 31, 463.
[46] Ibid., 462.
[47] Ibid., 459.
[48] Ibid., 461.

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dential nomination of Martin Van Buren to southern Democrats on the grounds of reciprocity. An important element in procedural obligation, reciprocity requires that an individual treat others as they had previously treated him. In a party context, reciprocity requires that those who have previously benefited from partisan discipline display it when in the minority. Van Buren's unstinting support for the party's earlier southern presidential candidates had proved his party loyalty. Now in 1836, the southern Democrats were expected to lay aside their natural preference for a southerner and to show, through their support for the northerner, that they too disinterestedly accepted the party's authority.[49]

Martin Van Buren confessed his Burkean prejudice that consistent loyalty to the party constituted prima facie evidence of political virtue and endorsed candidates accordingly. He backed William H. Crawford of Georgia for the presidential nomination in 1824 against Andrew Jackson, Henry Clay, and John Quincy Adams because "his [Crawford's] friends seemed more anxious to preserve the unity of the Republican party."[50] Similarly, he regretted Jackson's decision to contest that election despite Crawford's nomination by the party's congressional caucus. Remembering Jackson's previous irregularity, Van Buren supported his presidential effort in 1828 only after imposing a precondition: to receive Van Buren's support, Jackson must avoid a repetition of his earlier unvirtuous behavior and accept the party's authority.[51] (Whether Jackson offered such assurance is uncertain.)

Writing in the middle period, Jabez D. Hammond, a Democratic historian of political parties, argued that a losing minority faced only one virtuous alternative—willing submission; anything less violated the rules of political competition. Participation in the decision-making process obliged an individual to support the eventual decision.

> When political friends consent to go into caucus for the nomination of officers, every member of such caucus is bound in honor to support and carry into effect its determination . . . To try your chance in a caucus, and then because your wishes are not gratified to attempt to defeat the result . . . strikes me as a palpable violation of honor and good faith.[52]

For Democrats, unselfish subordination of personal judgment to party decisions constituted political virtue.

Beginning the efforts in 1825 which eventually culminated in the creation of the national Democratic party, Van Buren specified two conditions—one substantive, the other organizational—a presidential candidate had to fulfill in order to gain the support of his Albany Regency. To be acceptable, a candidate had not only to stand for the principles of strict construction and equal rights but

[49] "Statement by Democratic Republicans," I:628.

[50] Van Buren, *Autobiography*, 131.

[51] Remini, *Election of Andrew Jackson*, 39, 54.

[52] Jabez D. Hammond, *The History of Political Parties in the State of New York from the Ratification of the Federal Constitution to December 1840* (Albany, N.Y.: C. Van Benthuysen, 1842), I: 193.

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also to be the regular nominee of the party organization—in this case, the party's congressional caucus.[53] Later Van Buren accepted the national nominating convention as a superior substitute for nomination by the caucus; but both methods of nomination represented organizational agreement among Democrats.

The established decision-making process within the Democratic party enjoyed the same authoritative status as the procedures of the Constitution. Democrats like Van Buren contended that regular nominations were the strength of the party;[54] such nominations supposedly assured losers of the fairness of the eventual decision and hence encouraged defeated minorities to submit. Questioned in 1843 whether he would support the Democratic presidential nominee if his own bid failed, Van Buren answered: "I hold it to be impossible that a selection can proceed from such a source [the national Democratic convention] which I could not cheerfully support."[55] From Van Buren's perspective, individuals would grant allegiance to the Democratic party only if they believed in the essential fairness of the actual decision. Since the diversity of interests within the party precluded any substantive inquiry into the actual decision, there was no better guarantee of fairness than faithful adherence to the neutral forms to which all Democrats subscribed. For Van Buren and other Democrats, common acceptance of procedures by individuals who were divided by their particular interests bespoke the reasonableness of those procedures and ipso facto the presumptive fairness of the actual decisions.

The Democrats' preference for neutral procedures, compromise, and negotiation within the party dictated a corresponding set of values for dealing with another party *of the same kind*[56] and hence acceptance of regularized partisan competition. Surpassing mere tolerance, the Democratic party positively valued its Whig opponent as an external stimulus for internal Democratic harmony. The Democrats' understanding of their party presupposed the external pressure of an opposition party to help unite all shades of Democrats. According to Van Buren and his Albany Regency, an organized opposition was the sine qua non of Democratic unity. Paradoxically, not an opposition but the absence of one endangered the Democratic party; the Democrats' heterogeneity meant that their party was "most in jeopardy when an opposition is not sufficiently defined."[57] The threat posed by the opposition could induce disgruntled Democrats to accept their procedural bonds; the opposition would appear even less attractive than the majority within their own party. While the party's heterogeneity precluded a common positive purpose, the desire to defeat the Whigs at least

[53] Remini, *Martin Van Buren*, 53–54.

[54] Formisano, *Birth of Mass Political Parties*, 70; and Wallace, "Changing Concepts of Party," 467.

[55] Martin Van Buren, "Political Opinions," in Blau, *Social Theories*, 99.

[56] Wallace, *Ideologies of Party*, chaps. 8–13.

[57] Wallace, "Changing Concepts of Party," 476. Also, see Van Buren, *Inquiry into Political Parties*, 52–53, 71–74, 84–88, 165, 167–168, 203; Remini, *Martin Van Buren*, 36; and Wilson, *Space, Time and Freedom*, 113, 207.

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gave the Democrats a concrete purpose to substitute for the abstract one of preserving equal opportunity.

Institutionalizing Diversity: Saving the Party and the Nation

The Democratic party's retention of support required not only faithfulness to traditional usages and the external pressure of an opposition but also the party's avoidance of decisions that offended its identifiers' most important values. In 1830 William Marcy advised: "Don't be too fastidious; when party is strong almost anything that is done is right."[58] The party's strength usually indicated that the party had adopted positions that did not insult the various ways of life pursued by Democrats; individuals respected their partisan obligations only so long as the party did not jeopardize their deepest values.

As a heterogeneous coalition held together by procedural obligation and expediential loyalty, the Democratic party necessarily strove to avoid political choices that might drive disaffected groups from the party. Since procedural norms survive and flourish only if they do not compete with deeply-held values, the Democratic party preferred to exclude important issues from national politics so that a defeated minority could support the majority's decision and the party without repudiating its own way of life. To avoid compelling a group to choose between its preferred way of life and loyalty to the party, the Democratic party protected intraparty minorities by granting them effective veto power within the party's councils; in turn, this veto power required that Democrats compromise their differences, and the party's unit rule facilitated the negotiations necessary to achieve compromise.

The best known example of such a veto power was the two-thirds rule, which required that the party's presidential nominee receive two-thirds of the national convention's votes rather than a simple majority. Consequently a bloc controlling one-third plus one of the votes exercised power disproportionate to its numbers. Initially proposed by Van Buren and adopted in 1832 to frustrate Calhoun's presidential ambitions, the two-thirds rule transcended its original tactical rationale. Neutralizing Van Buren's formal majority at the 1844 convention, the two-thirds rule claimed him as its first victim after Van Buren's public opposition to the annexation of Texas had estranged southern Democrats. Having denied him the required two-thirds majority, the meeting nominated the first presidential 'dark horse,' James K. Polk, whose lack of public recognition qualified him as the ideal compromise candidate.[59]

Two informal rules further protected sectional minorities within the Democratic party. First, the Democrats defined a national party geographically; a national party had to have a strong presence in all sections. Furthermore, a party's geographical nationality was a precondition of its legitimacy. For Democrats, the

[58] Formisano, *Birth of Mass Political Parties,* 56.

[59] Ralph M. Goldman, *Search for Consensus: The Story of the Democratic Party* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979), 48–49.

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absence of competitive Republican electoral strength in the South made the Republican party a sectional, or non-national, party. Ascribing the Republicans' sectionalism to their advocacy of national legislation against the extension of slavery, Democrats concluded that no truly national and hence legitimate party could identify with anti-extension. Rejecting the Democrats' criterion to which conservative Whigs also adhered, the Republicans claimed to be the only truly national party since they upheld the primary national value of freedom. In effect, the religious works-faith distinction that divided the parties' constituencies had been recast into political language.

The Democratic commitment to maintaining a strong presence in all sections required that a majority of Democrats in both North and South, rather than a simple majority of Democrats within the party, approve the party's stand on an issue; hence the Democrats' geographical definition of a national party necessitated intersectional compromise within the party. For example, Stephen Douglas favored Democratic platforms that were acceptable to both northern and southern partisans.[60] In tandem, the party's two-thirds rule and geographical definition of nationality made Calhoun's theory of the concurrent majority actual through the new instrumentality of party.

Required to compromise intraparty differences, the Democratic party represented, in Van Buren's words, "the sober second thought" of the people.[61] As a party of compromise, the Democratic party filtered and refined popular sentiment so that the party supplemented Congress's role as a purifying agent. The institutionalization of heterogeneity within the party dampened political conflict and transformed the party into a conservative institution.[62]

The demands of maintaining the national organization also tempered majority power within the state parties. Displaying appropriate sober second thoughts in 1849, Michigan Democrats elevated national partisan exigencies above their personal preference for congressional prohibition of the extension of slavery. Although acknowledging serious intraparty disagreement over the Wilmot Proviso that, if enacted by Congress, would have excluded slavery from the national territories, Newcomb County Democrats in Michigan did not regard the Proviso as a "test of democracy or as affording the slightest grounds why the Democracy . . . should be divided and defeated." Commenting on the commitment of Michigan Democrats to the national party, Ronald Formisano concluded: They

> thought it reprehensible to be a "most Southern Northern man," and at one point the legislative party apparently endorsed the Wilmot Proviso, but Democrats handled the slavery extension nettle ultimately as professional politicians who placed party unity above all.[63]

[60] Jaffa, *Crisis of House Divided*, 63.

[61] Remini, *Election of Andrew Jackson*, 19.

[62] Wallace, *Ideologies of Party*, 418.

[63] Formisano, *Birth of Mass Political Parties,* 210, 208. Similarly, see Holt, *Forging a Majority*, 60, 70.

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To avoid alienating southern Democrats from the northern wing, Michigan Democrats adjusted their position on slavery extension and thereby helped preserve the national party. Earlier in 1844, the New York Democrats had similarly avoided an overt conflict with the national party over the annexation of Texas.[64] A party of compromise like the Democrats impeded, if it did not actually prevent, the translation of antislavery opinion into governmental and political action.

Since the party was more authoritative than unrefined public opinion and mere personal judgment, William Marcy demanded that Democratic legislators bow to the dictates of the party and defeat a bill proposing popular election of presidential electors. Rejecting public opinion as authoritative, Marcy declaimed: "Some timid men who wish well to the Democratic party are apprehensive that the current of public opinion runs so strong that it cannot be resisted. . . . Too many are . . . popularity hunters."[65] Later, Marcy's attitude encouraged northern Democratic politicians to ignore the anti-extension wishes of their constituents and accommodate southern sensibilities.

To conciliate the party's northern and southern wings without capitulating to either, the Democratic party adopted territorial popular sovereignty as the best possible solution to the problem of slavery in the national territories. The ideal of equal opportunity, which was first embodied in strict construction, reappeared in the doctrine of territorial popular sovereignty. Like strict construction, popular sovereignty preserved the fragile Democratic union of "the planters of the South and the plain republicans of the North" by defusing an explosive conflict over fundamentals.

In 1848, Benjamin F. Hallett, the first Democratic national chairman, contrasted the Democratic party's adherence to "democratic principles covering the whole Union" with the sectionalism of the free-soil movement. Maintenance of the national Democratic party, Hallett argued, required the party to repudiate both extremes of the slavery issue: the Albama test and the Wilmot Proviso. Northern Democrats would not abide the former, which pledged Democratic candidates to the extension of slavery; conversely, the party's endorsement of congressional proscription of slavery in the territories would invariably alienate southern Democrats.[66] Later, during the continuing storm over the extension of slavery and the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act, the official platform of Michigan Democrats explained the attractiveness of territorial popular sovereignty: "The doctrine of Congressional non-intervention . . . is the only platform upon which the democratic party . . . can maintain its nationality and its ascendancy, and preserve the Union."[67] The devolution of responsibility onto the inhabitants of

[64] Benson, *Concept of Jacksonian Democracy*, 226, 233, 235.

[65] Wallace, "Changing Concepts of Party," fn. 61, 471.

[66] Benjamin F. Hallett, *Facts for Candid Men and True Democrats* (Albany, N.Y.: N.p., 1848), 3, 10–13.

[67] Formisano, *Birth of Mass Political Parties*, 245.

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the territories enabled the national party to escape identification with either pole of the slavery debate.

When a Democratic Congress incorporated popular sovereignty into the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the party expected all Democrats, whether opponents or proponents of the extension of slavery, to rally to that act because its principle of popular sovereignty provided equal opportunity for free northerners and southern slaveholders to settle a territory and to determine whether that territory would be free or slave. A Democratic editor defended the 1854 Act: slavery was not at issue because popular sovereignty "commits no one in favor of slavery";[68] rather it merely gave southerners the same opportunity to pursue their interest that northern Democrats demanded for themselves. For Democrats, the earlier Missouri Compromise had created an illegitimate cultural privilege by reserving some national territory exclusively for freedom. By repealing that aristocratic law, the 1854 Act had beneficently opened all territories to free and equal competition between freedom and slavery.

Supplementing the Constitution's governmental balancing, political parties successfully balanced society. According to Frederick Grimke, "parties take the place of the old system of balances and checks. The latter balance the government only, the former balance society itself."[69] As heterogeneous national coalitions, political parties created intrasectional divisions while forging intersectional cohesion, thereby obviating a belligerent confrontation along the natural cleavage of free versus slave states. The electoral competition between the two major parties in all sections dissipated dangerous sectional feeling. Whigs and Democrats replaced southerners and northerners as major political identities so that parlous sectional loyalties were subordinated to anodyne partisan affiliations.

Transcending the negative accomplishment of disrupting sectional unity, political parties positively integrated the country by generating intersectional bonds of union that muted sectional discord. The social pluralism generated by the nation's large territory and population had effectively fragmented society, but fragmentation alone was insufficient to alleviate sectional stress. James Madison had noted in 1819: "When individuals belonging to them [political parties] are intermingled in every part of the whole Country, they strengthen the Union of the Whole, while they divide every part."[70] Van Buren traced the virulence of the slavery issue during the nonpartisan Era of Good Feeling to the absence of partisan divisions: "Formerly [during the period of Jeffersonian Republican-Federalist competition] attacks upon southern Republicans were regarded by those of the North as assaults upon their political brethren and resented accord-

[68] Charles Lanphier quoted in Johannsen, *Stephen A. Douglas*, 447.

[69] Hofstadter, *Idea of a Party System*, 267.

[70] Letter of 27 November 1819 in James Madison, *Mind of the Founder*, Marvin Meyers, ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1973), 414.

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ingly."[71] While northern and southern members of the same party were necessarily interested in one another's well-being, nonpartisanship provided no similar incentive for northerners to defend southerners. Desiring the intersectional concord fostered by partisan identification, Van Buren recommended the restoration of partisan competition.

Partisanship and the Realization of a Government of Law

Democratic party theory reaffirmed the Constitution's commitment to a "government of law, not of men." Thinking that political authority is safely entrusted to institutions, the 1835 "Statement by the Democratic Republicans" discredited the idea that the party's voters could properly vote for the opposition's candidate whenever they judged him to possess superior qualities. To vote according to the candidates' education, intelligence, status, virtue, etc. erroneously assumed that governmental performance depended upon good men rather than strict adherence to constitutional procedures. A government of law rendered the personal qualifications of would-be officials irrelevant.[72]

In the 1836 presidential campaign, the Democratic party ignored the calumnies against Van Buren and instead concentrated on his role as the party's nominee. The national party exhorted:

> "*Principles are everything: men, nothing.*" If Van Buren be the rallying point of anti-bankism, anti-nullification, and the right of instruction, what [Democrat] will fail to rally around him? Is his mere name to frighten men from their principles. . . ? The [Democratic] party will adhere to principle, regardless of names.[73]

Van Buren's claim upon Democratic voters had nothing to do with his personal characteristics but rather derived solely from his nomination by the Democratic party. To vote for the nominee of the party that stood for limited government was necessarily to vote for that principle. For a Democrat to defect from Van Buren's campaign simply because he believed the Whig candidate to be better qualified mistakenly transformed American government into a government of men.

Casting this argument into the liturgical religious language understood by most Democrats, a party meeting in Michigan declared that for Democrats to abandon their party because of the candidate's "alleged mistakes, misconduct, or corruption could only find its parallel in the folly and wickedness of the person who would change his religion, in consequence of the delinquencies of the minister appointed to enforce its obligations."[74] For Democrats, the institutional church and institutional party were equally authoritative; neither institu-

[71] Remini, *Martin Van Buren*, 132. See Hofstadter, *Idea of a Party System*, 202, 226–227; and Brown, "Missouri Crisis," 66, 69–70.

[72] "Statement by Democratic Republicans," I:637. See Silbey, "Election of 1836," I:585.

[73] Silbey, "Election of 1836," I:588 (Original emphasis.)

[74] Formisano, *Birth of Mass Political Parties*, 71.

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tion depended upon the character of its officials, but the office sanctified its occupant regardless of his personal characteristics.

Martin Van Buren thought that partisan elections contributed to the country's government of law by elevating the party at the expense of individual attributes. Hence the presidential candidacy of Jackson in 1828 confronted Van Buren with a dilemma. On the one hand, Jackson's popularity and promise of electoral victory appealed to Van Buren's professional desire for office; but Jackson's nickname "Old Hero" implied the importance of personal qualifications. Consequently, during the campaign, Van Buren attempted to minimize Jackson's personal appeal while instead stressing Jackson's partisan identification. Van Buren wanted to transform Jackson's presidential campaign into a party effort so that the party, not Jackson, could claim victory. A Jackson victory on the basis of his military record and widespread popularity would symbolize the nation's dependence upon exceptional leaders; however, for Jackson to run, win, and govern as a partisan would accentuate the party's role.[75]

As an antidote to Jackson's popularity, Van Buren favored his nomination in 1828 by a national convention, which would more closely identify Jackson with the party and devalue his military heroism. Of course, a national convention would concentrate electoral strength for Jackson; but Van Buren believed that it would also achieve "what is of still greater importance, the substantial reorganization of the Old Republican party."[76] (Despite Van Buren, a convention was not held in 1828.) Van Buren did not merely seek Jackson's election; he also wanted to use the election to recreate traditional partisan divisions so that partisanship would once again dominate election campaigns. In 1828 and again in 1836, Van Buren pursued not only electoral victory but also the constitutional objective of institutionalizing elections by turning them into partisan affairs.

The Democrats' spoils system with its attendant rotation in office further reflected the party's predilection for a government of law. The distribution of patronage to the party faithful accomplished more than the rewarding of political friends. Rather, the spoils system's institutionalization of rotation in office represented an attempt to regularize government administration in order to diminish the role of the personal qualities of individual officeholders.[77] By affirming that any individual could perform a governmental function, the spoils systems detracted from the importance of individual qualifications and accentuated the role of the government office devoid of human content. Making the spoils system possible, strict construction's emphasis on the repetition of routine tasks so diminished the importance of personal qualifications that supposedly anyone could now perform official duties.[78]

[75] Remini, *Martin Van Buren*, 26, 132–133.

[76] Ibid., 130. Also, see Remini, *Election of Andrew Jackson*, 39, 54.

[77] Lynn L. Marshall, "The Strange Stillbirth of the Whig Party," *American Historical Review* 72 (January 1967): 454–458; and James Q. Wilson, "The Rise of the Bureaucratic State," in Nathan Glazer and Irving Kristol, eds., *The American Commonwealth 1976* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), 81–84.

[78] Andrew Jackson's First Annual Message to Congress made the Democratic case for rotation

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Democrats like Van Buren not only denied any governmental need for exceptional statesmen but also substituted partisan loyalty and discipline for personal judgment in political affairs. The external discipline of partisanship helped individuals moderate their divisive and potentially dangerous attachment to their personal interests. Political decisions could not be safely entrusted to individuals who were likely to be swept along by considerations of narrow interest; hence Martin Van Buren advocated "substituting *party* principle for personal preference. . . ."[79] For him, individual Democrats were obliged to support the party regardless of its particular decisions; partisan discipline superseded an individual's preference for particular candidates and policies. Reproving Azariah Flagg's objection to a particular caucus nomination, William Marcy explained the rationale behind blind submission to regular nominations:

> An opposition to a candidate which is abstractly right may be politically wrong. . . . The example of opposing a candidate nominated by political friends is bad not only as to its effects on the pending election but as to others that are to succeed it. An opposition upon the ground of principle will be used to authorize an opposition on the ground of caprice.[80]

If individuals were once permitted to cite their personal preference or judgment to justify their refusal to support the party's candidates, the Democratic party might dissolve under the pressure of a plethora of contradictory selfish claims.

Without the external discipline of partisanship, individual Democrats were likely to abandon and violate the party's principle of equal opportunity in order to satisfy their narrow self-interests. To be outside a political party signified unrestrained pursuit of interest, not independent statesman-like virtue. Steven Mason, Democratic governor of Michigan, argued that the claim to represent the people and not a party was "the language of an individual who means to represent anyone rather than those who elected him." Mason elaborated: ". . . whenever I see a man declaiming against party spirit and professing to be for the *people alone*, I always think that he is for slipping quietly along, serving his own interests."[81] As early as 1824, the Albany *Argus*, the newspaper of Van Buren's Albany Regency, identified nonpartisanship in politicians with either self-interest or, even worse, despotism. According to the *Argus's* analysis, a self-interested individual proclaimed his independence of party in order to benefit from the victory of either party; such an individual sought no more than personal gratification in elevation to office. More dangerously, a politician's nonpartisan stance possibly revealed a despotic temper; unwilling to abide by the constraints upon individual action imposed by parties, a political independent was probably willing to ignore and violate all laws and bounds.

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in office. Alpheus T. Mason, ed., *Free Government in the Making*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 447.

[79] Remini, *Martin Van Buren*, 131. (Original emphasis.)

[80] Wallace, "Changing Concepts of Party," 467; also 461.

[81] Formisano, *Birth of Mass Political Parties*, 69. (Original emphasis.)

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> It is easy for those whose ambition is as insatiable as the sea, and who to gratify their inordinate lust for power, would overleap all bounds, to affect to be independent of all things, except for the good of the whole, to act for the nation and not for a party, to be patriots and not politicians.[82]

Therefore, according to the Albany Regency, either self-interest or tyrannical disposition disqualified the nonpartisan politician from receiving public trust and confidence.

Spurning an evangelical faith in the possibility of literal self-government based on voluntary adherence to God's law,[83] Democrats believed that fallen man was incapable of sufficient internal restraint. Driven by natural desire, self-interested individuals were capable of only a quasi self-government restrained by loyalty to the party organization and constitutional procedures. Unconstrained by external party discipline, self-interested individuals would quickly degenerate into a Hobbesian state of war. The Democrats' acceptance of constitutional checks on majoritarian power reflected this same pessimistic evaluation of both human nature and the limited possibilities of self-government.[84] Hence Democrats suspected any claim to act according to individual conscience and judgment as camouflage for unrestrained desire. The exercise of individual judgment in evaluating candidates was far riskier and more uncertain than voting for the Democratic principle of strict construction by voting for the party's candidate. When casting his ballot, a Democrat should trust the institutional party, not his frail personal judgment, which was likely to be warped by self-interest. The institutional wisdom of the party far exceeded the individual's meager stock of reason. For Democratic politicians, their party enshrined the accumulated reason of almost a half century of political experiences; hence the party with its filtering effect and cumulative layers of political wisdom was more reliable than the judgment of any individual or group.

Procedural versus Substantive Justifications of Defection

Van Buren's Albany Regency considered defection from the party to be the most heinous political crime;[85] revealing the narrow limits of procedural obligation, defection generated a nonpareil partisan crisis. The Democrats' doctrine of a government of law clearly proscribed defections that sprang from disagreements over policy or candidates as well as conscientious scruples. Any such defection violated the norm of equal opportunity that the loser submit to the eventual decision. Yet, procedurally-motivated defections did accord with the Democrats' claim that only agreement on the "rules of the game" held the party together.

[82] Wallace, "Changing Concepts of Party," 485.

[83] For the evangelicals' belief in the possibility of literal self-government, see Lewis Perry, *Radical Abolitionism: Anarchy and the Government of God in Antislavery Thought* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973); and Ronald Walters, *The Antislavery Appeal: American Abolitionism after 1830* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), chap 5.

[84] Welter, *Mind of America*, chap. 9.

[85] Wallace, "Changing Concepts of Party," 485.

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The defection of Martin Van Buren and his New York Barnburners in 1848 and the irregularity of Stephen Douglas and his followers a decade later manifested their faithfulness to the procedural norms that they had been so instrumental in incorporating into the party. When they temporarily shook off their party bonds, Van Buren and Douglas remained true to their original vision of the Democratic party as a heterogeneous coalition bound together by procedural obligation and institutional loyalty. While John Hale in 1845 and anti-Nebraska Democrats in 1854–1855 cited their anti-extension differences with the national party to excuse their apostasy, Van Buren and Douglas shunned such a substantive defense and instead exculpated their acts of irregularity by accusing the party of violating equal opportunity and procedural fairness. Committed to congressional proscription of slavery in the national territories, the anti-Nebraska Democrats attributed their defection to irreconcilable policy differences with the national party, which had endorsed the Kansas-Nebraska Act and its principle of popular sovereignty. But when Van Buren and Douglas disobeyed partisan norms, these party stalwarts sought to avoid any discussion of the party's actual decision and instead concentrated their fire on the majority's supposed vitiation of the party's decision-making process; they alleged procedural irregularities to exonerate their opposition.

Stephen Douglas and other popular sovereignty Democrats cited a lack of procedural fairness to justify their 1858 revolt against the party's endorsement of the proslavery Lecompton constitution for Kansas. The long train of abuses culminating in the ratification of the Lecompton constitution violated popular sovereignty's commitment to equal opportunity; the work of only a small minority, that constitution had been repudiated by an overwhelming majority of the territory's population. Opposing the national party, Douglas and his cohorts rejected the Lecompton constitution not because it was proslavery but because its fraudulent enactment by a minority violated the majority rule principle of territorial popular sovereignty. Required by the logic of equal opportunity to remain morally indifferent whether slavery or freedom triumphed, Douglas only insisted that the settlers possess the genuine opportunity to choose between the two alternatives.

To justify their temporary rejection of the Democratic yoke in 1848, the New York Barnburners led by Martin Van Buren cited procedural irregularities at the party's state and national conventions, which had supposedly denied them equal opportunity within the party.[86] Although the Barnburners favored congressional exclusion of slavery from the national territories and their Democratic opponents endorsed territorial popular sovereignty, the Barnburners honored institutional values even in the face of such a substantial cleavage. Unlike the anti-

[86] For the Barnburners' case, see Douglas W. Jaenicke, *American Ideas of Political Party as Theories of Politics: Competing Theories of Liberty and Community* (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1981), 305–318 and chaps. 9, 10. Although allied with the Barnburners in the 1848 Free Soil party, the Conscience Whigs justified their bolt from the state and national Whig parties with substantive antislavery arguments. Ibid., 305–318, and chaps. 11, 12.

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Nebraska Democrats and John Hale who shared their commitment to the Wilmot Proviso, the Barnburners loyally subordinated their personal preference for the Proviso to procedural fairness. The Barnburners' justification of their defection harped on one point—their Democratic opponents had violated the norm of fair and equal competition within the party.

Political parties are a kind of political community; to interpret ideas of political party as broader theories of politics can be worthwhile. Like any political regime, American political parties confront the problem of political obligation especially when practical politicians attempt to maintain partisan unity in the face of substantive disagreement. The particular idea of party articulated by the Jacksonian Democrats contained a political theory familiar to readers of *The Federalist*. Both *The Federalist* and the Jacksonian Democrats' idea of party accepted procedures as the primary source of unity available to a heterogeneous people; but Democratic politicians clothed their argument in the new garb of mass parties and regularized partisan competition.*

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Politics and Policy Analysis

PETER J. MAY

When it comes to assessing the relevance of political science to public policy, the discipline seems to have an identity crisis. Within the literature and at conference panels it has become fashionable to stress the limitations of political science insights for guiding policy making.[1] Nonetheless, as indicated by the growing importance of public policy studies and policy analysis within the discipline, there is substantial interest in making the discipline more policy relevant.

When placed in the historical context of the development of the field of policy analysis, it is ironic that the policy relevance of political science is being lamented. Indeed, one of the main features that in principle distinguishes policy analysis from its more sterile ancestry of systems analysis is attention to political considerations. In discussing the "new" field of policy analysis in 1967, Yehezkel Dror commented that unlike systems analysis:

> Much attention would be paid to the political aspects of public decision-making (instead of ignoring or condescendingly regarding political aspects). This means much attention to problems of political feasibility, recruitment of support, accommodations of contradicting goals, and recognition of diversity of values. Especially important are de-

[1] Among other discussions of the relevance of political science to public policy, see "The Place of Policy Analysis in Political Science: Five Perspectives," *American Journal of Political Science* 6 (May 1977): 415–433; Stephen L. Elkin, "Political Science and the Analysis of Public Policy," *Public Policy* 24 (Summer 1974): 399–422; Hugh Heclo, "Review Article: Policy Analysis," *British Journal of Political Science* 2 (January 1972): 83–108; Austin Ranney, ed., *Political Science and Public Policy* (Chicago: Markham, 1968); and Ira Sharkansky, ed., *Policy Analysis in Political Science* (Chicago: Markham, 1970).

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velopment of theories and construction of models which do full justice to the special characteristics of politics and political behavior and do not try to force them into a procrustean bed of economic terminology and theory.[2]

What explains the differences between the high hopes of a few decades ago and the continuing questioning of the relevance of political science? Part of the explanation rests with the inability to translate existing theories into concrete policy guidance, or short of guidance, into "methodological" advice about policy making. In Richard Nelson's words, the policy frameworks offered by political science are too "squishy" to be of practical value to policy makers and their subordinates.[3] Or at least, that is a commonly accepted view.

There are aspects of policy making for which the contributions of political science have been increasingly relevant. For example, the policy implementation literature has become a central consideration in policy analysis. It was only a decade ago that implementation was declared the "missing link" in policy making. Yet, there are other aspects of policy making and analysis for which there is a surprising void in the political science literature.

One major gap between the reality of policy making and the literature is attention to "political feasibility" as an element of policy making. While political feasibility considerations are clearly an important part of a policy maker's decision calculus, relatively little has been written about what constitutes feasibility, how one gauges it, and its role in policy making.[4] The conventional wisdom seems to be that this aspect of analysis is especially idiosyncratic and, therefore, belies systematic treatment. It can be argued that the political aspects of policy making are too complex to be subjects of forecasts or other prospective assessments.

In thinking about political feasibility, one could turn to three sources of information. First, there is the political science literature suggesting various theories about the relationship between policy and politics. Second, are the numerous case studies of policy enactment and implementation. And third, the practical knowledge of policy makers, legislative staff, and political consultants could be codified in some fashion. By restricting attention to the literature about politics

[2] Yehezkel Dror, "Policy Analysts: A New Professional Role in Government Service," *Public Administration Review* 27 (September 1967): 200.

[3] Richard R. Nelson, *The Moon and the Ghetto, An Essay on Public Policy Analysis* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977).

[4] For previous discussions of various aspects of political feasibility, see Yehezkel Dror, "The Prediction of Political Feasibility," *Futures* 1 (June 1969): 282–288; Ralph K. Huitt, "Political Feasibility," in Austin Ranney, ed., *Political Science and Public Policy* (Chicago: Markham, 1968); Duncan MacRae, Jr. and James Wilde, "Political Feasibility: Enactment and Implementation," in *Policy Analysis for Public Decisions* (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1979); Giandomenico Majone, "On the Notion of Political Feasibility," *European Journal of Political Research* 3 (September 1975): 259–274; and Arnold J. Meltsner, "Political Feasibility and Policy Analysis," *Public Administration Review* 32 (November/December 1972): 859–867, "Political and Organizational Analysis," in John P. Crecine, ed., *Research in Public Policy Analysis and Management, Supplement* 1 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1979): 51–77.

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and policy making, this article reviews the relevance of selected political science theories to political feasibility.

The article begins with a discussion of the meaning of "political feasibility" and its role in policy formulation. Next, the question of the relevance of selected political science literature to feasibility assessments is addressed. Finally, some suggestions for developing methodologies to assess political feasibility are offered. Throughout, the discussion is cast in terms of evaluating *prospective* policies, whether that function be performed by policy analysts, political advisers, or legislative staff. The illustrations and setting are limited to the formulation of federal-level, domestic policies, but obvious parallels exist for other levels of government.

Political Feasibility of Prospective Policies

In the process of devising policy proposals or seeking their acceptance and implementation, policy makers at least informally make "political feasibility" assessments. Both the timing and types of these assessments vary according to differing perspectives concerning the role of politics in policy formulation.

Varieties of Political Feasibility

Probability of Success. One definition considers political feasibility to be judgments about the "probabilities (or range of probabilities) that within a given time, defined policy alternatives will receive sufficient political push and support to be approved and implemented."[5] Just like the boating enthusiast, policy makers want to know the chances for clear sailing. This may entail assessing the likelihood of clearing relevant legislative hurdles. One White House assistant in the John F. Kennedy administration wrote, "The first question was always, Will it fly on the Hill?"[6] In addition, such assessments may entail gauging the odds of successfully overcoming political resistance that could be anticipated during program implementation.

One can imagine such judgments being made at several points in the policy process. When formulating policies, attempts may be made to assess political prospects. If the probabilities are sufficiently low, a policy proposal may be revised in order to increase its chance of approval and implementation. Or, once a policy has been formulated the chances for securing its passage may be assessed in order to decide whether or not the proposal should be pushed at that

[5] This is one of several definitions provided by Yehezkel Dror in *Design for Policy Sciences* (New York: American Elsevier, 1971), 59–60; Similar definitions are provided by MacRae and Wilde, "Political Feasibility"—"degree of possibility that the policy will be carried out"—and by Meltsner, "Political Feasibility and Policy Analysis"—"whether a program could survive without being unacceptably changed."

[6] Quoted from Paul C. Light, *The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Carter to Kennedy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 138.

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time. One aide to Richard Nixon noted, "We didn't want to send legislation [to Congress] that had no chance of success, but we also didn't want to hold back on legislation that had an opportunity."[7]

An example of probability calculations entering explicitly into policy formulation is provided by a reporting of an analysis concerning the Ronald Reagan administration options for addressing acid rain.[8] The analysis was presented by Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director David Stockman to the Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and Environment. Stockman's presentation contained cost-benefit calculations along with a discussion of "legislative process realism." The latter aspect of the analysis was summarized by a map of the United States, entitled "The Legislative Geography and Dynamics of SO_2 Controls," which depicted the types of proposals favored by each state's congressional delegation.

Identification of Constraints and Opportunities. Political feasibility assessments can also be viewed as "developing a sense of what [political] constraints to recognize and of when and how far to stretch those constrains. . . . "[9] According to this perspective, simply pointing out the probability of success is insufficient since such probabilities are dependent upon the political strategy that is used to enact and implement a policy. The task, therefore, is both devising a political strategy for gaining acceptance of a policy proposal and gauging the likely success of the strategy. As told by a Jimmy Carter administration legislative liaison: "It's O.K. for somebody to sit around dreaming up legislation they think is good. But if it is so good, show us how it is going to be passed. It brings you down to earth sometimes."[10]

This kind of activity requires both an understanding of the bases of support and resistance to policy proposals and an ability to judge overall success. With such knowledge, one can suggest ways in which to modify policy proposals or ways to "sell" proposals in order to enhance support for enactment or prospects for implementation.

One hallmark of successful policy makers is knowing what features to include in policy proposals in order to build supportive coalitions or to reduce resistance. A notable case is the legislative strategy that Senator Pete Domenici and his staff devised in order to secure passage in 1978 of waterway user fee legislation.[11] The basis of the strategy consisted of identifying prospective legislative roadblocks

[7] Ibid., 138.

[8] "Congress' Search for an Acid Rainbow," *The Washington Post National Weekly*, 13 February 1984, 6–7.

[9] Charles Schultze, *Politics and Economics of Public Spending* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1968), 92. For similar views see Robert D. Behn, "Policy Analysis and Policy Politics," *Policy Analysis* 7 (Spring 1981): 199–226; and Giandomenico Majone, "On the Notion of Political Feasibility."

[10] Frank Moore quoted from "The Tough Job of Normalizing Relations With Capitol Hill," *National Journal*, 13 January 1979, 26.

[11] This case is chronicled in T. R. Reid, *Congressional Odyssey: The Saga of a Senate Bill* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1980).

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such as unfavorable committees and the essential votes. Then Domenici maneuvered around the roadblocks and secured the essential votes by redefining the content of the bill.

Political Prices, Opportunity Costs, and Consequences. Political feasibility can be also viewed as the "political price to be paid for a course of action."[12] Any policy action entails political costs, with some proposals being more costly than others. Like financial costs, the political costs of a policy proposal revolve around prices and opportunity costs. Securing approval or implementing a policy proposal involves a "price" in the form of policy or other concessions that diminish the policy advocate's store of political capital. Even if enacted (and certainly if not enacted), there are opportunity costs of not giving attention to other, perhaps more profitable, issues. Balanced against these prices and opportunity costs are the political consequences of being associated with enactment of, or failure to enact, a particular policy proposal.

Political feasibility evaluations in these terms require assessment of political prices and opportunity costs. Acceptance or rejection of particular proposals depend upon a policy maker's willingness to bear the political costs and consequences associated with a proposal. A policy proposal may be feasible in the sense that it has sufficient probability of enactment, but the political costs or consequences may be sufficiently large to argue against the proposal.

In studying the formation of presidents' agendas, Paul Light found that presidents and their staffs "openly subscribe to a theory of legislative expense; they believe that programs have specific political and economic price tags."[13] Not surprisingly, evidence regarding the potential electoral consequences of enacting particular policy proposals may be important to policy makers. Reportedly, one of the factors that undermined Reagan administration support for Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator William Ruckelshaus's plan for reducing acid rain through control of smokestack emissions was a coal and utility industry paper circulated among administration officials entitled "The Politics of Acid Rain."[14] That paper listed the states that would pay for a control plan, Reagan's 1980 vote margins in those states, and the electoral votes the states would have in 1984.

Political Feasibility and Policy Formulation

The case for explicit consideration of political feasibility as part of the evaluation of prospective policies rests on the realities of policy enactment and im-

[12] Definition supplied by Ralph K. Huitt, "Political Feasibility," 264. Similar definitions are reflected in Charles Schultze's discussion of the "political opportunity costs in the selection of issues and choice of issues to be examined" and in Wildavsky's discussion of "political costs." See Schultze, *Politics and Economics*; and Aaron Wildavsky, "The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Systems Analysis, and Program Budgeting," *Public Administration Review* 4 (December 1966): 308–310.

[13] Light, *The Presidential Agenda*, 110.

[14] "Congress' Search for an Acid Rainbow."

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plementation. In the same manner that economists caution us to be concerned with economic efficiency, political scientists underscore the importance of considering "political rationality."[15] The calculus of political rationality requires explicit attention to political feasibility as an element of policy formulation. As stated by Ben J. Heineman and Curtis A. Hessler in their "presidential memorandum," written at the outset of Reagan's first term: "Every policy proposal must be judged not only on its merits but also in terms of its implications for the politics of governing (can it pass the Congress? will state and local governments accept it?), the politics of nomination and the politics of election. . . . In a very real sense, you face no greater challenge in functioning as the domestic president than to blend policy and politics properly."[16] Such considerations do not rule out great leaps in policy or daring proposals. Policy makers are simply cautioned to think through the strategy for gaining acceptance and implementation in order to breathe political life into such bold moves.

In practice, there is an uneasy relationship between policy and politics in policy formulation.[17] Policy makers concerned about appearing to be too political sometimes downplay political feasibility—a fault attributed to the Carter presidency. Moreover, the structure of policy making reinforces the separation of policy and political considerations. Within federal governmental offices, there often is a clear separation of political advice from "pure" economic and program policy analysis. The junior-grade analyst is not expected to provide political advice about the fate of a policy proposal. The political calculations are left to political appointees, legislative liaison staff, or legislative strategy groups. The experience to date with numerous structural arrangements within the executive office of the president and with formal structures for policy formulation have shown that the reconciliation of "pure" policy analysis with politics is difficult, no matter what the policy in question is or the institutional setting.

Political Feasibility and Political Science

Within the political science literature one readily finds pessimism about the ability to say anything definitive beyond the obvious about policy making. For example, consider the comments of one set of political scientists:

[15] Lindblom's work is especially noteworthy in emphasizing political rationality. See, in particular, Charles E. Lindblom, *The Intelligence of Democracy, Decision Making Through Mutual Adjustment* (New York: Free Press, 1965); and David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision, Policy Evaluation as a Social Process* (New York: Free Press, 1970). For a contrast between political rationality and economic rationality see Aaron Wildavsky, "The Political Economy of Efficiency."

[16] Ben J. Heineman, Jr. and Curtis A. Hessler, *Memorandum for the President: A Strategic Approach to Domestic Affairs in the 1980s* (New York: Random House, 1980), 36–37.

[17] The uneasy relationship is discussed by Heineman and Hessler, ibid., as well as more generally in terms of structural relationships by Steven J. Wayne, *The Legislative Presidency* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978).

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> The plausible and provocative theories of public policy formation . . . appear in general to be no more or less adequate than those in any area of political science. But the kinds of phenomena that the theories seek to explain are radically different from most of the other phenomena we study. It is this difference in the objects of analysis that is the source of the difficulty. In brief, public policy as a focus of systematic comparative analysis is more complex than such phenomena as electoral votes, legislative roll calls, incidents of political violence, and elite ideologies.[18]

Such pessimism may well be warranted for efforts to develop overarching theories of public policy or for testing existing theories. However, policy makers' needs are not as complex as those of political scientists interested in developing theories about policy formulation. Policy makers seek informed advice concerning political feasibility; political scientists seek precise theories. For both there is the inevitable difficulty of applying general theories about policy formulation to specific cases. Yet, the policy maker can and often must settle for little more than informed speculation; the political scientist cannot, or at least should not.

Strands of the Literature

The following discussion addresses insights concerning political feasibility that are derived from selected literature. Some topics—policy typologies and agenda setting—are the mainstream of the political science policy literature of the past decade. The remaining topics—interest-group theory and legislative analysis—are well developed literatures in political science that seem especially relevant to political feasibility.

Policy Typologies. Perhaps the best known political science literature dealing with public policy is the various efforts to classify public policies, beginning with Theodore J. Lowi's distinctions among distributive, redistributive, and regulatory policies.[19] The appeal of such activity lies in establishing relationships between the substance of policy and related politics; the underlying assertion is that substance to a large degree determines the politics of enactment and implementation.

The various typologies have been influential in describing policy activity.[20]

[18] George D. Greenberg, Jeffrey A. Miller, Lawrence B. Mohr, and Bruce C. Vladeck, "Developing Public Policy Theory: Perspectives from Empirical Research," *American Political Science Review* 71 (December 1977): 1533.

[19] Among other literature, see: Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies and Political Theory," *World Politics* 16 (June 1964): 677–715, "Decision Making vs. Policy Making: Toward an Antidote for Technocracy," *Public Adminstration Review* 30 (May/June 1970): 314–325; and "Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice," *Public Administration Review* 32 (July/August 1972): 298–310; also other typologies offered by James Q. Wilson, "Organizations and Public Policy" in *Political Organizations* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 327–345; and Robert Salisbury and John Heinz, "A Theory of Policy Analyses and Some Preliminary Applications," in Ira Sharkansky, ed., *Policy Analysis in Political Science* (Chicago: Markham, 1970), 39–59.

[20] Other applications of typologies include regulatory and implementation politics. See James Q.

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However, the typologies are of little value in predicting the political feasibility of particular policies. As elaborated in other criticisms of the typologies, it is difficult to decide for any specific policy and typology how that policy should be classified.[21] Because policies are often multidimensional, containing a mix of types, there is no objective basis for classification. Policy makers' perceptions of the policies are likely to dominate any objective classification.

The typologies suggest different political implications when choosing among broad policy strategies—that is, between obviously distributive or redistributive programs, or between regulatory programs with concentrated or disbursed costs. However, alternative policy proposals often do not differ in the broad terms of a distributive versus a redistributive program, but in the particulars of distribution or redistribution. In this respect, even if a particular policy could be adequately classified within a given policy typology, the distinctions of the typology are most likely too broad to be of much utility in forecasting political feasibility.

These criticisms suggest the policy typology literature has little relevance for the task of predicting "probabilities of success" of particular policy proposals. Yet, the literature could be helpful in thinking about constraints and opportunities when fashioning political strategies. In particular, the literature underscores the importance of identification of the perceptions of policy by policy makers or relevant interest groups as a key to understanding the sources of resistance or support for policy proposals.

Such knowledge can be important both in understanding the political sensitivity of a policy proposal and in fashioning a political strategy for gaining acceptance of a proposal. It may be useful to gauge how sensitive the overall characterization of a policy is to what appear to be relatively minor changes in the content of that policy. For example, a slight change in fee structure might change the perception of a user fee into that of a tax. Similarly, in piecing together a political strategy, it may be useful to attempt to alter perceptions of policies without necessarily changing the content of the policy. This may entail such things as changing labels of problems or programs—from the "sulfur dioxide problem" to "acid rain"—or minimizing the redistributive aspects of a program while dramatizing the distributive aspects.[22]

Wilson, "The Politics of Regulation," in James W. McKie, ed., *Social Responsibility and the Business Predicament* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974): 135–168; and Erwin C. Hargrove, "The Search for Implementation Theory" in Richard Zeckhauser and Derek Leebart, eds., *What Role for Government? Lessons from Policy Research* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983): 280–294.

[21] This and other critiques are raised in several sources: Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "The Categorization of Policy Contents," in Austin Ranney, ed., *Political Science and Public Policy* (Chicago, Markham, 1968), 41–52; George D. Greenberg et al., "Developing Public Policy Theory;" and Peter J. Steinberger, "Typologies of Public Policy: Meaning Construction and the Policy Process," *Social Science Quarterly* 61 (September 1980): 185–207, with rebuttal and reply.

[22] For example, James Q. Wilson discusses the ways in which policy entrepreneurs can emphasize different aspects of program impacts in order to increase program acceptability. See Wilson's "Organizations and Public Policy."

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Agenda Setting. The types of policy proposals that public officials are willing to entertain at any time bear a close relationship to the issues or problems of immediate concern to officials. The agenda setting literature deals broadly with the way in which issues reach official agendas and how policy proposals influence the agendas.[23] The dominant, but not exclusive, paradigm in this literature is that of various groups' demands and policy proposals vying for the official agenda and policy action.

This literature is relevant to political feasibility assessments in two ways. First, part of the feasibility assessment may consist of gauging whether or not relevant officials will pay attention to a policy proposal or problem. Consider the experience with educational vouchers.[24] The failure of school districts to even consider educational vouchers, or limited tests of vouchers, places obvious restrictions on the likelihood that the policy proposal could ever be adopted. For many school officials, educational vouchers are viewed as a solution in search of a problem.

The concept of a "policy window" is useful in thinking about the timing of policy proposals.[25] The term embodies the notions that opportunities for particular proposals only occur given the "right" circumstances, and that combinations of circumstances are of limited duration. Political strategists should be concerned with identifying their windows of opportunity, gauging the size of the policy windows, and identifying means to expand the windows.

The agenda-setting literature is also relevant to the political feasibility of proposals already on the official agenda, since the way in which issues or proposals reach the agenda can affect the prospects for future enactment or implementation.[26] Policy proposals that are initiated within government circles may backfire during implementation if the reactions of relevant interest groups are not anticipated. For example, the proposal to sell certain federal lands, which was initiated within the Interior Department during Reagan's first term, ran into serious opposition by environmental groups thereby causing a rethinking of the lands under consideration. One might imagine a different scenario had the policy proposal originated in response to environmental group initiatives. The point isn't that citizen participation is always essential, but that the prior history and visibility of issues is important to consider. In terms of political strategy, policy makers would want to consider the means by which policy proposals are initiated as a mechanism for enhancing political feasibility.

[23] Among other overviews see Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda Building*, 2nd ed., (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1983); and John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984).

[24] David K. Cohen and Eleanor Farrar, "Power to the Parents? The Story of Educational Vouchers," *The Public Interest* 48 (Summer 1977): 72–97.

[25] See the discussion by Kingdon, "The Policy Window and Joining the Streams" in Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives,* 173–204.

[26] Distinctions among different entrance patterns to policy agendas and the implications for policy action are made in Roger Cobb, Jennie-Keith Ross, and Marc Howard Ross, "Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process," *American Political Science Review* 70 (March 1976): 126–138.

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The agenda literature offers a number of propositions about issue expansion and containment that suggest the conditions under which resistance to or support for policy proposals can be mobilized.[27] As such, this literature provides a foundation for thinking about political strategies for enacting and implementing policies. Central to formulation of a political strategy is recognition of the degree of public (or attentive group) acceptance that is required for a policy to be implemented and how that can be mobilized. The foundation provided by the issue expansion and containment literature, however, is weakened by the difficulties of ascertaining which propositions are relevant to particular policy settings.

Interest-Group Theory. The agenda-setting literature is a subset of the interest-group literature, which views policy making in the United States as balancing demands of interest groups, as opposed to responding to powerful individuals, public opinion, or policy makers' self-interests.[28] According to the interest-group perspective, the probability of successful enactment and implementation of a policy proposal can be gauged by assessing the positions and strength of relevant interest groups. Similarly, political constraints and opportunities can be gauged by assessing the amount of group resistance to proposals and the groups which are likely to be swayed. The political consequences of a proposal can be gauged in terms of the relevant interest groups' reactions to enactment of the policy proposal.

The interest-group perspective undergirds the existing frameworks for assessing political feasibility.[29] For example, William D. Coplin and Michael K. O'Leary's calculus for conducting a political feasibility assessment for a particular policy proposal entails: assessing for each relevant group its issue position, power to influence policy, and salience (degree to which the group cares about the issue); combining the issue, power, and salience scores for each group, by multiplying the scores for the three factors; and summing the various groups' scores to indicate the overall magnitude of feasibility.

In essence, this and related frameworks that attempt to provide political feasibility scores are no more than accounting systems. The real work of estimating political feasibility comes in identifying relevant interest groups and in making judgments about issue position, power, and salience for the various groups. Knowledge of these aspects of feasibility, along with knowledge of coalitions, provides a basis for developing a political strategy aimed at particular groups or for assessing political constraints and opportunities.

[27] See in particular James S. Coleman, *Community Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1957); Cobb and Elder, *Participation in American Politics.*

[28] Among other overviews see Robert H. Salisbury, "Interest Groups" in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science,* vol. iv (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 171–228.

[29] For variants of the model described in what follows see William D. Coplin and Michael K. O'Leary, *Everyman's Prince, A Guide to Understanding Your Political Problems*, rev. ed. (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1976); and Grover Starling, "Political Feasibility," in Starling, *The Politics and Economics of Public Policy* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1979), 378–404.

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Recognizing the limits of these frameworks, the key insights for those concerned about political feasibility are those strands of the literature that undergird the accounting framework. One might highlight three points.[30] First is the importance of differentiating interest groups and actors according to their issue positions, power, and salience. Not all interest groups with a stake in a given policy will have the same influence in policy making, nor will they have identical incentives to exert their influence. Second, an interest group's power will vary among decision-making arenas and thus separate calculations are required for each relevant arena. Third, an interest group's salience and issue position will vary according to which aspect of an issue is under consideration. For any policy proposal an interest group might be concerned only with certain aspects, or might be supportive of some but resistant to others. This complicates measurement of interest-group positions. But it also provides a basis for altering interest-group positions through modification of elements of a policy proposal.

Legislative Analysis. To the extent that we wish to think of political feasibility in terms of the probabilities of, constraints upon, or opportunity costs of *enacting* legislation, the literature dealing with legislative analysis would seem to be especially relevant. Within the diverse legislative-analysis literature, the most relevant topics would appear to be roll-call analyses and committee decision making.[31]

Despite the existence of a well-developed literature about roll-call analysis and legislative voting, the prediction of legislative outcomes is not yet a central feature of the literature.[32] The theories of legislative voting that have been derived and tested through analyses of roll-call votes might provide a key to predicting congressional policy enactment were it not for two problems. First, roll-call analyses have focused upon ex post facto predictions of individual congressmen's decisions. In other words, does a given theory provide an accurate prediction of how congressmen actually voted? Political feasibility, on the other hand, is defined in terms of prospective predictions at aggregate levels. In other words, how much support will there be for a given policy proposal? Second, some of the key independent variables employed in roll-call analyses must themselves be forecast if prospective predictions are to be made. For example, when employing the cue-taking model, one must first gauge the strength of various cues—presidential en-

[30] These notions are developed more fully by Arnold J. Meltsner in "Political Feasibility and Policy Analysis."

[31] For recent overviews of the literature see: John W. Kingdon, "Models of Legislative Voting," *Journal of Politics* 39 (August 1977); Leroy N. Rieselbach, "The Forest for the Trees: Blazing Trails for Congressional Research," in Ada W. Finifter, ed., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline* (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1983); and Herbert F. Weisberg, "Evaluating Theories of Congressional Roll-Call Voting," *American Journal of Political Science* 22 (August 1978).

[32] One exception is an analysis by Davis and Jackson in which they use roll-call analysis to both diagnose the defeat of Nixon's Family Assistance Plan in 1970 and to suggest a political strategy for securing future passage of an income maintenance program. See Otto A. Davis and John E. Jackson, "Senate Defeat of the Family Assistance Plan," *Public Policy* 22 (Summer 1974): 245–273.

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dorsements, the state delegation's position, the party leadership endorsement, support of the committee chairman reporting the bill, vote of the conservative coalition, vote of the party majority, and so on.[33] Through head counting the strength of the cues can be and often is gauged, but such activity requires a good political intelligence network.

It is somewhat surprising, given the volume of literature about roll-call votes, that relatively little has been written about committee votes and decision-making patterns.[34] The literature suggests that different congressional committees have their own personalities, so to speak, and that the decision making within committees varies somewhat by issue. All of this would suggest that any effort to model probabilities of successful committee clearance would require committee specific and issue-domain specific models.[35]

The roll-call literature and related models of legislative voting do not at present provide predictions of probabilities of enactment for policy proposals. In providing an understanding of the cues to which legislators look for advice about voting decisions, the roll-call literature suggests one basis for formulating predictive models. In some senses, however, the literature about committee decision making is more relevant, since committees are a key to understanding political feasibility in terms of its probabilistic definition. Along these lines, efforts to predict the probability of committee reporting of bills are especially relevant. Unfortunately, given the degree of variability among issues and committees, it seems unlikely that such modeling efforts will greatly improve upon the null prediction of political infeasibility.

Reassessing Relevance

Let us now return to the question of the relevance of the political science literature by summarizing the implications of the discussion so far for notions of political feasibility: probabilities of success for policy proposals; identification of policy constraints and opportunities; and calculations of political prices, opportunity costs or consequences of particular proposals. In brief, the political science literature provides an appreciation of constraints and opportunities and indicates the elements which might enter into predictive models or political cost

[33] The "cue-taking" model is developed in Donald R. Matthews and James A. Stimson, *Yeas and Nays: Normal Decision-making in the U.S. House of Representatives* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975).

[34] See the discussion of the literature by Rieselbach, "Forest for the Trees." The major work in the field is Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *Congressmen in Committees* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).

[35] One such modeling effort is being undertaken by Mark Crain of George Mason University and is discussed in "Can Computer Program Outguess Lobbyists," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 31 March 1984, 754. My thanks to Professor Crain for sharing information about the model and initial forecasts. The computer models assume more stability in committee decision making than the political science literature would suggest, as discussed for example in David E. Price, "Policy Making in Congressional Committees: The Impact of 'Environmental' Factors," *American Political Science Review* 72 (June 1978): 548–574.

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calculations. However, the underlying theories provide little indication of how the various elements could or should be combined to form a political feasibility calculus.

The difficulty of making probabilistic judgments about the likelihood of policy proposals being enacted and implemented is underscored by much of the literature reviewed here. There is insufficient agreement within the literature about the factors that affect political feasibility, much less the relationships among factors, to suggest a basis for making probabilistic judgments. The closest one comes to such guidance is provided by divergent models derived from the interest-group and legislative-analysis literatures. In the former approach, feasibility is calculated in terms of the positions and the strength of relevant interest groups or actors, with the relevant groups varying somewhat by decision arena. The legislative analysis approach to judging political feasibility entails modeling the flow of legislation and calculating the odds of passing particular hurdles. The two approaches complement each other in the overall calculation of feasibility. Yet, the basis for combing these approaches into a model for predicting feasibility in probabilistic terms is far from clear.

The literature reviewed here is stronger in providing insights about political constraints and opportunities. Given the level of abstraction of these insights, the literature is perhaps best described as providing ways of thinking about political constraints and opportunities, rather than providing specific hints about what works. More specific advice about political strategy might be derived from case studies of policy entrepreneurs and policy proposals.[36]

Perhaps the most uncertain contribution of the literature is to our understanding of political prices and consequences. To the extent that the literature provides guidance about the degree of difficulty of securing enactment of policy proposals, it also suggests the political price that must be paid to secure approvals. Yet, other than suggesting the importance of thinking about which groups are affected by a given policy proposal, the literature is thin in suggesting how to trace political consequences. Such calculations require both identification of the affected groups and prediction of those groups' electoral responses to policy actions.

Toward Feasibility Estimates

It is fruitless to attempt to develop a predictive model that forecasts the political feasibility of policy proposals. The variability in proposals, settings, interests groups, and the like are substantial enough to inhibit such modeling efforts. Moreover, the underlying theoretical base for developing predictive models is such that we should never expect more than a partial feasibility calculus.

[36] See, for example, the advice about policy termination that has been derived from case studies, as exemplified by Robert D. Behn, "How to Terminate a Public Policy: A Dozen Hints for a Would-be Terminator," *Policy Analysis* 4 (Summer 1978): 393–413.

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Nonetheless, the literature reviewed here suggests the kinds of considerations that could, and often do, enter into judgments about political feasibility. In providing methodological guidance one might emphasize such things as understanding the perceptions and causal thinking about policy proposals, mapping the alignments of interest groups and actors with respect to particular policy proposals, gauging the likelihood of clearing key legislative hurdles, or identifying likely sources of resistance to proposals during implementation.

What form might such guidance take? The development of political feasibility calculations or political strategies may be constrained both by time and by access to political intelligence.[37] Under such constraints, those charged with diagnosing political feasibility might benefit from methodological advice that guides an "arm chair" analysis of political feasibility, perhaps relying upon a few phone calls or use of other secondary sources of information. In rarer situations, there may be considerably more time to develop a political analysis and considerably greater access to political intelligence. For example, the White House legislative strategy group or congressional caucuses are in a good position to conduct head counts of support for policy proposals as illustrated by the David Stockman analysis of acid rain proposals. Such legislative strategy groups might benefit from methodological advice that fosters an understanding of political feasibility as well as provides a means for revising that understanding as new information becomes available or circumstances change.

The notion of political maps helps to tie together notions developed with the literature discussed in this article. In general, a political map attempts to portray the relationships among factors that affect the politics of a given issue. We can think of two kinds of political maps. "Perceptual maps" entail efforts to portray how particular policy features are perceived by relevant interest groups or policy makers. "Position maps" entail efforts to portray the positions (support or resistance) and influence of relevant interest groups or policy makers.

Political mapping is clearly only a means for informing judgments about political feasibility. Political maps must be interpreted with care in order to estimate probabilities of enactment and implementation, to develop political strategies, or to gauge political impacts. Because political maps portray alignments or perceptions at one point in time, they do not adequately indicate the sensitivity of these factors to changes in policy proposals or political symbols. With these caveats in mind, let us consider the two types of political maps.

Perceptual Maps

One of the notions that emerges from the policy typology literature is the observation that policy makers' or relevant interest groups' perceptions may be a key to understanding the sources of resistance or support for policy proposals.

[37] For a discussion of constraints upon policy formulation see, Arnold J. Meltsner, *Policy Analysts in the Bureaucracy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976), 276–282.

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Knowing how policies are perceived provides a basis for designing political strategies aimed at altering perceptual maps by symbol manipulation such as relabeling policy features, redressing misperceptions, or altering policy content. To gain such an understanding, one needs to construct a map showing perceptions of a policy or key features and perceptions of the impact of the proposed policy.

An example of such perceptual mapping is Steven Kelman's study of the perceptions of the economic-incentives approach to environmental policy held by relevant congressional staffers and staffs of environmental organizations and trade associations who deal with environmental issues.[38] In exploring the perceptions of each set of actors, he found few respondents thought of environmental incentives in terms of economic efficiency, while most thought of the issue in ideological terms of market versus government regulation. As a consequence, in stressing the efficiency aspects of economic incentives, economists essentially ignore the terms and terminology of most of the policy debate. Knowing how economic incentives were perceived by various groups, Kelman was able to outline partially a political strategy aimed at securing adoption and implementation of pollution charges as an ingredient of environmental policy.

Another example is Bill Cavala and Aaron Wildavsky's study of the political feasibility of policies that would give poor people income as a right, for example, a negative income tax.[39] Their interviews with members of Congress, conducted in 1969, showed most did not understand what was meant by any of the common terms used to describe guaranteed income proposals. Nonetheless, they found well-formed but often incorrect beliefs regarding the effects of work incentives, popular support for income redistribution, and so on. It turned out that their political diagnosis was overly pessimistic for shortly after making the diagnosis, Nixon's Family Assistance Plan passed the House but failed in the Senate.

As one might infer from these studies, the methodology of perceptual mapping is not well developed in the context of conducting political feasibility assessments. Any such methodological development would want to consider ways of acquiring data other than direct interviews (for example, analysis of issue papers or speeches), selection of relevant interests, disaggregation of perceptual maps in order to distinguish different patterns of causal thinking, and so on. Some useful guidance for developing perceptual mapping in this context might be derived from the work of Robert Axelrod and others in mapping foreign policy decision-making patterns.[40]

[38] Steven Kelman, *What Price Incentives? Economists and the Environment* (Boston: Auburn House Publishing, 1981); and "Economists and the Environmental Muddle" *The Public Interest* 64 (Summer 1981): 106–123.

[39] Bill Cavala and Aaron Wildavsky, "The Political Feasibility of Income by Right," *Public Policy* 18 (Spring 1970): 321–354.

[40] Robert Axelrod, ed., *Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

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Position Maps

A related type of political mapping consists of mapping the positions of interest groups or key actors vis-à-vis the main features of a policy proposal. Such a mapping provides a potential basis for predicting the likely outcomes of each policy alternative as well as for formulating political strategies.[41]

One example of a position map is Paul Light's analysis of key interest-group resistance to various policy options for dealing with the recent social security crisis.[42] From studying interest-group testimony at congressional hearings and talking with lobbyists, Light was able to identify the groups that were opposed to each of the potential elements of a reform package. The position mapping is rather general, in that the feasibility assessments fail to take into consideration differences in the power of the groups or the salience of the issue to the various groups. Nonetheless, from the mapping one is able to envision the lines of opposition to reform and the trade-offs they pose.

An example of a somewhat more sophisticated approach to position mapping is a study of policy proposals dealing with natural hazards undertaken by Peter H. Rossi and his colleagues.[43] The study involved interviews with more than 2,000 "political elites" in a sample of twenty states and one-hundred localities subject to relatively high risks of floods, tornadoes, hurricanes, or earthquakes. The respondents were chosen on the basis of either occupying key political or appointed offices (governors, mayors, planners) or because they were expected to have a strong stake in hazards issues (realtors, developers, bankers). Respondents were asked about their perceptions of the degree of hazard risk in their community or state and their support for various potential policies for averting or coping with disaster losses. The responses provided a basis for mapping alignments of support for the various proposals, as well as sources of possible resistance. These findings would be useful in thinking about prospective implementation problems since the policies under consideration ultimately require state and local actions.

As is evident from this and earlier discussion, the methodology of position mapping is also not well refined. Among other methodological developments, consideration needs to be given to methods for identifying key decision points in legislative flows, selection of actors or interest groups that are influential at particular decision points, data collection methods, and measurement of the sensitivity of position maps to changes in policy proposals or symbols.

[41] This discussion draws upon Arnold J. Meltsner, "Political Feasibility and Policy Analysis," and "Political and Organizational Analysis."

[42] Paul Light, "Solutions for a Package of Pain," in Light, *Artful Work: The Politics of Social Reform* (New York: Random House, 1985), 99–113.

[43] Peter H. Rossi, James D. Wright, and Eleanor Weber-Burdin, *Natural Hazards and Public Choice: The State and Local Politics of Hazard Mitigation* (New York: Academic Press, 1982).

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Conclusions

We often find ourselves asking what contributions the political science discipline can make to public policy formulation and assessment. One potential comparative advantage of the discipline is in guiding judgments about the political feasibility of policy proposals. Clearly, politicians spend a good deal of effort in making such judgments. Yet, the conventional wisdom seems to be that political scientists have contributed little to our understanding of or methodologies for assessing the political feasibility of prospective policy proposals.

The political science literature about policy and politics provides little specific advice about political feasibility assessments. This in itself is not surprising, since few articles are concerned with the methodology of such calculations. On the other hand, the literature provides insights about policy making that are potentially relevant for political feasibility assessments and political strategy formulation. As discussed in this article, the underlying political science theories provide little indication of how the various propositions concerning political feasibility could or should be combined to inform political feasibility calculations.

Efforts to develop methodologies for assessing political feasibility must be tempered by recognition of the constraints imposed by the vagaries of policy making and by the limited theoretical base for combining diverse propositions about policy and politics. For these reasons, we should never expect more than a partial political feasibility calculus based upon informed judgments. The challenge is to develop methodological guidance that informs judgments about the probabilities of legislative enactment, political strategies, or the political costs of policy proposals.*

* The author expresses thanks to Neil Berch for his research assistance as well as to Richard Elmore, John Mendeloff, Richard Weatherly, Walter Williams, and William Zumeta for comments on earlier verisons of this paper.

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Two Roads Diverged in a Wood: A Review Essay on British Politics

JORGEN S. RASMUSSEN

As numerous book titles have informed us, there always is a political system somewhere that is "in transition." To be "at the crossroads," however, implies rather more: it is to be at a portentous point where the direction selected will make all the difference. While Patrick Dunleavy and Christopher Husbands think that Britain is at that fateful juncture now, Martin Holmes is certain that the country reached that point seven years ago, took the road less traveled by, and indeed a jolly good thing it was to have done so.[1] It would be hard to find books more disparate than these two: one a neo-Marxist analysis of British voting behavior and the other an adulatory description of economic conditions during the first Thatcher government.

Holmes believes that Thatcher has transformed British economic policy and the aims of the Conservative party. What happened during her first term was "little short of a revolution" and the resultant "Thatcher era, and the Thatcher phenomenon which propels it, will be the dominant feature of British political life for some time to come."[2] While Dunleavy and Husbands see no new departure in policy, they break with the past in offering a new approach to the analysis

[1] Patrick Dunleavy and Christopher Husbands, *British Democracy at the Crossroads* (Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1985); Martin Holmes, *The First Thatcher Government 1979–1983: Contemporary Conservatism and Economic Change* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985).

[2] Holmes, *First Thatcher Government*, 216.

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of electoral politics, which clarifies how flawed British democracy has become. They believe that "the grounds for concern about the future of British 'polyarchy' are more substantial now than at any previous time in the postwar period."[3] They anticipate the coercive use of state power to enforce consent.

Once an international dimension is added to current British politics, however, such apocalyptic visions vanish. David Butler and Paul Jowett, reporting on British participation in the 1984 Euroelections, concede that no one in Britain had "any sense that the election was deciding anything important" and grant that "it could not be said that the outcome of the election seriously affected the British political stituation."[4] Taken together, these three books provide a virtual AAA touring guide to the gamut of forks in the road encountered, or about to be, on a journey through current British politics.

Having in two previous books charted Britain's economic course during the 1970s, Holmes in the current one continues the story into the 1980s. This work, in contrast to the earlier ones, is marked by extraordinarily explicit partisanship. After indicating how the economic objectives of the Thatcher government broke with postwar policy in Britain, Holmes devotes separate chapters to unemployment, inflation, public spending, trade unions, and industrial policy. He examines the electoral response to these policies in 1983 and closes with an assessment of Thatcher's achievements.

Butler and Jowett's account of the 1984 Euroelections in Britain is organized similarly to Butler's and David Marquand's book on the first direct elections for the European parliament in 1979.[5] The first quarter of *Party Stategies in Britain* sets the stage with discussions of the main developments in British relations with the European Economic Community (EEC) during Thatcher's first term and how British Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) functioned during this time. Separate chapters examine how each of the main parties organized their Eurocampaigns. Two chapters focus on campaigning itself. The one dealing with the campaign at the constituency level draws upon the information obtained from questionnaires the authors circulated to all the candidates. The national chapter includes a detailed report on media, especially press, coverage. The final chapter assesses the results to speculate not only on future Eurocampaigns but also on their significance for British domestic politics. John Curtice contributes a substantial appendix analyzing the results in detail to ascertain such things as the impact of the candidates and issues and the partisan effects of low turnout.

While both Holmes and Butler/Jowett are, therefore, sequels to earlier work, Dunleavy and Husbands diverge from prevailing scholarship. Although they employ a neo-Marxist approach, their book is far from being an ideological rant.

[3] Dunleavy and Husbands, *British Democracy*, 215.

[4] David Butler and Paul Jowett, *Party Strategies in Britain: A Study of the 1984 European Elections* (New York: St. Martin's, 1985), 93, 127.

[5] David Butler and David Marquand, *European Elections and British Politics* (London: Longman, 1981).

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They are capable social scientists offering a sophisticated analysis of electoral politics. Thus much of their book is simply another study of the 1983 general election covering such familiar topics as the run up to and the course of the campaign, party images, the media, the social bases of politics, party issues, and voter attitudes. What sets it apart is their rejection of the party identification and issue voting approaches to the study of electoral behavior in favor of a "radical approach" focusing on the conflicts of interest produced by social inequality and ideological pervasiveness. They interpret the results of the 1983 election by using their model to analyze data from a survey of opinion conducted immediately after the campaign.

A Revolution in Policy?

Margaret Thatcher's uniqueness as the first female chief executive in a major industrial nation is obvious, and no British prime minister since Winston Churchill has possessed a comparable reputation for unyielding determination. But are such contracts just matters of image, not of substance? Does Thatcher really represent a new departure in British politics? Did Britain truly encounter divergent roads in the late 1970s and head off in a new direction?

That significant economic changes have occurred in Britain in the last few years hardly can be denied—inflation has been dramatically reduced and several enterprises formerly owned by the government have been returned to private ownership. But then the record becomes rather ambiguous. Holmes concedes that Thatcher has not been able to contain public spending—this is about the only aspect of economic policy on which he faults her. With respect to unemployment, the change under Thatcher certainly has been obvious, but hardly a development for which most people would be willing to praise her. The near tripling of the number of people out of work fails to daunt Holmes, however; he absolves her of any responsibility for the increase. He does not even regard unemployment as the price that had to be paid for controlling inflation. Rather, overpaid workers priced themselves out of jobs and overmanned British industry rid itself of unnecessary workers in an effort to increase productive efficiency. Thus the rise in joblessness was all to the good.

While such conclusions are a matter of opinion, economic performance can be precisely measured in a number of areas. Richard Rose has examined several of the relevant indicators much more systematically than has Holmes and offers evidence that secular trends play a larger role in accounting for economic outputs than do differences in partisan objectives.[6] Rose emphasizes the lack of success of the Thatcher government in achieving its economic goals, arguing for continuity, not sharp divergence, of policy. Thus while some economic change has occurred in Britain, the shift hardly merits being called a "revolution"; even

[6] Richard Rose, *Do Parties Make a Difference?* 2nd ed., (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1984), 106–41.

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governments as determined as Thatcher's do not have as much scope for economic maneuver as Holmes believes.

Transformation of Decision Making?

For Holmes the revolution is not limited to policy content. He believes that Thatcher has transformed as well the process of policy formation. Indeed, had she not done so, the policy content revolution that he thinks has occurred would not have been possible. He praises Thatcher for ending corporatism by denying the unions any role in economic policy formation and notes with satisfaction that this hard line, rather than resulting in industrial unrest, reduced strikes to their lowest level since the 1940s. That the unions' restraint might have had something to do with high unemployment escapes Holmes.

Furthermore, the idea that Maggie sent the unions packing is open to question. Anthony King argues that Thatcher is an innately cautious politician and that this characteristic has been most evident in her dealings with the unions.[7] Even under the rule of she-who-must-be-obeyed, militant workers have been able to muscle concessions out of the government. When convinced that There Is No Alternative, Thatcher has given way. Similarly Rose maintains that despite Thatcher's identification with confrontational politics, British politics continues to fit a consensus model better than an adversary one.[8]

As for policy formation within the government, as distinct from between the government and other political actors, scholars have stressed the importance of the collective nature of cabinet government as a constraint upon the prime minister's role.[9] The prime minister is seen as presiding over, not dominating, the cabinet and as seeking consensus. He or she can do no more that set a theme or a purpose for the government and endeavor to steer it toward certain objectives. The prime minister does not have a significant role in the detailed formulation of specific policies. The prime minister is granted, however, special interest in economic policies and somewhat greater influence in these matters, a qualification of some relevance given Holmes's subject matter.

Thatcher's uniqueness lies in her unwillingness to accept such traditional constraints, not only in economic affairs as Holmes explains, but in other policy areas as well.[10] She came to office with a broad policy agenda that she was determined to implement. Nonetheless, Holmes claims a pervasiveness in economic policy exceeding that noted by most other scholars. He asserts that Thatcher "herself was the prime source of economic policy formation. The key personnel

[7] Anthony King, "Margaret Thatcher: The Style of a Prime Minister," in Anthony King, ed., *The British Prime Minister*, 2nd ed., (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1985), 118–22.

[8] Rose, *Do Parties Make a Difference*, xxix-xxxi.

[9] Richard Rose, "British Government: The Job at the Top," in Richard Rose and Ezra Suleiman, eds., *Presidents and Prime Ministers* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), 22–6, 32–43; and King, "Margaret Thatcher," 114–8.

[10] King, "Margaret Thatcher," 98, 117, 124–6.

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would suggest and advise but the overall strategy was never removed from No. 10 Downing Street's control. Indeed, it was centralised at No. 10 and imposed on other more traditional policy sources."[11] "Asserts" is the operative word, because a weakness of Holmes's account is his failure to provide information on the details of policy making. He describes economic conditions and the substance of the policies formulated to deal with them, but says little about the actual policy process. Holmes's Thatcher is rather like the deists' God—having set the mechanism in motion she vanishes from the scene.

Vanishes, that is, except for the occasional Jovian rumbling of thunder and casting of lighting bolts. Holmes certainly stresses her importance in prodding—or as King calls it, humiliating and bullying[12]—her colleagues toward policy reforms. The impression that one gains from Holmes, however, is of a prime minister not needing to intervene directly in the policy process but able to determine the substance of policy largely by sheer strength of will. There is something to be said for this view; even cabinet ministers do what they know she wants—and she certainly does not hesitate to voice her preferences—to avoid a dressing down. Nonetheless, such a picture is a bit misleading because it tells only part of the story. Thatcher is only too willing to intervene in the minutest details of almost everything.

Butler and Jowett's account of events in the European Parliament between the elections of 1979 and 1984 provides an excellent example. Margaret Thatcher appears in her usual manifestation—the abrasive leader determined to thrust herself into the details of policy making even at the fringes.[13] The conflict between those willing to compromise and those more intransigent (wets and drys), which Holmes discusses in relation to domestic economic policy, was clearly present among the Conservative delegation to the European Parliament. Thatcher is said to be "incensed that Conservatives in the European Parliament could get away with voting against the government's line at Westminster."[14] The Westminster Conservative whips summoned miscreant MEPs to account for their behavior; a meeting was arranged between Thatcher and the Conservative MEPs so that she could persuade them to vote as she wanted.

While Holmes can point to various successes achieved by her style of governing, other scholars have noted more than he does that she frequently was defeated in cabinet even on economic policy during the initial two years of her first administration.[15] And even Holmes concedes that it was the recapture of the Falklands that really established her authority. Not only did that military triumph pave the way for the 1983 electoral victory, as has been widely noted, but it also insured her dominance not just in matters of defense, but over all other

[11] Holmes, *First Thatcher Government*, 200.
[12] King, "Margaret Thatcher," 131.
[13] Butler and Jowett, *Party Strategies in Britain*, 16–28.
[14] Ibid., 26.
[15] For example, King, "Margaret Thatcher," 103–4.

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policy as well.[16] But for a rather fortuitous military adventure by a Latin American caudillo, British politics might not have taken such a divergent path. Determination and cajoling would not have been sufficient to insure the policy reorientation that Thatcher sought.

Thatcher's operating procedures also have their limits in their effect upon her relations with the public. Holmes offers the curious judgment that her relations with the public were "good" and that she broke with previous Conservative leaders in being "unashamedly populist."[17] People doubtlessly do regard her as purposeful and decisive—qualities that are felt to help make her a good prime minister. But Holmes fails to grant that the public also sees her as divisive, conceited, cold and aloof, and out of touch with the common person.[18]

Even if Holmes does tend to present a rather overstated and one-sided portrait of Thatcher's role in policy formation, he still offers ample evidence to reinforce King's assessment that she has developed a new prime ministerial style and has demonstrated that the prime minister can have even greater policy authority than had been thought.[19] To this extent the Thatcher phenomenon is a new departure. Holmes's case for a revolution in British politics is stronger with regard to the *process* of policy making than it is with regard to the *content* of economic policy.

The European Dimension

Holmes believes that Thatcher also "has changed the nature of contemporary Conservatism" since "the effects of these policies affected the presentation of Conservatism both within the party itself and, ultimately, to the electorate."[20] In the case of foreign policy one could argue that the "revolution" in postwar British policy occurred long before Thatcher. The decision to join the European Economic Community certainly was a major reversal of long-established policy. Furthermore, that such a decision should have been taken by the party of the Empire is even more remarkable. Add to that the idea of permitting British citizens to elect representatives to an international parliament, and one has a situation unimaginable to most people only a generation ago.

Thatcher's impact has not been as dramatic as these events have been, but she has left her mark on the nature of the Conservatives' appeals to the electorate in European matters. Given her battles with the European Community, one is almost surprised that the Conservative campaign did not link hands with the Labour left and advocate British withdrawal. One of the ads used by the Conservatives featured a photo of combat-weary British World War I soldiers and the caption "AT LEAST THESE DAYS WE'RE ONLY FIGHTING OVER BEEF

[16] Ibid., 106–7; and Holmes, *First Thatcher Government*, 82.

[17] Holmes, *First Thatcher Government*, 210.

[18] See King, "Margaret Thatcher," 111–4 for a more balanced assessment of the impact of Thatcher's personality upon the public.

[19] Ibid., 136–8.

[20] Holmes, *First Thatcher Government*, 1.

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AND LAMB." It was something short of a ringing endorsement of British membership, hardly what the party would have done under Edward Heath. And while Butler and Jowett do not suggest that this theme was Thatcher's idea, here again, as with policy making, a mere declaration of general attitude probably was sufficient to do the job.

Since the British, as someone once observed, are a people who believe that nothing ever should be done for the first time, the controversy over direct Euro-elections was fought back in the 1970s. The second such elections in 1984 produced little more than a yawn. Nonetheless, the campaign does tell us a bit more about British politics than just the British ability to absorb and defuse "revolutionary" change.

Butler and Jowett regard Labour's campaign as evidence that it had learned something from its 1983 fiasco.[21] The party had come to recognize that it can ignore the message from the opinion polls only at its peril. Also Labour's campaign broadcast was much more professionally prepared than had been true of those during the general election. But while Labour's Eurocampaign was an improvement over the general election one (it hardly could have been worse), the party still had a ways to go in developing a really effective organization.

The Euroelections saw the Alliance of the Liberals and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) lose much of the ground it had gained in 1983, being relegated once again to a distant third in popular support, to say nothing of seats. As with Labour, there were improvements. Candidate selection—the issue that had threatened at one point prior to the general election to tear the Alliance apart—was handled fairly amiably. The SDP had indicated that it would refuse to sit with the Liberal Group in the European Parliament, since it includes representatives from continental parties on the right of the political spectrum. This proved to be a fairly typical disagreement over the inconsequential. Since no Liberal or SDP candidate was elected for any British constituency, who would sit next to whom mattered little.

Divergent Roads for the Labour Party and the Workers?

Thus in the Euroelections of 1984, Britain did not continue its journey down the path leading to a transformed party system; but, apparently retracing its steps, it plodded once again along the familiar road of the traditional Conservative/Labour two-party system. In Holmes's view, however, the nature of party competition has been transformed regardless of whether the party system has changed. The attempt of the Labour left to break out of Butskellism—the cross-party concensus of Richard Butler and Hugh Gaitskell in the 1950s and 1960s—has proven to be an electoral failure, but under Thatcher the right has shown that repudiating this accord can be a winner. The irony is that the "great revolution

[21] Butler and Jowett, *Party Strategies in Britain*, 63–65, 84, 87, 96, 136.

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in post-war British political life in the end has not come from the left," but "from the right, Mrs. Thatcher's radical right."[22]

Coming as they do from the end of the political spectrum opposite to Holmes, Dunleavy and Husbands could be expected to take a different view of the 1983 electoral verdict on the first installment of Thatcherism. What is noteworthy is the scholarly sophistication with which they have done so. Therefore, their study needs to be put in its academic context.

Nearly twenty years ago David Butler and Donald Stokes published a study of British voting behavior immediately recognized as a classic.[23] The authors' ability to marry so successfully their contrasting, although logically complementary, expertise was remarkable. While Butler had not originated the so-called Nuffield series of accounts of British general elections—he was not associated with it until the second volume and did not direct it until the third—these reports clearly had become his progeny. The Nuffield series sought to provide a reliable record of British general elections—what were the main issues of the campaign, what strategies did the parties employ, how did the media cover the campaign, what were the background characteristics of the candidates. Voting behavior as such, the motivations for partisan preferences, was given little attention. Stokes was a member of the University of Michigan team that had become the foremost source for studies of American political behavior. In contrast to Nuffield, the Michigan approach put limited emphasis upon the campaign—elections simply were those points in time in which voters formally declared the preferences that the interaction upon them of socio-economic forces and political socialization had produced. Michigan was less concerned to record political events than to explain why they had occurred.

Perhaps the major thrust of Butler and Stokes's analysis was that Labour would be the dominant party in British politics in the last third of the twentieth century. Early childhood socialization was regarded as the key to voting behavior. Voters who had been socialized into the old Liberal/Conservative party system were dying off in the 1960s and were being replaced in the electorate by voters who had become aware of politics in Labour or nonpartisan homes. Thus they were available to be mobilized by a Labour party now seen as the party of government. This all fit in very well with Labour's victories in the 1964 and 1966 general elections and with Labour Leader Harold Wilson's determination to present Labour as the channel for the great white heat of technology.

We should not forget, however, what a remarkable shift such views entailed. Less than ten years earlier such a portrait would have produced incredulity. In 1960, Labour was a party that seemed to be tearing itself apart over nuclear weapons. It had been out of office for nearly a decade and had seen the Conservative party increase its number of seats in Parliament at four successive elections. *The* book on British voting behavior then (not nearly as elaborate a study

[22] Holmes, *First Thatcher Government*, 3.

[23] David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain* (New York: St. Martin's, 1969) and 2nd college ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1976).

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as Butler and Stokes would produce, but quite influential, nonetheless) was entitled *Must Labour Lose?*[24] Far from being seen as the dominant party of the future, Labour appeared to be a party that might be condemned to perpetual opposition status as much as were the Communists in Italy.

The point is how quickly and totally even academic assessments of the British party system can change. If, as Harold Wilson once said, "A week in politics is a long time," then a decade is an eternity. Indeed Butler and Stokes soon were to some extent victimized by the rapid fluctuation of party fortunes. Not only did Labour win only two of the four elections in the 1970s, but both victories were indecisive—one failed to produce a parliamentary majority, and the majority that the other did yield was so narrow that it had dissipated about half way through the parliamentary term. Furthermore, a resurgent Liberal party and nationalist parties in Wales and Scotland reduced the two leading parties' share of the vote to levels not experienced for half a century. Academic studies now focused on dealignment and realignment of the party system. And Labour seemed to have come full circle—the question in the mid-1980s is the same as at the start of the 1960s: Must Labour Lose?

Thus the time clearly is ripe for someone to do a Butler and Stokes for the 1980s, to analyze the bases of voting behavior in contemporary Britain so as to explicate the changes in the British party system and suggest likely developments. All that this may require is a demonstration of how new data can be fit into Butler and Stokes's still valid theoretical framework. Alternatively, it may be necessary to argue that they got it wrong, that only by rejecting their basic premises can we make sense of what has happened. Bo Sarlvik and Ivor Crewe, who assumed responsibility from Butler and Stokes for the British electoral studies of the 1970s, have tended to favor the first option.[25] Whether those in charge of the 1983 survey, Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell, and John Curtice, will do so as well is uncertain, since their study was not available at this time of publication.

In the meantime, however, Dunleavy and Husbands clearly have taken the divergent path; they explicitly state that they "are skeptical of the tradition inaugurated by Butler and Stokes."[26] They assert that voting behavior can be explained more satisfactorily by a "radical" model than by either the party identification or issue voting approaches. The radical model has some affinity with the Marxist idea of false class consciousness. Various social groups differ not only in conflicting interests, but also in their permeability to ideological messages, especially those transmitted by the mass media. Therefore, only some of the electorate is sufficiently perceptive or insulated to vote for its self-interest. Since one's location in the social hierarchy is crucial, voting behavior must be analyzed

[24] Mark Abrams, Richard Rose, and Rita Hinden, *Must Labour Lose?* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1960).

[25] Bo Sarlvik and Ivor Crewe, *Decade of Dealignment: The Conservative Victory of 1979 and Electoral Trends in the 1970s* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

[26] Dunleavy and Husbands, *British Democracy*, xviii.

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by social, not occupational, class. That is, what matters is where one is placed in the productive system and how much power he or she possesses to determine personal work tasks.

The radical model attributes the decline in class voting in Britain, remarked upon by all students of British politics, to the impact of cleavages rooted in the most basic features of the social hierarchy. Conflicting interests between those working in the public and those in the private enterprise sectors cut across and attenuate the traditional occupational-class voting patterns. So also do conflicts between those practicing collective or individualized consumption, that is, between those consuming primarily goods provided by government and those well-off enough to purchase goods mainly in the marketplace. As for the implications of this approach for theories of party competition, the radical model does not conceive of party leaders as pandering to public desires in an effort to win elections. Rather, "party leaders look for sources of power that can be deployed to persuade voters to want what the party has to offer."[27] Whatever else may be said about Dunleavy and Husbands's model, it certainly seems to characterize accurately the strategy that in 1983 yielded Labour the greatest electoral fiasco in its history.

Scholarly approaches breaking with existing paradigms are welcome because they offer the prospect of new insights obscured by the accepted wisdom. Dunleavy and Husbands's potential for providing this service is seriously jeopardized, however, by an inadequate sample for their opinion survey. While a sample of 1,000 is acceptable for many purposes, it simply will not permit much of the subgroup analysis essential to their argument. Frequently they work with subgroups well below one hundred respondents, and even instances of subgroups numbering only two or three dozen are not uncommon. Quite simply, much of their argument is based on unreliable data. That warning needs to be kept in mind in any discussion of their findings.

Furthermore, they do not convincingly demonstrate the greater utility of the radical model over either the party identification or the issue voting models. In some instances the figures that they interpret as substantiating their case could be shown to support one of the alternative models as well. At times they are forced to concede that their approach yields results little different from those that would have been obtained by more familiar approaches.[28] Nor is the logic of their argument always compelling. For example, they regard the instability of popular attitudes on political issues and the logical inconsistencies which such attitudes frequently exhibit as grounds for rejecting issues as a major determinant of voting. The main contribution of their radical approach is to emphasize the importance of media influences upon partisan alignments.[29] While other approaches do not stress this factor as greatly, they hardly can be said to ignore it.

[27] Ibid., 48.
[28] For example, Ibid., 124.
[29] Ibid., 214–5.

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While the relative virtues of contrasting analytical frameworks may be of interest to scholars, more casual observers may want to learn something about the "real stuff" of politics. What can Dunleavy and Husbands tell us about such matters? One of the great mysteries of practical politics is how a Conservative government managed to maintain itself in power in 1983 with three million unemployed. Not too many years ago unemployment of more than one million was thought to be quite sufficient for the electorate to drive a government from office. Holmes crows that Thatcher's 1983 "landslide has utterly invalidated this hypothesis in contemporary British politics."[30] Leaving aside the question of whether an election in which a party's share of the popular vote declines from what it received in the previous election can be called a landslide, regardless of what its vote produces in the way of parliamentary seats, is unemployment no longer a political liability in Britain? Dunleavy and Husbands show that unemployment did not hurt the Conservatives a great deal because many voters tended to believe that the party was not at fault for much of the joblessness and doubted that Labour could do much to get people back to work.

Nonetheless, Dunleavy and Husbands's analysis "disposes strongly against the view that the Thatcher government could, and can, increase unemployment with impunity and without regard to electoral effects."[31] Their analysis shows that every percentage point in the unemployment rate cost the Conservatives 1.5 percentage points in voting support. Furthermore, so strong were the effects of unemployment on voting that once it is taken into account, the wide variety of other economic variables that they investigated were all reduced to insignificance. The only other "event" variable of importance was the Falklands—worth a whopping 17 percentage points in Conservative support.

Thus it might be thought that Labour simply was unlucky in 1983—surely Thatcher will not find another group of islands to defend before the next election. But that is not Dunleavy and Husband's view. Why *weren't* people willing to blame the Conservatives for unemployment in 1983? Why *didn't* they think Labour could do better? Not because they intellectually had taken on board Rose's argument that secular trends are more important than party differences and policy intentions in determining governmental economic output. The culprit is the mass media and its anti-Labour bias. This is the factor that causes Dunleavy and Husbands to fear for the health of British democracy and to assert that the country is at the crossroads and may well choose the direction leading to a repressive society.

But it is clear even from their analysis that it is not so much British democracy as it is the Labour party that is at the crossroads. Dunleavy and Husbands's ecological analysis of British parliamentary constituencies shows that Labour's strength is tied to "characteristics that are either decreasing numerically . . . or . . . are very much minority statuses. . . . Labour's task is therefore how to transcend this 'ghettoization' of its support in order to form a broader electoral coali-

[30] Holmes, *First Thatcher Government*, 191.

[31] Dunleavy and Husbands, *British Democracy*, 154.

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tion."[32] Labour's recovery in the opinion polls in the two years since the general election fails to encourage them. While the party's level of support has increased, the structure is unchanged. "No major new policy initiatives have been made by the party in order to transcend the social factors that have so marginalized its vote."[33] And they not only grant that Labour lost the issues battle in 1983, but they fear the same result next time. Labour remains committed to unilateral nuclear disarmament despite the fact that less than 10 percent of the British electorate endorses such a policy.

Clearly Dunleavy and Husbands are at a loss to know how Labour can hope to win when it persists in such unpopular policies. Thus in a way they abandon their radical model in the end. Their advice to Labour is *not* to persist in trying to get the public to like what it has to offer, but to offer the public what it wants. If Labour supporters with the ideological preferences of Dunleavy and Husbands begin to show such electoral realism, there may be more hope for the party than many people think. Since that remains to be seen, however, British politics still is at the crossroads despite nearly seven years of Margaret Thatcher.

[32] Ibid., 212.
[33] Ibid., 219.

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Book Reviews

The Turning Point. Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill, and Chiang-Kai-Shek, 1943: The Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran Conferences *by Keith Sainsbury. New York, Oxford University Press, 1985. 373 pp. $24.95.*

Turning points in history, as Keith Sainsbury observes at the end of this fine study of the 1943 conferences, imply that "a decisive shift of some kind took place at that point," and especially that acts taken "foreclosed options which had previously been open" (p. 307). In this context, Sainsbury, a senior lecturer in politics at the University of Reading, makes an excellent case that these conferences marked a turning point for the military strategy of World War II. The case that the meetings were the turning point for wartime diplomacy as well, is also advanced, but necessarily with more qualifications.

Sainsbury's concise analysis of the labyrinthine Allied talks over military strategy is one of the book's major strengths. Others are his command of British archival sources and his detailed account of the Teheran Conference itself, an account that we have needed. The flipside of these strengths, however, is that the U.S. and Soviet policies, while covered broadly, are not as well dissected as the British views. Soviet paranoia about opened archives partly explains this imbalance, of course, and it is also explained, as Sainsbury notes, by his "only limited" use of open U.S. archival sources (p. 359). Nor, more strangely, is there indication that the important works by Robert Dallek, Robert Divine, Lloyd Gardner, or Gabriel Kolko on the 1943–1945 years were consulted. Another necessary weakness of such an approach is that the discussions of 1941–1942, and especially those of 1945, receive short shrift. Sainsbury does deal with this problem by introducing his account with a general, but useful, overview of the U.S., British, and Soviet assumptions and policy positions that developed in the autumn of 1943, and by intercutting the narrative to observe how, for example, the decisions (or lack thereof) on the Far East or Poland shaped the better known 1945 agreements.

The book's importance on the military side is not surprising. Sainsbury wrote an important work on the North African landings, and here he carefully uses Michael Howard's masterful work on World War II Mediterranean strategy. Sainsbury is thus able to take issue with mainstream U.S. historians by arguing that Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Eastern Europe political policy and military strategy were equally interwoven" (p. 306). At Teheran, Roosevelt neutralized Churchill's domination of western military strategy by suc-

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cessfully insisting that the invasion of France take precedent over further major operations in Italy and the eastern Mediterranean. Roosevelt's military priorities matched his political priority of placing general postwar cooperation with the Soviets over explicit discussion with Stalin over the details of postwar eastern Europe. Churchill meanwhile moved to resolve the territorial problem by pushing for an autonomous eastern Europe that would be militarily and politically viable (by which Churchill meant some kind of western involvement), and then by adding part of Germany to a new Austro-Hungarian empire.

Sainsbury notes that he owes some debt to Mark Stoler's *The Politics of the Second Front*, which revisionist historians admire, but he declares he does not want to be involved in the revisionist-orthodox historians' argument over the Cold War's causes. The attempt to find a middle of the road where one does not exist makes the diplomatic analysis less provocative than the military context that Sainsbury fashions to understand the late 1943 decisions. His handling of Cordell Hull at the pivotal Moscow Conference (especially the Secretary of State's sudden demand that Britain discuss the doing away of its Imperial Preference economic system), as well as the book's apparent underlying assumption that Roosevelt should have made demands on eastern European questions regardless of their effect on U.S. domestic politics or the Allied war effort, reveal an interesting British perspective. When that perspective and London's archival sources are used to dissect the debate over military strategy, Sainsbury makes an especially useful contribution.

WALTER LAFEBER
Cornell University

The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan *by Steven L. Spiegel. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1985. 522 pp. $24.95.*

By examining and contrasting the policies of successive U.S. administrations toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, Spiegel provides an important study of both decision making in Washington and America's role in the Middle East.

The organization of the book—one chapter is devoted to each postwar administration in chronological order—points to one of Spiegel's principal analytic conclusions. He argues that the chief determinant of U.S. policy has been the specific philosophic orientation of the president and his chief advisers. The international system, the bureaucracy, Congress, and interest groups do affect the context in which decisions take place. But "[o]nly by examining the attitudes of the presidential elite do we understand why and how policy changes" (p. 393).

Spiegel uses no rigorous methodology to reach this conclusion. Rather, he observes that the most significant shifts in policy have come after changes in administration when new personnel enter office. Domestic and external constraints and styles of decision making have an impact on policy, but, Spiegel argues, administrations tend to adapt their perception of changes in the political and strategic environment to their existing attitudes, not vice versa.

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Spiegel's argument is, for the most part, a cogent one, but he tends to push it a bit too far. His assertion that "crises do not alter the basic policy of an administration" (p. 383) seems somewhat overstated. Eisenhower's decision to intervene in Lebanon in 1958, in contrast to his restrained reaction to the Suez crisis in 1956, reveals a clear evolution in his approach to the Middle East. The spread of Arab nationalism and the coup in Iraq did increase Eisenhower's willingness to use force. Similarly, the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan altered the Carter administration's fundamental global and regional assumptions about Southwest Asia.

In broad terms, however, Spiegel does succeed in demonstrating the overriding importance of presidential perspectives and attitudes in shaping U.S. Middle East policy. This conclusion challenges the popular belief that interest groups and the bureaucracy have played vital roles in determining the orientation of policy. A further implication of Spiegel's conclusion is that the policy of a given administration is firmly wedded to static assumptions, thereby reducing its flexibility and its sensitivity to changes in the external environment.

In addition to presenting this interesting and original analysis, Spiegel provides a well-documented and very readable narrative of the substance of policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict during each administration. He weaves together the global concerns of U.S. leaders with their understanding of regional alignments and developments. Spiegel also carefully delineates the respective positions of, and the dynamics among, the key actors in the policy-making process: the president, the National Security Council, and the State and Defense Departments. His treatment of the Truman and Kennedy-Johnson years is particularly valuable, given that past scholars have tended to focus on periods during which the Middle East occupied a more prominent position in U.S. policy. Spiegel's book thus serves as an key resource for further research and is an important contribution to the study of how Washington forms America's Middle East policy.

CHARLES KUPCHAN
Harvard University

Preventing Nuclear War: A Realistic Approach *edited by Barry M. Blechman. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1985. 197 pp. Cloth, $22.50; paper, $17.50.*

This welcome book is among the most innovative anthologies of new arms control proposals to appear in years. Drawn from papers prepared for a private commission cochaired by Senators Sam Nunn and John Warner, it reflects the growing reorientation in arms control thinking. There is no shortage of requiems to orthodox strategic arms control. The accomplishments of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT) have tarnished over time, and the outlook for further progress in Geneva is bleak. Some analysts caution against yielding to disenchantment and adversity. Another school of thought emphasizes seemingly modest proposals that might be negotiable even in this time of renascent confrontation. While such proposals cannot alter the basic nature of the strategic competition, they can reduce the risk of accidents and misunderstandings that could precipitate nuclear war.

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As Nunn and Warner make clear in their introduction, the proposals advanced here are intended as "relatively small and noncontroversial steps." Echoing the word "realistic" in the volume's subtitle, they seek a new arms control agenda empasizing "pragmatic, politically feasible means" (p. 2) of reducing the likelihood of nuclear war. Such proposals to make the superpower rivalry more manageable are inspired by the quiet success of agreements previously overshadowed by the SALT/START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) process. The new cast of heros includes the Hot Line Agreement (which Nunn and Warner helped update), the 1971 Nuclear Accidents Agreement, the Standing Consultative Commission, and especially the 1972 Agreement on Incidents at Sea (which Warner helped negotiate). While enthusiasm for strategic arms control waxed and waned, these prosaic accords soldier on, safe in their modesty and obscurity. In his chapter setting this approach in the context of superpower relations, Joseph S. Nye praises its potential, but warns against thinking this is all we need. This ambivalence reappears in other chapters.

The chief recommendation of the Nunn-Warner group called for the establishment of Joint U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. These would offer standing forums where middle-level U.S. and Soviet officials could plan mutual responses to specific crisis scenarios and discuss worrisome deployments, alerts, etc. In an impressive critique, Richard Betts argues that the Centers' effectiveness and even their agenda cannot be satisfactorily predicted; too much depends on how they evolve. Moreover, there is the problem that any forum where governments explain their actions can also be used for propaganda, intelligence gathering, or outright deception. Despite these misgivings, Betts concludes that Joint Centers "would offer modest yet possibly meaningful improvements in communications (p. 85)." Joint Centers may most effectively deal with third parties—nuclear proliferators and terrorists. In his chapter on nuclear terrorism, Barry Blechman is noticeably more enthusiastic about the role they could play. Wade Williams presents the case that a formalized bilateral dialogue could perform many of the same tasks and may be easier to initiate.

Not all the proposals in the book can be described as "small and noncontroversial." Sidney Drell and Theodore Ralston, in their chapter on restricting ballistic missile tests, maintain that test restraints could undermine the confidence necessary to launch a first strike. Alan Vicks and James Thompson evaluate proposals to restrict strategic bomber and submarine operations as confidence-building measures. They discouragingly conclude that such measures could only marginally contribute to crisis stability. Proposals that aspire to reduce only the chance of accidental nuclear war generally fare better. Victor Utgoff's proposal for on-site radar facilities to warn of missile launches offers a way of reducing the dangers of accidental alerts while chipping away at the verification problem.

This short book contains a lot of new grist for old mills. It also has plenty of liabilities. Some chapters merely rework previously published material. Several are written in turgid prose sure to chase off any dilettante. The lack of a concluding chapter is especially disappointing. Most of the proposals themselves betray the shortcomings of their low aspirations. While addressing potential accidents and misunderstandings, they are not designed to inhibit the rational incentives to escalate in times of crisis. For this very reason these proposals can be criticised as political palliatives, appeasing a weary public without tackling the most serious problems. But in lieu of the amity and resolve big steps require, there

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is still much that can be done. We have entered an era where small steps are as precious as big ones used to be.

AARON KARP
Columbia University

Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation *by Deborah Welch Larson. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1985. 380 pp. $35.00.*

This book, written by a political scientist, promises a psychological explanation of the American entry into the Cold War. As the argument develops, however, the author seems less interested in using theories of psychological cognition to explain history than in using history to test theories of psychological cognition. The result is a book that will perhaps enlighten political scientists and social psychologists but may be something of a puzzle for historians.

Historians should not, however, ignore it. The bulk of the book consists of an intelligent and balanced account of the evolution of United States policy toward the Soviet Union in the early Truman years. Larson's focus is on the four men—Harry S. Truman, James F. Byrnes, W. Averell Harriman, Dean Acheson—whom she considers the key figures in this evolution. Her question is: "Why did these men find it necessary to abandon all hope of a constructive, civilized relationship with the Soviet Union and embark on an altruistic if sometimes futile effort to preserve the balance of influence against the threat of Soviet gains throughout the world?" (p. 23). The historian might replace "all" by "immediate" in the first line and omit the business about altruism and futility; but it remains a good question.

The outlines of the story are, of course, familiar. The archival research has been thorough, however, and Larson has turned up a useful amount of fresh and edifying detail. Apart from obligatory historiographical references, she largely ignores Cold War revisionism. The Open Door has no role in her analysis; "the United States," she writes, "had no substantial economic or political interests in Eastern and Central Europe" (p. 102). Her most novel contribution—the portrait of Truman—is far indeed from the truculent, purposeful Cold Warrior of revisionist demonology.

Larson portrays rather an uncertain, vacillating President who was inarticulate on strategic issues, lacked a coherent philosophy of foreign policy, was unduly impressed by the last person who talked to him, and spent these years in a "genuine torment of indecision" (p. 329). Seeing Joseph Stalin (the author contends) in the same image of Democratic party boss Thomas Pendergast, Truman expected the Soviet dictator to respect the politician's code and as late as 1948 explained Soviet policy by saying that "Joe is a prisoner of the Politburo. He can't do what he wants to" (p. 197). Truman was reluctant to abandon Franklin D. Roosevelt's "grand design" and did not change his beliefs about the Soviet Union, Larson thinks, till several months after the Truman Doctrine speech (p. 341). In general, Larson sees the Cold War belief system as the consequence, not the cause, of the adoption of the containment policy.

The case is well argued and is worth consideration. There are minor slips—William O'Neill for William McNeill (p. 182); Herbert for Freeman Matthews (p. 255); Montreaux

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for Montreux Convention throughout. But the author's main interest, it would seem, lies less in history than in the overlay of cognitive analysis imposed on the historical materials. She spread out a range of psychological theories of attitude change—the Hovland theory; self-perception theory; schema theory—in the hope of determining which theory "best explains the formation of the Cold War belief system" (p. 59). None of the theories, she rather anticlimactically decides, is generally satisfactory, though self-perception, schema, and attribution theories are "more directly applicable" (p. 342) than the others.

No doubt one's failure to find this approach illuminating is evidence of the deplorable resistance of the historical mind to social science generalization; but this historian at least cannot see that the cognitive overlay adds anything to historical analysis except pretentious jargon. The point that laboriously emerges was perhaps more crisply stated by Evelyn Waugh's Gilbert Pinfold when he observed that "in a democracy men do not seek authority so that they may impose a policy, they seek a policy in order to acquire authority."

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.
City University of New York

Liberalism and Its Challengers: FDR to Reagan *by Alonzo L. Hamby. New York, Oxford University Press, 1985. 386 pp. $24.95.*

Since Franklin D. Roosevelt took office as president in the midst of an economic depression and until recently, liberalism has prevailed as the dominant persuasion in American politics. The New Deal established a pattern of government intervention to provide reforms within the capitalist system at home as well as to promote the interests of that revamped system abroad. Born in an age of economic scarcity and diplomatic isolationism, FDR's brand of liberalism survived two generations only to collapse in an era of relative affluence and extensive engagement in foreign affairs.

According to Alonzo Hamby, a professor of history at Ohio University, liberalism foundered because a "New Class" of intellectuals, professionals, and bureaucrats formulated policies and implemented programs that outran the traditional objectives of the once-dominant New Deal coalition. As the notion of entitlements was substituted for the work ethic and concern for equality of results replaced that of individual opportunity, many disaffected liberals rejected what they saw as the excesses of the Great Society and sought to return to the pristine values of New Deal-Fair Deal liberalism. It was a measure of how much liberalism in the 1960s had changed that the revised position held by its former supporters was labeled "neoconservatism."

Hamby has written more of a political than an intellectual account of the metamorphosis of modern liberalism. He does not neglect ideas, but he has chosen to emphasize the character of the political leaders who shaped, challenged, and transformed the liberal ethos. In doing so, he has taken a biographical approach to his subject. Mainly focusing on the presidents from Roosevelt through Nixon, he also includes sketches of Martin Luther King, Jr., who helped redefine liberalism from outside the political establishment, and Robert A. Taft, Joseph R. McCarthy, and Robert F. Kennedy, who in differing ways

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posed challenges from within. To some extent, this book reminds one of Richard Hofstadter's classic, *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It.* Like this earlier work, Hamby's does not profile notable progressive women, but more importantly, it underscores the primacy of consensus in molding American political thought. The author suggests that ideological movements tend to lose touch with reality, that they are prone to commit excesses, and that the most effective political leadership comes from those figures who operate "inside the limits of a broad, deeply felt American consensus" (p. 3). Within this framework, he gives generally high marks to Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy, and he assigns varying degrees of lower grades to Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon.

Hamby displays considerable skill as a stylist in fashioning this synthesis. His portraits are sharply drawn and brightly written. Each commentary is well informed and furnishes critical insights about the American political system. Nevertheless, this book has some significant limitations in methodology and interpretation. In focusing on "great men" the author seriously neglects the importance of grass roots movements in initiating social change and pressing politicians in Washington to carry out their aims. This was especially true for civil rights, and although the King presentation takes note of this, it also fails to pay sufficient attention to the mass movements of blacks that functioned independently of King and in crucial ways influenced his strategies and tactics. Hamby's focus on specific individual behavior magnifies the role of personal idiosyncracies in policy development and lessens the possibility of seeing the extent to which the shared ideological assumptions of political leaders and the interests they reflected provided continuity in decision making from one national administration to another. Moreover, the author's excessive psychoanalysis of Johnson and Nixon (but not FDR, Truman, Eisenhower, or Kennedy) muddles what is otherwise an incisive appraisal of their regimes.

Written from a centrist point of view, this volume will not satisfy those who accept most of the revisionist scholarship of the past two decades concerning liberal reform and the Cold War. Disagreements with particular interpretations notwithstanding, Hamby presents a stimulating synthesis that challenges students of recent American history to rethink some of their positions.

STEVEN F. LAWSON
University of South Florida

Equality in America: The View from the Top *by Sidney Verba and Gary R. Orren. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1985. 325 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $12.50.*

This is an important and frustrating book, important because it takes us further in understanding dimensions of equality than we have been before, frustrating because its distinguished authors intermix their sophisticated survey of leadership attitudes with assertions about the exercise of political power that deny their most significant findings.

First the good news. "Equality," Verba and Orren write, "lies at the heart of policy making and political struggle" (p. vii). Right on! "Many of the characteristics that make America exceptional," they continue, "derive from the ambivalent nature of equality in

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the United States" (p. 4). Just so. "Almost all Americans claim the label of egalitarianism; they differ, though, on what equality means" (p. 5). Indeed, it may well be, as their survey of feminist, labor, business, farmer, black, media, party, and intellectual leaders suggests, that disagreement over the meaning of equality may be the prerequisite for agreement on its desirability.

There is a table that I found most illuminating, and it is about one of the great questions of human life: Who is to blame for misfortune? The overwhelming devotion of Democrats, together with allied groups, to system blame, while a majority of Republicans and their business allies blame the individual, would be worth a book in itself. Where Verba and Orren concentrate on what appear to me small differences between women and blacks, however, I see huge differences that cry out for explanation. If media leaders are prone to system blame, for instance, that might have something to do with opposition to authority in general rather than to a particular political party. What is the relationship between Democratic party devotion to public programs and the tendency of their leaders to blame the very system on which these good things, especially for the disadvantaged, depend?

The excellent chapter on political parties is especially good at revealing the dilemma of Democratic party leaders. Though they are closer, that is, more egalitarian, to their voters on economic issues, they are further from them on race and gender. But since the leaders are less egalitarian on gender and race than feminists and blacks, but more so than labor leaders, ". . . they cannot move closer to one group on any of the three issues without moving away from the others" (p. 141).

There are many more interesting findings (attitudes toward income differentials depend more on ideology than on personal position) than I can mention here. Interspersed among them, however, are assertions that bias the account. The most characteristic, repeated in slightly different forms, is that "egalitarian politics coexists at best with difficulty next to an inegalitarian economy" (p. 42). There follow suitable phrases—"the mutual reinforcement of economic and political inequality" (p. 258), "success converted into privilege" (p. 257), "a skewed political process" (p. 259), and on and on. Aside from preferring to take my Charles Lindblom straight, I find the exploration of opposing hypotheses lacking. While it is undoubtedly true that "the market's failure to live up to its own ideals fuels policy controversy" (p. 257), it is also true that no system lives up to its ideals entirely and that we may not want any system to do so (for example, the egalitarian Khmer Rouge), for that would rule out efforts to mix systems, such as the welfare state.

My confidence is not increased when I read that comparable worth, which, if widely implemented, would require the determination of wages by public officials, is just a manifestation of the good old American belief in equality of opportunity. For that would obfuscate the distinction between equality as opportunity and equality as result that lies at the heart of differences over equality. Nor does Verba and Orren's equation of "equal political rights"—organizing, petitioning, voting—with an "equal voice over what government does" (p. 182), suggest that they have taken the difference between opportunity and result to heart. For if equality of opportunity cannot be achieved without equal results, the practical difference between these concepts would, in any event, be spurious.

Were it true that economics dominates politics as well as social life, then without a significant increase in economic equality there could be no significant decrease in other

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forms of inequality. And this is exactly what Verba and Orren appear to argue. "The consensus against [economic] redistribution hampers any radical movement toward greater equality" (p. 253). Not to worry. Just as conservatives cannot abolish income floors, Orren and Verba reassure us, so radicals will be unable to establish income ceilings. The movements that attempt to reduce social differences, from women's rights to civil rights to gay rights and much more, movements that make a difference to us every day, must be mere epiphenomena, unable to alter the economic fix. Were politics able to dominate economics, as appears to have happened elsewhere in the world, however, then the trends toward *Equality in America* would be read in quite a different way.

The major contribution Verba and Orren make is the evidence and argument they adduce in favor of the proposition "that values are autonomous" (p. 248) though my preference would be to conceive of shared values as attached to preferred patterns of social relationships. If it is true that "what shape the leaders' attitudes is their general values on equality" (p. 250), then it follows that if those values change, so would a lot of other things. In view of "the difficulty of keeping the domains of equality separate" (p. 251), as the authors say, a change in one or more domains might well lead back into the economic dimension. The "value autonomy" hypothesis deserves serious discussion among political scientists.

AARON WILDAVSKY
University of California, Berkeley

The New Urban Reality *edited by Paul E. Peterson. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1985. 301 pp. Cloth, $31.95; paper, $11.95.*

The new urban reality in the title of this collection of nine essays is the product of two recent transformations in metropolitan America. One is the increasing concentration in cities of poor unskilled minorities; the other is the shift in urban economic life from the manufacture of goods to the processing of information and the provision of corporate support services. The theme of the contributions in this volume is that this intersection has on the whole led to increasing urban deterioration and that the public policies of the last twenty years have failed to change things much. The heart of the problem is that unskilled minorities cannot find remunerative work in the new high-skill economy, while the city, with its tenacious patterns of segregated housing, poor schools, and radial transportation systems, hampers the efforts of that underclass to take suburban blue collar jobs or to get the necessary training for technological work in the downtown service sector.

Many of the papers in this volume will be familiar to specialists in the field: they are the *Reader's Digest* version of longer works previously published or restatements of themes and arguments with which their authors are already associated. Examples include Herbert Jacob's contention that local crime rates are the product of national forces and thus essentially immune to local anticrime or police policy; Terry Nichols Clark's thesis that urban fiscal strain is less the function of population out-migration than of political unwillingness to adjust city spending to diminished resources; and John D. Kasarda's summary of the transformation to a service economy.

Other contributions seem fairly derivative or obvious. For example, Elijah Anderson's

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essay about the self-protective adaptations and territorial norms in an integrated neighborhood of Philadelphia will remind readers of Gerald Suttles's work. Gary Orfield's essay, understandably passionate, recapitulates Kenneth Clark's *Dark Ghetto* by contending that residential segregation is a key institution for creating and maintaining inequality.

Two essays in the collection stand out, one because it is particularly sensible and persuasive, the other because it offers an original perspective. The first is William J. Wilson's effort to explain why urban minority crime, teenage pregnancy, drug addiction, and other social pathologies have increased despite two decades of attempts to eliminate discriminatory barriers to black achievement. His argument is that these "social dislocations" are less the product of discriminatory practices or of a culture of poverty than of the wage-depressing competition for bottom-of-the-ladder jobs generated by a continual migration flow to the cities, by the sheer youth of the black and Hispanic urban population, and by the diminishing number of unskilled jobs in the economy that reduces opportunities for the growing cohort of minority young people.

The most original paper is Brian J.L. Berry's discussion of why gentrification takes place in some cities and not others. Middle-class workers will tend to seek and revive inner city neighborhoods, he argues, when there is an active suburban housing market that leads to high rates of inner city housing abandonment (a counter-intuitive proposition), combined with significant office employment growth in the central business district. Under those conditions, there is a convergence of inner city houses available for renovation and a pool of potential middle-class buyers.

Although the essays in this collection are diverse in subject matter and reflect the pre-established research agendas of their individual authors, the common theme of the two transformations plays a serious organizing role and lends the whole enterprise a good deal of coherence. As a quick statement of concerns expressed at greater length elsewhere, it certainly merits the attention of those who care about the status of American cities.

PETER K. EISINGER
University of Wisconsin

High Technology Policies: A Five Nation Comparison *by Richard R. Nelson. Washington D.C., American Enterprise Institute, 1984. 94 pp. Cloth, $13.95; paper, $4.95.*

Richard Nelson focuses on the role of the governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Japan in the technological progress of each country. He attempts to answer three questions: Do special advantages accrue to the economics of a country that is especially strong in high technology? Is leadership in high technology a product of, rather than a cause of great economic strength? Are government attempts to stimulate high technology industries effective, or are they frequently ineffective, or even counterproductive?

After concluding that there is not much to be learned from a quantitative analysis of available data, Nelson examines the broad policies of each country. There follows a more

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detailed look at the oft-examined fields of electronics, aviation, and nuclear power. Nelson's analysis leads him to conclude that as a result of our current organization of knowledge, leadership in research and development (R&D) technology may be useful, but it is not vital to a country's strength in high technology industries. The rapid interchange of the most recent technological information is inevitable. Countries are powerless to inhibit it effectively. It will move almost immediately from the country making the advance to other advanced industrial countries due to such factors as easy travel, rapid communication, and the proliferation of multinational companies with subsidiaries in every advanced country. Japan's great success in the field of electronics is used to illustrate that a country need not initiate the technological advance in order to build a strong industry as a result of it.

Nelson questions Joseph A. Schumpeter's widely accepted claims (*Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy,* 1942) for the vital role of high technology leadership in assuring the strength of a nation's economy. He argues that it may well be the other way around, that a strong educational base and a healthy economy foster leadership in high technology. Furthermore, very few technological lead industries represent an important portion of a nation's highly-skilled labor force. Nor is the argument any longer valid that a strong lead in a cutting edge industry is necessary in order to provide employment in industries into which it feeds. Again, the example of Japan in the field of electronics is illustrative.

Nelson's anecdotal examination leads to an ambiguous answer to the question of the effects of government intervention. Sometimes it helps, sometimes it doesn't seem very effective, and at still other times it is clearly detrimental. For example, in the United States the development of computers was originally supported almost solely by the military, with little thought that they might eventually have an important civilian application. Despite the lack of ability to foresee the great industrial impact of the project, it clearly helped the United States establish leadership in the field. On the other hand, one of the most important of all advances in electronics occurred with no government assistance. Integrated circuits were invented and developed without government support. The third type of outcome, downright detrimental effects, is illustrated by government intervention in the development of nuclear power, which has proven counterproductive in all countries except Japan.

Among Nelson's other conclusions are that all statements about the effect of government R&D on technological advance or productivity are conjecture. This, however, does not preclude him from adding to the conjecture on the subject. Some of his conclusions are:

Japan's restricted domestic market, and the largest restricted market in the free world, the United States military, have greatly aided the technological advance in each country by protecting suppliers of advanced products and services. He also believes that defense and industrial policy will become more and more interrelated. The most useful government intervention is to support broad and sound education in science and technology and to foster strong basic economic institutions. Nelson concludes that "The flexible industrial structure of the United States should not be discounted as a formidable competitive engine of progress" (p. 87).

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The book demonstrates that the current state of the political economy in this field is such that even as competent a scholar as Nelson must rely on anecdote and inference rather than being able to arrive at conclusions by a holistic objective methodology. As a result, there is always the question as to whether the effects being examined are actually ascribable to the particular factors that the author has decided should be regarded as causational, or whether other factors, which may have been ignored or given little weight, had a much greater impact on the outcome. The contents and logic of the book warrant its inclusion in the social science collection of those interested in the subject and in college and university libraries.

HARVEY PICKER
Columbia University

Behind the Lines: The Private War against Soviet Censorship *by Donald R. Shanor. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1985. 179 pp. $13.95.*

George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* projected a future in which modern communications technologies would be the tools for the enslavement of men's minds. It seems ironic that Donald Shanor, in a book about communication in the Soviet Union, should see modern technology as the way to loosen the intelletual shackles of the Soviet people. Ironic or not, Shanor's reasoning makes good sense. He argues that censorship of information and surveillance of Soviet citizens have become much more difficult in the age of automated telephone service, computer technology, satellite broadcasts, and more extensive foreign travels, particularly by Soviet soldiers stationed abroad. In the wake of these developments, the Soviet power structure finds it impossible to continue its tight monitoring and control of citizen access to information coming from abroad. In fact, the ready availability of such information in thousands of underground citizens' networks will force the Soviet mass media to broaden their own offerings to include such information so as to retain a modicum of control over its interpretation.

Besides projecting a future of more open communication inside the Soviet Union than would have been imaginable just a few decades ago, Shanor also describes existing breaches in the Iron Curtain. These seem wider than we have been led to believe in the past. According to Shanor, many millions of Soviet citizens are exposed directly, or via a word-of-mouth network, to foreign broadcasts or to news from the West relayed through interpersonal letters, photographs, phone calls, and audio or video cassettes. For the most part, this vast Soviet audience seeks out western news because it is hungry for information lacking in the tightly-controlled Soviet mass media. Civil disobedience or rebellion against the government are goals of only a tiny minority. While the majority merely want news from abroad to keep informed and talk and gossip, the dissident minority has more subversive goals. It relays information to the West in hopes of influencing public opinions and generating pressures on the Soviet Union that will lead to greater respect for human rights.

To round out his tale of what he calls "the private war against Soviet censorship," Shanor describes the procedures used by the Soviet power structure to control the mass media and artistic production. He shows how dissent and dissatisfaction are partially

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diffused by encouraging the airing of minor complaints through letters to the party structure and to the media. He also draws on his knowledge of the Soviet public and his extensive experience as a journalist to critique the American government's efforts to disseminate news to the Soviet citizenry. A chapter on "The Voices of America" contains interesting accounts about the successes scored by the magazine *Amerika* and about the political struggles that are shaping broadcasts by Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe, and the Voice of America.

Behind the Lines should be of interest to audiences eager to learn about the many ways in which the human spirit manages to free itself from governmental controls even in tightly organized modern societies like the Soviet Union. Such audiences are unlikely to object to the fact that Shanor writes from an ethnocentric perspective imputing to the average Soviet citizen the same desires for free and open communication and for access to a wealth of political information generally imputed to American citizens. The book has less to offer for the expert in Soviet studies. Much of the information presented here is familiar, and the trappings of serious scholarship, such as use of 150 interviews with Soviet citizens and emigres, are covered over by the light, journalistic touch. This manner of presentation does not diminish the substantial value of the book for the general reader. In fact, it enhances it. Serious political information is not likely to find a wide audience unless it is presented with the flair that good journalism can impart.

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago

American Violence and Public Policy: An Update of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence *edited by Lynn A. Curtis. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1985. 263 pp. $23.00.*

This is a disappointing book. It contains chapters written by some of the most prominent students of crime: Marvin E. Wolfgang, Norval Morris, Franklin E. Zimring, and James F. Short, Jr. among others. Yet it contributes little to our knowledge of violent crime or to the agenda of public action that might combat it.

The core of the book consists of a recital of well-known research findings and policy recommendations, sprinkled with many admiring references to the Eisenhower Foundation, which sponsored the book. The only chapter that I found made a new contribution was Franklin Zimring's "Violence and Firearms Policy," in which he speculates about the ways in which women, blacks, the elderly, and the young may in the future respond to gun control measures. Zimring's speculations are informed by some shrewd insights into the effects of demographic trends on public opinion poll results.

Instead of contributing to our knowledge of violence, the book contains some astonishing lapses. After recounting the familiar discrepancy between the crime counts of the Uniform Crime Reports and the National Crime Survey, Neil Alan Weiner and Marvin Wolfgang assert that when appropriate adjustments are made the data "begin to look more alike" (p. 24). Their support for that statement does not come from some published study but from a private memorandum from the acting director of the Bureau of Justice Statistics to the Attorney General. Some might suspect that such a memorandum was self-

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serving and in any case, no reader can check its accuracy. Even more surprising is their alarmist calculation that almost eight million people committed a criminally violent act in 1981 (p. 25). Their estimate is inflated by 25 percent (the difference between 1.5 and 2.0 persons per offense) from that which might be derived from National Crime Survey estimates. In addition, it does not take into account that a considerable number of crimes are committed by the same persons. A lapse of a different sort occurs in the chapter by Alan R. Gordon and Norval Morris who examine the life history of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (commonly known as LEAA) when they make no reference to the two detailed studies of that unhappy agency that have been published: by Virginia Gray and Bruce Williams, *The Organizational Politics of Criminal Justice* (Lexington Books, 1980) and by Malcolm M. Feeley and Austin D. Sarat, *The Policy Dilemma: Federal Crime Policy and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1968–1978* (University of Minnesota Press, 1980).

A still different lapse occurs in Robert H. Kupperman's chapter on "Terrorism and Public Policy" in which he lists a number of East Bloc and developing nations as supporters of terrorism but omits such obvious western examples as the United States in Latin America, Israel in southern Lebanon, and South Africa.

Kupperman perhaps misses the most interesting opportunity in this volume, because terrorism has not been researched as intensively as the other subjects of the book. However, instead of inquiring into why the United States has been so fortunate in avoiding frequent terrorist incidents, Kupperman urges government action to prepare for what he sees as its inevitable spread to this country.

The chapters on black violence, citizen self-help, collective violence, and public policy tread over familiar ground and provide few new ideas. This is a book that novices (do they still exist with respect to crime?) should avoid as superficial, while specialists will put it aside as redundant. It is no competitor to Charles Silberman's *Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice.*

HERBERT JACOB
Northwestern University

Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America *by Walter LaFeber. New York, W. W. Norton, 1983. 357 pp. $18.95.*

Walter LaFeber has produced a well written and insightful introduction to the role of the United States in Central America. LaFeber argues that the current revolutionary crisis in Central America is the inevitable product of the system of "neo-dependency" (i.e., colonialism without the inconvenience of administrative responsibility) which the United States imposed on the region by force at the turn of the century, and which it has maintained ever since by a combination of economic and military might. In order to protect the Panama Canal and the lucrative foreign investments made by U.S. corporations, the United States sought to exclude from the region all foreign influence other than its own.

Washington's preference for stability and a good business climate combined with the local landed oligarchies' determination to preserve their own economic privilege and po-

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litical power. The result has been wretched poverty for the vast majority of Central Americans and political repression for any who dared try to change their plight. These are the long-term conditions underlying the revolutionary upheavals of the late 1970s.

LaFeber is one of the premier historians of U.S. foreign policy, so it is not surprising that he is at his best when unraveling the early history of how Washington imposed control over the region and how this outward thrust fit into the broader canvas of the emerging global power of the United States. He makes the particularly important point that U.S. economic domination over Central America was not the natural product of market forces, but was imposed by U.S. political influence and military power.

The major failing of *Inevitable Revolutions* is that it places too much weight on the United States as the determining factor in Central American history. At first glance, it seems almost impossible to exaggerate the immense power wielded not only by Washington but also by such private concerns as the infamous United Fruit Company. But the societies of Central America have their own internal dynamics as well. Although these dynamics have been profoundly affected, even distorted, by the United States, U.S. influence has never *replaced* them; Central America has never been a *tabula rasa* for Washington.

LaFeber discusses conditions in Central America as little more than an adjunct to his primary analytic focus on U.S. policy. For internal developments he relies mainly on secondary sources—a sharp contrast to the original research in primary documents that undergirds the accounts of U.S. policy. As a result, the last few chapters are marred by a number of errors.

For instance, the *Tercerista* faction of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua is mistakenly referred to as the "Third World" faction. Actually they called themselves the Insurrectional Tendency, but came to be known as *Terceristas* because they were the third faction to be formed after failing in their efforts to mediate between two other factions. In the case of El Salvador, the Forces of Popular Liberation (the first guerrilla army, founded in 1970 by Cayetano Carpio) is confused with the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (a coalition of five guerrilla armies organized in 1980) because the full name of Carpio's group is *Fuerzas Populares de Liberacion Farabundo Marti.* The formation of another guerrilla group, the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), is mistakenly dated to 1969 when it was not formed until 1972—an important difference since the reason for its creation was the military's theft of the 1972 election.

There are places where the errors are less obvious, where the meaning of key events and the role of important actors are misinterpreted or oversimplified. For instance, the reaction of Central American elites to Jimmy Carter's human rights policy was not simply to ignore it, as LaFeber argues, but to try to comply—at least until the reduction of repression unleashed new political ferment. The role of the Church in fostering political awareness and organization among the poor is recounted well, but the resistance of the Church hierarchy to liberation theology goes unmentioned, thus leaving the false impression that the Church was monolithically committed to radical change.

The tendency to disparage the role of indigenous political dynamics is clearest when LaFeber tries to explain why, after two centuries of tyranny and oppression, Central America has suddenly erupted in revolution. Because the book is so focused on the role

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of the United States, it tries to find the explanation in Washington, attributing the explosion to the disappointment of expectations raised by John F. Kennedy's ten-year Alliance for Progress program. Even then, it cannot explain why the combined power of the United States and the region's domestic elites is no longer sufficient to keep the lid on.

Despite these shortcomings, *Inevitable Revolutions* is a valuable contribution to the rapidly growing literature on Central America. Its central thesis is undoubtedly correct. The revolutionary crisis now underway marks the demise of Washington's quasi-colonial empire in Central America, and like so many Europeans before us, we are not enduring the process of decolonization with much wisdom or dignity.

WILLIAM M. LEOGRANDE
The American University

America Overcommitted: United States National Interests in the 1980s *by Donald E. Nuechterlein. Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1985. 238 pp. Cloth, $23.00; paper, $10.00.*

What is the national interest? Donald E. Nuechterlein defines national interests as "the country's perceived needs and aspirations in relation to other sovereign states constituting its external environment" (p. 7). This determination is influenced by the interplay of interest groups, factions, and bureaucracies, but "ultimately the President has to make a judgment about the extent to which the national interest is involved in a specific international issue or crisis."

Nuechterlein identifies four basic national interests: defense of the homeland; economic well-being; a favorable world order; and promotion of ideological values. The problem lies in assessing the intensity of the stakes related to each of these basic interests in particular instances. He suggests a four-tiered scale of priorities: survival, where the very existence of the nation is in peril; vital, where serious harm to security and well-being could result if strong measures are not taken; major, where potential serious harm could come; and peripheral, where little if any harm to the entire nation will result. Nuechterlein combines these categories to form a four-by-four table which he applies to major regions in a chapter-by-chapter analysis. He concludes that only four major countries (Canada, Mexico, Britain, and the Soviet Union) vitally affect the defense of the United States; and only four are economically vital (Canada, Mexico, Japan, and West Germany). On the other hand, eighteen countries are vital to our interest in world order, and twelve are vital to the promotion of our democratic values.

As a set of judgments by an intelligent observer of American foreign policy in the 1980s, Nuechterlein's book makes interesting reading. But as an analytical framework for judging foreign policy interests, it is seriously deficient. Defining vital interests is a classic problem. For Nuechterlein, a vital interest is at stake "when an issue becomes so important to a nation's well-being that its leadership will refuse to compromise beyond the point that it considers to be tolerable" (p. 11). But this approach does little to tell us what is vital *ex ante,* and *ex post*; it is merely tautological. Moreover, when listing criteria for determining vital interests (such as proximity of the danger and economic stakes), Nuechter-

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lein includes "risk of Congressional opposition." But that seems odd, and it certainly begs serious political (and Constitutional) questions about the role of Congress on the definition of national interests.

In short, this book contains an interesting description of foreign policy interests in the mid-1980s, but its analytic framework requires further development.

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR.
Harvard University

A Mirror for Socialism: Soviet Criticism of China *by Gilbert Rozman. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1985. 292 pp. $26.50.*

This is an excellent survey of more than 160 Soviet articles and books dealing with the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Soviet materials cover the period from the late 1950s up to 1982, with concentration on studies published during the late 1970s—the period of China's "global anti-hegemony campaign" against "Soviet socialist imperialism."

Rozman focuses his study on what he describes as Soviet "sociological" writings dealing with problems of the development of socialism in China. He admits that "none of the authors treated is formally trained as a sociologist" (p. 57). He nonetheless chooses to classify the literature as sociological because of its subject matter—social classes in the PRC. The separate chapters in Rozman's book survey Soviet commentaries on China's peasants, workers, intelligentsia, officials, and national minorities.

In each chapter he seeks to distinguish between an "orthodox" and a "reform" perspective within the Soviet literature. The orthodox group is characterized as suspicious of meritocracy and the uses of incentives to resolve problems of economic underdevelopment in China and opposed to any new initiatives which would encourage inherent capitalist tendencies in China. "The orthodox school appears to use backwardness as a justification for greater central control" (p. 251). In particular, the orthodox group tends to favor tighter Party discipline as a means of improving the quality of China's official class.

The reform group is more inclined to trust the Chinese intelligentsia to lead the necessary social reforms in China, in cooperation with a "new breed of officials" who are willing and able to utilize the talents of experts. The reform school accepts the value of a more ambitious program of material incentives as a good in itself and as a means of moving all social classes in China in the direction of a truly socialist society. The author clearly considers the reform literature to be more interesting than the orthodox writings, not only because the reformers tend to make recommendations that are more directly relevant to the kinds of developments now underway in China, but also because the reform group offers more sophisticated and scholarly analysis of the PRC "on its own terms." Rozman considers that the orthodox school is less familiar with the special historical and cultural characteristics of China and is, therefore, more inclined to superimpose inappropriate concepts drawn from the Soviet experience.

Rozman's study would be entirely satisfactory if it were nothing more than a straightforward exegesis of a previously understudied body of Soviet writings on China. It goes

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beyond simple exegesis, however, to develop the thesis that there are striking similarities between Soviet criticism of China's failings and western "anti-Communist" criticisms of the USSR. It also offers some insightful comments on the ways in which the critical Soviet literature on China is used as an indirect means for Soviet scholars to discuss problems of socialist development within the USSR itself.

This reader was disappointed in only one aspect of Rozman's book – his failure to provide us with a concluding section in which the vast body of Soviet sociological studies that he has surveyed is explicitly linked to outstanding political differences between Moscow and Beijing, or at least linked to extant western studies that discuss Soviet political commentaries on China. Two such studies that could have profitably been addressed by the author are Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser's analysis of *War and Peace: The Views from Moscow and Beijing* (Policy Papers in International Affairs, #20, Institute of International Studies, Berkeley, 1984) and Rozman's own article on "Moscow's China-watchers in the Post-Mao era . . ." (*China Quarterly*, June 1983) which has a more directly political emphasis than Rozman's book. It would be unreasonable to complain about Rozman's failure to directly link his study of Soviet sociological writings on China to more general issues of Sino-Soviet political relations if it were not for the fact that the author makes it clear in both the preface to the book and in its conclusion that he views the book as providing a background for understanding internal Soviet debates relating to issues of Sino-Soviet rapprochement. This small criticism has to be placed in context, however. Rozman has written an impressive scholarly study that should be recommended to anyone interested in Soviet writings about China.

DOUGLAS STUART
The Johns Hopkins University, Bologna Center

Refugee Scholars in America: Their Impact and Their Experiences *by Lewis A. Coser. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984. 351 pp. $25.00*

In his new book, Lewis Coser attempts to provide a synoptic overview of the contributions to American scholarship and culture of those intellectuals who received their education in central Europe, emigrated to America after 1933, and became part of the intellectual landscape. Concerned primarily with the experiences of major figures in the social sciences and the humanities, he seeks above all to explain the conditions that facilitated or impeded their integration into American academic and cultural life. The book draws upon existing memoirs and historical studies, supplemented by questionnaires and benefiting from the author's personal acquaintance with some of the subjects of his study.

The book's primary contribution is to the sociology of knowledge, and it is richest in recapturing the institutional contexts to which the refugees came. Coser shows how the representatives of intellectual currents who shared common assumptions with existing American movements were most painlessly absorbed and quickly rewarded in their new setting, while those scholars identified with European movements with little previous resonance in the United States took longer to achieve recognition, and in some cases were hardly accorded a hearing by Americans. Coser also examines the role of anti-Semitism

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in the academy as a barrier to the initial acceptance of the refugees, and he suggests that the arrival of a critical mass of internationally esteemed academics of Jewish origin helped breach the walls of genteel anti-Semitism and prepared the way for a greater acceptance of native-born Jews in many academic disciplines.

Though the author is well suited to his tale by virtue of his personal experience and and catholic intellectual interests, his empathy and expertise are not equally distributed among the various disciplines and intellectual currents explored in the book. While the chapter on the social theorists of the Frankfurt School is replete with ironic observations born of long intellectual reflection, the sections devoted to the neoliberal economists of the "Austrian school" are detached and dutiful. The discussion of Leo Strauss's contribution to the study of political thought is utterly lacking in empathy and given to sarcastic dismissal. Coser is most dependable in his discussion of sociology and social thought. Elsewhere his grasp is less sure. His discussion of the historian Hans Rosenberg, for example, fails to mention Rosenberg's work on the political and cultural ramifications of the Great Depression, perhaps his most influential (and controversial) work.

The sections of the book dealing with the central European background of the refugees are sometimes less illuminating than one might wish. Paul Tillich's plea of 1932 for an alliance of the Strasser wing of the Nazi Party with the Social Democrats on the basis of a shared antipathy to the functional rationality of bourgeois civilization goes unmentioned, as do the antidemocratic political implications of Erich Voegelin's search for a new basis of *Herrschaft* (domination) during the 1930s. Here and elsewhere in his book Coser unwittingly reflects the secondary accounts upon which he draws, which more often tend to the filiopietistic, not to say hagiographic, rather than toward detached objectivity.

The greatest virtue of this work lies in its scope, which calls to our attention the methodological and political diversity of the refugee intellectuals. Those inclined to think of them primarily as men and women of the left will be forced to reconsider when faced with thinkers such as Strauss, Voegelin, Hans Morgenthau, Ludwig von Mises, Fritz Machlup, and Gottfried von Haberler. Coser's book reminds us that American political thought of conservative, liberal, and radical stripes profited from the forced migration. If Coser's comprehensiveness has its costs in terms of the depth of his intellectual portraits, the scope of his canvas leads to a heightened appreciation of the *variety* of the intellectual refugees and of their experiences, a diversity which calls into question any attempt to derive meaningful generalizations or to write a more comprehensive history in the future.

JERRY Z. MULLER
Catholic University of America

Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa *by I. William Zartman. New York, Oxford University Press, 1985. 260 pp. $24.95.*

As African countries gradually emerged from colonial control, their local or wider conflicts began to impinge on the relations between the major powers. Reluctant at first to become involved, the United States gradually assumed a degree of responsibility for

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helping to settle such conflicts, particularly those in which the Soviet Union also had an obvious interest. The consequences of either avoiding or assuming responsibility for aiding their settlement are carefully delineated in William Zartman's outstanding work. It should be required reading for those in the Department of State who are responsible for drafting or carrying out policies toward Africa and is strongly recommended to all others concerned with that continent.

The four situations that the book deals with in detail are the Moroccan-Algerian boundary conflict that spread into the western Sahara with the rise of its national liberation movement, Polisario; the Somali-Ethiopian clash in the Horn that pitted a nation state against a multi-national empire; the territorial struggle between Zaire, Zambia, and Angola within the central African region; and the still unsuccessful efforts to bring Namibia to independence.

Despite its economic interests in both Morocco and Algeria, the United States played almost no role in the western Sahara conflict although it, like France, could have aided a possible settlement by lending support to the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) efforts to resolve that increasingly complex situation.

The Somali-Ethiopian conflict in the Horn of Africa came to a head in the 1970s. In 1977 the superpowers moved in and ultimately stayed: the Soviet Union in drought-stricken Ethiopia while the United States acquired use of former Soviet bases in Somalia. But the basic conflict was not resolved and it remains to plague global politics.

The third conflict situation was in central Africa where Zaire, Zambia, and Angola meet, the rich copper belt and other rich minerals are found, and transport lines stretch out to both sides of the continent. Potentially Zaire is the heartland and as such was long the focus for American interest in the area. Since the mid-1970s, however, Zaire has been surrounded by independent states among which radical Angola is under a Marxist party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which has Russian support underwritten by some 20,000 Cuban troops. Further complicating the situation was and is the continuing presence in southern and eastern Angola of bitter opponents of MPLA, especially the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which is chiefly armed by South Africa but seen by Zaire and some American negotiators as a potential alternative to the MPLA.

Lastly, the book turns to Namibia, for which some forty years of efforts by the international community has still not secured its independence. The author's judgment is that western mediation from the beginning was "an unusual and laudable démarche," but he ends by recognizing that "as much as a carrot, the Namibian case requires a stick."

In a final chapter, Zartman provides some useful generalizations. He sees the United States as more interested in conflict resolution than in seeing one side win: that conflict resolution needs "a ripe moment," and the mediator a formula that "has something for everyone." He also admits that there is rarely an end to conflict, only a temporary stopgap and that looking ahead to the next stage is imperative. Hopefully Africa will come to the point when it is readier to settle its own conflicts. In the meantime, Zartman's book provides a wide range of helpful suggestions both for identifying signals of potential disturbances and for ways to meet them. No author could do more.

GWENDOLEN M. CARTER
University of Florida

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The Fraud Game: State Responses to Fraud and Abuse in AFDC and Medicaid Programs *by John A. Gardiner and Theodore R. Lyman. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1985. 266 pp. $24.95.*

This volume is a particularly welcome and significant work in that it is one of the first comprehensive and quantified reviews of abuse and fraud in the enormous government-administered Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Medicaid programs. Up to now, abuses in these programs have been mainly discussed in the pages of newspapers, on the evening news, or in government reports; this book changes that. Identifying welfare fraud and abuse "as the issue of the 1970's," the authors carefully define the issues involved, critique the historical methods of measuring fraud, review abuse from a policy perspective, and discuss the "natural barriers" to preventing and controlling it—specifically, the paradox that exists between agencies and administrators charged with the delivery of services and their counterparts charged with the control of abuses and the imposition of penalities.

Drawing upon scholarly literature and government reports, the authors proceed to establish fraud control "as an ecology of games—the relationship between fraud control and other issues . . . . [where] players utilize their resources in accordance with game rules to win desired outcomes of the policy issues which define the game" (pp. 28–29). Within that context six games are identified: the welfare policy game, the health policy game, the criminal justice game, the fiscal policy game, the intergovernmental relations game, and the public administration game. And the overlap, interactions, and scope of the players are schematically presented as the foundation for a thorough review of welfare fraud and abuse.

From there the authors go on to demonstrate that the service delivery system itself perpetuates abuse from both within and outside the system. Invaluable perspectives on this point are presented by way of testimony from recipients, who vary from young unwed mothers to nursing home elders and from the temporarily unemployed to the institutionalized welfare class; administrators, who are frustrated by a system that fragments power between the delivery and fraud units of government; and control units who are hampered by a benefit distribution system that contradicts the processes of welfare fraud prosecution.

Having reviewed these inherent conflicts, the authors present alternatives for changing the "fraud control game," noting that the entire issue is being reduced to one of simple "cost containment" and "zero error rates" and that the federal government is in the process of relegating the problem back to the states, a policy that will destroy any potential for a uniform approach for addressing the issue. In the end, they argue that "fraud and abuse can be controlled more effectively than they are now, but control should not be at the expense of other social programs" (p. 137).

The book closes with three chapters of appendices, each a case study of the fraud control process within specific states: Illinois, Colorado, and Washington. Each of these sections effectively complements the earlier chapters in which the game model was developed.

Overall, this book is an excellent addition to the various case studies and quantitative reports addressing welfare fraud and abuse; and it is one of the first works to critically

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address the actual conflicts inherent within that system. The only disappointing aspect of this work is not having had the model applied to New York State, the largest dispenser of such benefits in the nation. While the authors argue that a pro-active approach of prosecuting welfare fraud appears to be lacking, in New York City alone there have been over 300 successful prosecutions in the last two years. Thus, when the authors speak about the need for collaboration between the so-called players of the game, it appears that in New York City that process is evolving.

Nonetheless, I recommend this work without exception to all those interested in pursuing the effectiveness of social programs and those concerned with the control and abuse of fraud in such areas.

RALPH DA COSTA NUNEZ
New York City Youth Bureau

The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy *by Kathy E. Ferguson. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1984. 286 pp. $24.95.*

This interesting and provocative book is comprised of two disparate, although related, sections. The first, longer, and, in this reviewer's opinion, more successful segment, deals with the phenomenon of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is viewed as both a structure and process, as the "scientific organization of inequality" (p. 7) and a means for imposing a system of domination and subordination upon society. Women are seen as the antithesis of bureaucracy, because feminist theory and practice oppose the hierarchy and control inherent in organized bureaucracy. The book demonstrates how mechanisms of bureaucratic oppression have operated to manipulate women and other subordinate groups.

The author attacks the language of bureaucratic discourse (or bureaucratic language as a manifestation of political and social relations, following Michel Foucault) and its apologists in the literature of public administration. Ferguson makes a strong case for the view that administrative discourse is antitheoretical and profoundly opposed to self-criticism as well as politics and change. Providing particular insights, she views "femininity" as a mechanism for coping with secondary status and reinforcing women's privatization as human beings. Women and other subordinate groups are "feminized" into powerlessness, dependent on images created and on favorable responses from their superiors.

So far, so good. While this analysis deals with many familiar aspects of bureaucratic life and control, it does so in a sometimes brilliant and always insightful manner. Nonetheless, this reviewer parts company with Ferguson when the discussion becomes more prescriptive. While the case against bureaucracy as an authoritarian system that brooks no opposition and opposes change is forcefully articulated, surely a student of politics must agree that even some bureaucratic institutions contain possibilities for change, as whistle-blowing, efforts at worker participation, and the like have demonstrated. In this connection, it is difficult to accept Ferguson's absolutist assertion that "liberal feminist hopes that organizations will be rendered humane, less oppressive and more conducive to genuine personal growth by the inclusion of women are revealed to be naive and pious hopes" (p. 121). Her assumption that entry into public life for women

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has meant acceptance of the "rules of the game of bureaucratic discourse" fails to take into account widespread evidence that demonstrates that elected and appointed women in politics do, indeed, make a difference with regard to policy and hiring practices. Also troubling is Ferguson's contention that contemporary liberal feminism is "obsessed" with upward mobility for individualistic career women and falsely taken up with issues of formal rights—a contention that fails to take into account the extraordinary diversity within the feminist movement. Her statement that "most of the legal barriers to women's public activity have been successfully challenged" (p. 193) is puzzling at best, unless she refers only to access to public office and not to the many remaining manifestations of legal and economic discrimination.

Finally, her assertion that "feminist organizations cannot be themselves bureaucratic or they cease to be truly feminist" (p. 211) and her insistence that groups must be decentralized and independent of outside sources for revenue seems to substitute a new orthodoxy for what she decries. This is of particular concern because it is antithetical to another fundamental notion of feminst theory—that of choice. In fact, as Ferguson herself suggests, feminist organizations that have become professionalized have struggled with this issue and have sought to adopt what Rosabeth Moss Kanter calls "flattening hierarchy" in order to modify traditional nonparticipatory practices. But, surely no group should be read out of the feminist movement because of choice of organizational structure, both as a principle and because the movement is strengthened by the inclusion of different types of groups with different goals. While Ferguson's view that small size and vertical division of labor are essential to feminist organization, and that the emphasis on democracy and participation are undeniable contributions of feminists to other social movements is one shared by many feminist theorists, she never examines other related issues. Feminist theorists such as Sheila Rowbotham, while applauding the unique potential of feminist political organization, have also questioned its ability to affect the larger political system in the interest of societal—as opposed to individual—change.

Thus, what begins as a plea for reconceptualization ends by substituting an ideological rigidity of its own, lessening the contribution made by an otherwise first-rate work.

JOYCE GELB
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Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the American Working Class, 1788–1850 *by Sean Wilentz. New York, Oxford University Press, 1984. 446 pp. $34.95.*

Since the publication of *The Making of the English Working Class*, social historians in the United States have focused their attention on the craftsmen of the early years of the Republic, exploring the reorganization of their lives and work by the very beginnings of industrialization. *Chants Democratic* is an important contribution to this genre, offering meticulous portraits of both the changing workplace and the changing sensibilities of New York's artisans.

The chapter on "Metropolitan Industrialization" charts the diverse ways crafts produc-

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tion changed well before the factory or proletarian status were common. Wilentz offers sympathetic accounts of the small master, dependent on credit, struggling in an intensely competitive environment, and of journeymen working at home or in rented spaces, for whom hope of rising to master status had disappeared.

More importantly, Wilentz presents the political cultures of New York's artisans. Artisans cherished the same liberal values as other Americans, but "artisan republicanism" was distinctive for wedding these values to understandings of craft and trade. For the artisans, republican rhetoric described both the "cooperative workshop" and "a moral order in which all craftsmen would eventually become masters. . ." (p. 102).

This ideological world could no more withstand metropolitan industrialization than the "cooperative workshop" itself. The central project of *Chants Democratic* is tracing the unmaking of artisan republicanism into its several ultimately conflicting parts. For small masters, artisan republicanism became enterpreneurial republicanism, celebrating industriousness and mobility; alongside them was the emerging world of middle-class morality and social reform. For journeymen the path was more complex. Radicals, utopians, and Workingmen's party politicans offered political economies of various sorts. In the General Trades' Union (GTU) journeymen found their own values and voice. There the mutuality of the trade became the mutuality of the union, and craft gave way to class solidarity. Alongside the journeymen was the Bowery, with its truculent "republicanism of the streets." By 1837, when the GTU collapsed with the country's depression, the "bifurcation of artisan republicanism was complete" (p. 296).

The book continues to the "crisis of 1850," offering interpretations of nativism, land reformers and other radicals, and temperance advocates—these the currents of popular politics after 1837—and concluding with an epilogue at 1865. Here the author seems on less solid ground. The analysis of nativist impulses is scattered and uneven; the notion that the city or the working classes of 1865 were much as they had been, socially and culturally, in 1850, overlooks the arrival of thousands of immigrant workers.

Like much of what is written about American labor, this book is haunted by the Labor party that never happened and by a political calculus that is not quite explicit. On one hand, we learn that Democratic insurgent Mike Walsh led his proletarian followers into a "self-destructive" alliance with the party (p. 356), but we are not told what alternative strategy was sensible or even possible for New York's journeymen. On the other hand, Walsh aside, the activities of artisans and their leaders in the major parties are not discussed, despite the good reasons we have to think that partisanship was an important element of popular political culture in the age of Andrew Jackson.

The heart of *Chants Democratic* is in the artisans' own organizations from 1788 to 1837. Wilentz provides a sensitive and incisive account of artisans' undoing, their protest, and their cultural legacy to those more modern workers about to appear in the nation's cities.

AMY BRIDGES
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The Line of Duty: Maverick Congressmen and the Development of American Political Culture *by Johanna Nicol Shields. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1985. 297 pp. $37.50.*

Of the numerous elements that over the years have combined to make up the American political culture, Johanna Shields has chosen to study the individualists who stood relatively aloof from the development of party organizations in the House of Representatives during the mid-nineteenth century. Thus, while recognizing that the most important political events reflected in Congress during the period 1836–1860 may have had to do with the formation of political parties, or with the coming of the Civil War, this study concerns itself with "the political character of [congressional] mavericks" and hence aspires more to be a contribution to American cultural or intellectual than to political history.

Mavericks are defined as those members of Congress who on at least two major sets of issues regularly voted against the majority of members of their own party. This simple definition, which relies upon Thomas B. Alexander's carefully assembled numbers, yields a group of eighty-four maverick congressmen. It turns out that not a great deal can be said of this group as a group: they varied in their energy levels, in their eloquence, in their views of major questions, and in their success in the House. A fair number expressed the opinion that by going their own way they were obeying some higher principle than party loyalty. The examination of these justifications proves to be useful in situating congressional mavericks in a more general account of the development of an American political culture which, while mindful of the advantages of party organization, also mistrusted the concentration of power and approved of expressions of individual conscience. Mavericks were not institution builders, and many of them were uncomfortable with the norms of behavior that were slowly evolving as part and parcel of regular service in the House.

Thus, for the student of congressional history, perhaps the greatest merit of this volume will be the opportunity to watch the development of these norms by seeing how they were given boundaries by the unorthodox behavior of this study's principal subjects.

NELSON W. POLSBY
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German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler *by Henry Ashby Turner, Jr. New York, Oxford University Press, 1985. 504 pp. $25.00.*

Even in the very early years of the Nazi party, rumors were already circulating that the movement depended on financial support from Germany's capitalists. By the time of the Weimar Republic's final crisis in the early 1930s, the notion that Hitler was the hireling of big business had become a fixed idea on the political left. This view squared with the broader Marxist doctrine that fascism in general was a characteristic manifestation of monopoly capitalism in a late stage of its development.

A good deal less was heard of this interpretation during Hitler's dozen years in power because it was so obvious that he was not taking orders from big business or anybody else. But after the war the equation between Nazism and late capitalism was restored to

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the status of dogma on the other side of the Iron Curtain, especially in East German historical writing. In the West the same basic idea has reappeared in highly elaborate, theoretical form in various schools of structural analysis that see Nazism as coming out on the winning side in the behind-the-scenes struggle among different "monopoly groups." And even more traditional historians, as Turner remarks, have "felt obliged to include big business support among the factors contributing to the triumph of Nazism" (p. xi). Thus the belief that German capitalists were at least partly responsible for the rise of Hitler has become received wisdom.

What Yale's Turner set out to do in researching this massive book was to see if there was any truth lurking behind all this iteration and reiteration. He was interested in hard evidence about the "relationships between actual capitalists and actual Nazis rather than reliance upon grandiose theories about capitalism and fascism" (p. 359). Though the search for such evidence took him above all to the industrial archives of West Germany, it is hard to imagine after reading the 110 pages of notes to this book that Turner has overlooked any other important source.

Here is a capsule summary of what he found. Big business never made massive contributions to the Nazis; much more money went to the established parties of the right. Far from wanting a Nazi government, German capitalists were afraid of Nazi economic radicalism, and their fears were greatest precisely in late 1932. The payments that they did make to Hitler were, therefore, insurance premiums against the possibility of his rise to power rather than efforts to put him there. However, Hitler did not really need even these payments because his party was a spectacular success in self-financing. Nor could his policies be moderated by contributions from big business since he well understood that it was radicalism that attracted votes. Hence Hitler was interested more in neutralizing possible business opposition than in gaining its support. But it is doubtful that such opposition could ever have amounted to much, since big business proved incapable even of ousting Alfred Hugenberg as leader of the Nationalist party. As one crisis followed another in the 1930–33 period, German business leaders found themselves politically impotent onlookers rather than wirepullers, despite all their money. Indeed, the lesson of late Weimar history, as Turner sees it, is the primacy of politics over economics. German big business disliked the Weimar Republic but was not responsible for the Third Reich. To the extent that one could pin some general sort of blame on big business, one could do the same to the trade unions and other groups.

These revisionist conclusions, advanced by Turner in a much more nuanced fashion, should prove convincing to openminded readers. However, so much ideological capital has been invested in the received wisdom that there will doubless be those, as Turner himself foresees, who will dismiss his book as an exercise in "factology" that misses the higher spheres of historical explanation.

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The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition? *edited by David Holloway and Jane M.O. Sharp. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1984. 290 pp. $29.95.*

By 1975 the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) has endured for three decades, and in April its members signed on for another twenty years, thereby keeping in place the political-military infrastructure that with NATO symbolizes a divided Europe. Indeed, by the 1980s scholars have begun to catch up with the march of events in communist coalition politics. The Holloway and Sharp volume is a substantial contribution to the proliferating analyses of the Warsaw Pact. It is timely, important, and updates conference papers by scholars and policy makers gathered at Cornell University in May 1982 to assess the Warsaw Pact's third decade. The end product tells us as much, if not more, about the state of the art as about the workings of the Soviet-East European alliance.

It is no accident that the title ends in a question mark. This is an area where experts remain deeply divided. There are those who continue to see the Warsaw Pact as an instrument of Soviet domination of eastern Europe and those who believe the Pact is genuinely in the process of transition to a more traditional alliance involving compromise and mutual advantage. As Holloway points out, even among those chapters focused on the Soviet input, there are different conclusions concerning Moscow's preferred development (p. 23).

The conference that gave birth to this book did not achieve consensus. Therefore, Holloway defends the book's triple usage of the term "Warsaw Pact" as the institutions of the WTO (such as the Political Consultative Committee and the Committee of Defense Ministers), the sum of all military ties between the USSR and eastern Europe, and the totality of all Soviet-East European relations (pp. 19–20). Nonetheless, the book sends some exceedingly mixed messages.

For example, Christopher Jones's suggestion that the fate of East European armed forces within the Warsaw Pact parallels that of national formations within the Soviet Red Army (p. 102ff) implies sustained Soviet pressure for increased military integration. Conversely, Stephen Larrabee's view that the consequences of martial law in Poland may force Soviet strategists to rethink the entire doctrine of coalition warfare (p. 137) suggests as a minimum that there has been a period of agonizing reappraisal in the Kremlin. This is no minor difference. For, while these authors all agree on the centrality of Soviet policy for alliance options, the ability of the Soviets to translate their power into influence depends upon top civilian and military leaders agreeing on their priorities. There is some reason to think that Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko operated on the basis of different scenarios at least vis-à-vis the relationship of East-West German dialogue to security questions raised by the 1983 NATO deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles.

Yet there is a refreshing research-oriented quality about some of these analyses. Whether or not one accepts Jones's provocative conclusions, his rigorous attention to Soviet sources is impressive. Condoleezza Rice's detailed discussion of defense burden sharing reinforces Edwina Moreton's assessment of East European political objectives and the room for organizational maneuver vis-à-vis Moscow within the Pact. Paul Marer's clear statement of economic problems and prospects provides an essential context within which to evaluate restraints facing both Soviet and East European policy makers.

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Although not entirely consistent, both the Rice chapter and Jonathan Dean's essay dealing with the Warsaw Pact in the international system recognize the potentially conflicting objectives inherent in Soviet and East European Third World connections. Both Holloway and Larrabee point to the increasingly sensitive nature of party-army relations within the Pact, while J.F. Brown confronts the responsibility of western nations for the consequences of their own economic and political behavior toward East Europe. These issues will have high salience in the 1980s whatever fluctuations in Soviet policy flow from Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to consolidate his power.

This book has a wide-ranging academic audience: scholars of Soviet foreign policy, East European specialists, European security analysts, and those interested in theories of international organization and integration. It is a must for every major university library. I would even recommend it for graduate students who unfortunately can't afford it unless there is a future paper edition.

ROBIN ALISON REMINGTON
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Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations with a Militant Israel *by Stephen Green. New York, William Morrow, 1984. 370 pp. $14.95.*

In the postwar era there have been few bilateral security ententes whose special character has equalled that of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. This implicit alliance is historically unique for a number of reasons. First, there is no existing mutual defense agreement between the two governments, yet U.S. security policy in the Middle East is acknowledged to be "Israeli-centered." Second, Israel is the largest recipient of U.S. military and economic assistance.

Although the U.S.-Israeli relationship has endured, it has been strained at times. The early part of the first Reagan administration saw great tension between the two capitals, due chiefly to the irascible behavior of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. I served in the State Department during this period and recall that even Israel's most committed supporters in the U.S. government found themselves unable to excuse Mr. Begin's refusal to seek compromise solutions to a number of thorny issues, particularly Israel's settlements policy. The June 1982 invasion of Lebanon further poisoned the dialogue.

Taking Sides is a provocative and engaging study of U.S.-Israeli relations, designed to explore Stephen Green's thesis that "selective historical knowledge has led to fundamentally false impressions in America about Israel and about the Middle East dispute generally" (p. 11). Green concludes that there have been a number of misunderstandings concerning the nature of U.S.-Israeli relations," that at times, the U.S. and Israel "have been adversaries, or at least have acted as such" and that this special relationship has not always been "a two-way street" (p. 11).

While Green has clearly uncovered valuable historical documentation to support his argument, as he acknowledges in the opening chapter, his evidence has been "carefully selected" (p. 11) so that it is doubtful he would search for or reveal documents that contradict his thesis. This is the book's major flaw, and Green's recognition of his methodological bias suggests a lack of concern for serious scholarship. In addition, Green admits

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that he is not a Middle East specialist and as a result, the "evidence" as presented is often removed from a geopolitical context. Thus the reader is left with only vague impressions about the significance of key events.

The most interesting and historically useful sections are the chapters on the Israeli nuclear program and the 1967 attack on the USS *Liberty*. The discussion of Israel's search for the bomb reveals a history of Israeli deception, particularly regarding the operation of the Dimona nuclear reactor and Israeli attempts to acquire highly enriched uranium, a critical ingredient for a nuclear weapon. However, Green has an unfortunate tendency to draw conclusions based *solely* on his "selective evidence." For example, he irresponsibly declares "it is a safe assumption that Israel had nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver them at the beginning of the Six-Day War in 1967" (p. 176). He is in no position to make or support such a claim.

In chapter nine, "Remember the Liberty," Green presents an intriguing analysis of how and why President Lyndon Johnson dealt with the politically sensitive issue of an attack by an ally (presumably Israel) on a U.S. intelligence-gathering vessel. Green's hypothesis is that the U.S. Sixth Fleet ignored the *Liberty*'s SOS for fear that U.S. forces might become involved in combat against Israeli planes. Green's bold conclusion, however, that "foreknowledge of the planned attack by both the U.S. and obviously the Israeli governments, is established by this book" (p. 242) would require documentation not presented by the author. Similarly, his assertion that "Lyndon Johnson's Middle East team simply lost sight of the distinction between U.S. and Israeli national security interests" (p. 247) is sensational and unfounded.

In sum, *Taking Sides* presents a wealth of declassified material that does illuminate the tension and pressures underlying U.S.-Israeli security relations. Unfortunately, Green's real agenda of lobbying against this relationship is obvious to all. *He* has taken sides and, therefore, the book's value as a tool of historical scholarship is severely compromised.

JED SNYDER
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Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs: From Peace to War *by Shabtai Teveth. New York, Oxford Univeristy Press, 1985. 234 pp. $17.95.*

The appearance in English of part of Shabtai Teveth's projected multivolume biography of David Ben-Gurion can only be welcomed. The book's exploration of Ben-Gurion's views on the Arabs in Palestine during the period of British rule warrants no further justification: David Ben-Gurion was Israel's first prime minister and most famous founding father. The issue of peace with the Arabs is Israel's most enduring, formidable, and perhaps most morally troubling political problem. Understandably, Shabtai Teveth reads Ben-Gurion's thinking about Arabs as interconnected with the policies Zionists ultimately enacted.

That Zionists either ignored or were naive about Arab interests and aims is a notion with widespread currency. The theory that Palestine could geographically and economically accommodate additional millions without impairing the Arab economy or dis-

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mantling Arab society seems a utopian fantasy but was a refrain repeated in official Zionist statements. The argument that the creation of a Jewish national homeland would contribute to the development of the Arab community impresses us today as politically problematic though it too was a routine article of Zionist faith. In hindsight, Zionist policies during this formative historical period appear naively optimistic, dangerously abstracted, and stubbornly European and parochial.

As historical records show, however, the Zionist stance toward the Arabs was more complex, variable, and politically sophisticated than the standard version admits. Bold and seemingly naive claims that Zionism and Arab nationalism were compatible or even complementary often reflected a deep awareness of the irreconcilability of the competing claims and of the need to temper their radical implications in circumstances when Zionists lacked the power to prevail. Here the detailed study of Ben-Gurion's views is particularly illuminating for the larger Zionist political picture.

Concerning the problem of Arab nationalism, it would be impossible to maintain that Ben-Gurion's ideas were either extraordinarily insightful (see the essays of Ahad Ha-Am) or intellectually acute (see books by Haim Arlosoroff). The welter of conflicting statements Teveth has had to collect and explain are nevertheless worth taking seriously. For the consummate politician like Ben-Gurion, Arab policy had strong antecedents first and foremost in intramural Zionist party politics. And because global power politics could shape the outcome of these political struggles, Ben-Gurion also adopted positions in response to the capability of nations outside of Palestine to change local conditions by intervention. Ben-Gurion never consciously distanced himself from political reality. His policy proposals were guided by the audience that could generate the power to do what he suggested. If his statements appeared alien to the interests and aims of the Arabs, they were often familiar to the liberal British public he addressed.

Teveth's description of the multidimensional political environment in which Ben-Gurion and the Zionist movement operated, however, is abbreviated; where outlines are presented, more ample discussions would have drawn more clearly the meaningful distinctions. Still, Teveth's analysis begins to deploy the proper approach. Ben-Gurion refrained from addressing the Arab issue directly and candidly in public not out of political shortsightedness. Rather, as a supreme political tactician, Ben-Gurion understood that the Zionist dispute with the Arabs could never be both decisively and justly resolved without severely compromising efforts to achieve and maintain Jewish political sovereignty.

DONNA ROBINSON DIVINE
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The Middle East Since Camp David *edited by Robert O. Freedman. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1984. 263 pp. Cloth, paper,*

The essays collected in this volume were originally presented by their authors at the third of a series of conferences sponsored by the Baltimore Hebrew College. They are organized to provide analyses of selected events from the perspective of the superpowers and of regional and domestic politics. Extensive comment is provided on Lebanon, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Egypt, Israel, Syria, Iran, Iraq, the United States, and

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the USSR. To my mind, there should have been a chapter analyzing the impact of the post-Camp David Middle East on the western alliance and Japan. Comprehensive analyses of these above-average essays is not possible, and so I will focus on some of the matters that seem crucial to understanding the contemporary Middle East.

Freedman's analysis of Soviet policy fails to mention that in part the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was precipitated by the Shah's attempt to destabilize pro-Soviet regimes, perhaps forcing them to accede to the Shah's desire to build a rail link with Kabul. After his fall, the Afghan rebels supplied by the Shah continued to press their interests. Importantly, the Shah and these forces were using assets originally developed by U.S. agents operating in Iran who were seeking to pressure Muhammad Daud. After the invasion, these agents were assigned to Islamabad, Pakistan. *Pravda* was full of information on this group during the winter of 1981–82.

Barry Rubin's treatment of U.S. policy claims that the Camp David accords "marked a major triumph for U.S. diplomacy" (p. 59). Never considered is the fact that, having committed U.S. global prestige to a step-by-step settlement of the region's outstanding issue, the inability of either the Carter or the Reagan administrations to provide adequate incentives for subsequent steps in the peace process has cost the U.S., her allies, and the region dearly.

In their treatment of the Arab world after Camp David, Shireen T. Hunter and Robert E. Hunter fail to mention the role in the downfall of the Shah played by the Saudis, who were motivated in part by their fear of a U.S.-sanctioned Iranian invasion of the oil rich eastern province with its Shi'ah population. They also suggest that the recent factionalization of the PLO could influence Saudi Arabia to be more supportive of U.S. efforts in the region. This seems unlikely, given the nature of the emergent political coalition in the royal family that has succeeded largely as a consequence of U.S. actions in the region. The threat represented by the Islamic Republic, rather than the partial collapse of the PLO, is the most likely factor forcing accommodations to U.S. policy upon the Saudis.

In neither John F. Devlin's essay on Syria nor in Aaron David Miller's survey of the PLO nor Freedman's epilogue concerning Lebanon do we hear anything of Sheikh Sa'id Sha'aban's Tawhid. Located in Tripoli, his militant Sunni fundamentalists were the bane of the Alawites in Syria. Assad's encirclement of Tripoli and his machinations against Yasir Arafat (whose men were supplying and supporting Tawhid) were in fact largely directed against Sheikh Sa'id.

Don Peretz writes on Israel and Louis J. Cantori on Egypt but neither mentions the deal which Israeli Prime Minister Menachen Begin offered to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat: in return for Sadat's acquiescence in the Israeli annexation of Gaza and the West Bank, Begin would support the establishment of a Palestinian enclave running south from Lebanon's border along the Mediterranean. This event, plus Sadat's relation with the Shah, set Saudi and radical perceptions of Sadat. Peretz also does not connect the Arabization of the Galilee with the invasion of Lebanon. Nor does he mention the Israeli assault on the water that Jordon uses to irrigate farms on the East Bank, perhaps a prelude to further Israeli expansion.

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Zhou Enlai: A Biography *by Dick Wilson. New York, Viking-Penguin, 1984. 349 pp. $17.95.*

Almost ten years have elapsed since Premier Zhou Enlai's death in January 1976. Zhou was a survivor—not only had he weathered many political storms in the Party throughout his long and distinguished career, but his popularity, unlike that of the late Chairman Mao Zedong, has also remained unshakable since his death. What kind of man and leader was Zhou? What was his strength? How different is he from Mao and from other top Chinese leaders? These and other questions are examined in this outstanding biography by Dick Wilson, formerly editor of *China Quarterly.*

Although the book is chronologically organized, Wilson portrays and analyzes Zhou's career in three distinct roles. First, Zhou was a revolutionary in Chinese domestic politics. He was an important leader in the Communist revolution and played a major part in the Communist struggle to seize power from the Chinese Nationalists. After 1949, Zhou became premier and top administrator of the Communist regime; in addition to running the Chinese economy, he had the unenviable tasks of salvaging the economic disaster in the wake of Mao's utopian Great Leap Forward programs, and of holding the fanatical Red Guards in check and restoring law and order in the Cultural Revolution (CR) between 1966–76. Whereas many other leaders fell by the wayside, Zhou was one of the few who survived the intense leadership conflict in the CR and emerged from it as virtually indispensable to Mao and the regime. According to Wilson, Zhou's modesty, self-deprecating quality, and readiness to admit his failings were important political assets that saved him from many political troubles. Perhaps equally or more important was Zhou's reluctance to challenge Mao's leadership. Here Wilson's analysis of Zhou's submission to Mao's authority is most interesting and unquestionably controversial: "Mao supplied that bedrock father figure of unyielding judgment for which Zhou's childhood had perhaps made him yearn" (p. 299).

Second, Zhou is depicted as China's most adept diplomat, with an insight into the western world. Wilson argues that "compared with Mao and other Chinese Communist leaders, Zhou was more open, confided in more people, had a wider sense of world history, travelled more and received more visitors" (p. 18). Zhou's coup in the realm of foreign relations was his orchestration of the Kissinger and Nixon visits to China in 1971–72. According to Wilson, Zhou and Nixon got along very well, and Kissinger admired Zhou's "air of controlling tension, steely discipline and self-control, as if he were a coiled spring" (p. 275). The Nixon visit ushered in rapprochement with the West and greatly increased China's leverage over the Soviets. Wilson notes Zhou's political wisdom and foresight in the opening toward the West, while acknowledging the criticism Zhou received at home from the radical leaders.

Wilson is at his best in his treatment of Zhou the man, and it is this third dimension that sets his book apart from other accounts of the premier's life. Many personal anecdotes collected by Wilson illustrate Zhou as a brave, altruistic, hard-working, brilliant man. Set against his bourgeois family background and western education, Wilson stresses the transformation that Zhou underwent in his attempt to be a revolutionary in both private as well as public life.

But Zhou was also a complex person, and quite capable of violent and brutal measures

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if they were necessary to promote the cause of Communist revolution. Thus, as Wilson points out, Zhou decreed the execution of the family of Gu Shunzhang, Zhou's security chief, in retribution for Gu's defection to the Kuomintang (KMT); consequently twenty-four people, including eight in Gu's immediate family, were killed in revenge (p. 111).

While Wilson is critical of Mao, his portrait of Zhou is highly positive and even glowing. Unlike most China specialists, Wilson also gives Zhou a higher rating than he gives Deng Xiaoping, who has pushed major reforms in the post-Zhou China. Thus Wilson states: "When his successor, Deng Xiaoping, is finished, and when his successors have come and gone, it is Zhou's work and personality that will be remembered before Mao's or anyone else's" (p. 301). We have to wait and see whether Wilson is correct.

PARRIS CHANG
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Chinese Business Under Socialism: The Politics of Domestic Commerce, 1949–1980 *by Dorothy J. Solinger. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985. 368 pp. $35.00.*

The guiding conception of this study of Chinese commercial policy is that there have been three competing political "lines" toward it and other economic policies: a "radical" (Maoist) line, hostile to markets and the profit motive, guided by the idea that revolutionary transformation of the relations of production will lead to economic growth; a "bureaucratic" approach that is identical with conservative, Soviet-style central planning; and a "marketeer" line, of the kind that has inspired "liberal" reforms that seek to expand the role of markets and inject profit motives into business activities. Solinger examines three areas of commerical policy: the regulation of the private sector of small rural traders; the relationship between commercial departments and industrial enterprises; and free markets for peasant produce. By chronicling the issues faced in these areas at crucial times and the history of policy debates and policy changes, Solinger convincingly demonstrates that these shifting policies reflect the ascendance of one or another of the three lines.

Solinger, however, intends her book to be more than a coherent analysis of systemic problems and Chinese approaches to them. She presents her work as a "tendency analysis" of the kind forwarded by Soviet specialist Franklyn Griffiths for the study of group politics in communist regimes. Tendency analysis is based on the idea that certain professional and occupational groups tend to articulate similar interests independently without coordinated group action. She argues that her three "tendencies of articulation" are linked to identifiable bureaucratic and social interests, and that the shifting of policies reflects the shifting power of coalitions with interests in this area. She promises a keener understanding of the social bases, ideological foundations, and power considerations attached to each line.

However successfully Solinger illuminates Chinese policy alternatives, she does not go far in illuminating the political processes involved. She periodically reminds us that different social groups and branches of the economic bureaucracy win or lose with each policy shift, but these observations consistently take a back seat to her effort to demon-

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strate that the three lines tend to shape policy debates and alternatives. One does not leave this book with a clear conception of the organizations and groups that reputedly joined coalitions for or against a policy line at any given point in time, or of how they articulated their interests in a way that influenced policy. Despite the author's intentions, the elite debates appear to be largely disembodied from political maneuverings in bureaucracy and society; the debates are an almost metaphysical struggle between different conceptions of the communist economy. Solinger does offer us glimpses of these political processes, however, and provides a sound framework for a systematic analysis of political conflict. One can only hope that this agenda is approached more single-mindedly in future research. In the meantime, she has provided an illuminating analysis of the rationale behind competing policy approaches in this area—one that could scarcely be more timely in this period of Chinese economic reform.

ANDREW G. WALDER
Columbia University

The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 *by Jack Snyder. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1984. 267 pp. $35.00*

This is one of those very rare books that will be as welcome to historians as to political scientists, not to mention analysts of contemporary military affairs. As a historian Snyder has mastered the available printed works in English, French, German, and Russian, besides doing some respectable work in the archives himself. As a political scientist he commands a wide range of analytic approaches and expresses himself with enviable clarity. The conclusions he draws are directly relevant to our own times, but that relevance is allowed to speak for itself.

Snyder tackles the problem that has perplexed two generations of historians: why was it that in 1914, when the advantages that weapons technology gave to the defensive had been clearly demonstrated in two very recent wars (in South Africa and Manchuria), every major belligerent power took the offensive—with predictably disastrous results? Simplistic explanations attributing "the ideology of the offensive" to current Social Darwinism are rightly dismissed: until 1910 both France and Russia had basically defensive strategies, and the geopolitical imperatives that drove Germany to take the offensive on at least one front had far older roots. Snyder gives only slightly more weight to the general realization that a prolonged war would be socially catastrophic and that only by rapid victory could it be avoided. My only criticism of his thesis is that he does not give this consideration sufficient weight. I would also have wished him to provide more evidence for his generalization that "military professionals . . . usually incline toward the offensive" (p. 199). The historical record is rather more ambiguous. But even if this were true, Snyder does not rely on it as in any sense a sufficient explanation of what happened in 1914.

Snyder's analysis is a great deal more rigorous. Military strategy, he maintains, is shaped by the interaction "of motivational biases, doctrinal simplifications, and rational calculations" (p. 200); and with these three parameters in mind he examines the military

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policies of France, Germany, and Russia. (Austria-Hungary is excluded, and in view of the key role played by Conrad von Hötzendorf, this is a pity.) Motivational bias could arise from the prejudices and interests of the military profession, as to a large extent it did in France; or from a sense of immediate threat resulting in uncritical acceptance of strategies believed necessary to deal with it, as was the case in Germany. Strategic doctrines devised for this purpose harden into dogmas that reinforce the bias and produce institutions, habits, and vested interests that inhibit adjustment to changing conditions.

The three studies on which Snyder bases his conclusions will all be of great value to historians. The one on France takes full account of the sheer confusion of French military doctrine in the aftermath of the Dreyfus affair and the perceived need to introduce some principle of unity even at the cost of radical oversimplification. That on Germany brings out the cognitive dissonance between the general staff's realistic assessment of the tactical problems of the offensive and their belief in the possibilities of strategic success. As for Russia, belief in the strategic necessity for an immediate offensive to help France overrode legitimate doubts about the logistical capacity of the Russian armies to undertake one. The Russian calculations were indeed rational: if the Germans had crushed the French and then turned on them, their collapse would have come long before 1917.

For the military historian a nagging doubt remains. Overambitious as the Schlieffen Plan was, it was not necessarily doomed to fail. With different commanders on both sides, the German attack might quite conceivably have succeeded: 1940 was no less of a gamble. And if it had succeeded, would Snyder have written the same book?

MICHAEL HOWARD
Oriel College, Oxford

Yuri V. Andropov: Speeches and Writings *edited by Robert Maxwell. New York, Pergamon Press, 1983. 262 pp. $20.00.*

Soviet-U.S. Relations: The Selected Writings and Speeches of Konstantin U. Chernenko *compiled and edited by Victor Pribytkov. New York, Praeger, 1984. 203 pp. $21.95.*

Joseph Stalin, the feared autocrat of the Soviet Union and its dependencies, wondered toward the end of his life how his successors would hold together his vast empire without him. His successors have weathered several critical challenges from within, from the alliance system, and from without, and have somehow muddled through, continuing to hold together most of the empire. In the post-Stalinist decades, the Soviet state has been headed by five leaders who grew up and matured under Stalin: the sixth and current leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, is the first of the non-Stalinists. Milovan Djilas, formerly a member of Yugoslavia's communist party and now a leading dissident, perceptively captured the *Zeitgeist* of post-Stalinism and its New Class: "The heroic era of communism is past. The epoch of the great leaders has ended and the epoch of practical men has set in. The New Class has been created. It is at the height of its power and wealth, but it is without new ideas. It has nothing more to tell its people." (*Essential Works of Marxism* edited by A.P. Mendel, Bantam Books, 1965, p. 332.)

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The Soviet leaders discussed here exemplify this New Class. Having grown into maturity and authority under Stalin, they survived the dictator and went on to assume leading positions in the party and state. The Andropov and Chernenko volumes are of limited scholarly or analytical value: they consist largely of ceremonial speeches and ritualistic affirmations of the excellence of the Communist idea and its institutions. These are samples of Soviet institutional literature—self-serving, unctuous, ponderous, and often ambiguous to the point of irrelevance. A careful reading of these dreary texts will yield an occasional nugget of useful information, sharp disagreement, or particular personal preference, but it is a low-yield ore—agitprop boilerplate aimed mostly at concealing and obfuscating the real stuff of the incessant and intense process of Soviet bureaucratic politics.

These texts however are not wholly without interest. Considered together with a number of other western studies on post-Stalinist Russia and its politics, they do yield useful insights into one of the least understood and most guarded aspects of the Soviet state: the power politics within the Communist party. The post-Stalinist pattern of Soviet politics has evolved into a process of coalition rule by the party hierarchs. These Politburo coalitions involve spokesmen for the key bureaucracies and institutions that run the Soviet system under the domination of the party *apparat*. They include the defense establishment (and the vast defense industrial sectors), the security organs, the governmental/economic bureaucracies, the regional party organizations, and the ideologues who serve as the watchdogs and "conscience" of the party. Every contender for the party leadership since Stalin found it necessary to put together a broad, winning coalition of bureaucratic hierarchs based on one of two "electoral platforms," which emphasized at the outset either "butter" or "guns"—the former a policy tilt toward détente, stabilization/reduction of defense expenditures, enhancement of consumer interests, and a laissez faire approach to bureaucratic inertia and social and labor discipline; the latter, an emphasis on tough foreign and defense policy rhetoric, increased defense allocations, tightening of consumer interests, and harsh talk about social conservatism, labor discipline, and law-and-order.

Most leaders since Stalin proceeded through several analogous stages in their bid for, and after achievement of, power. Stage one is coalition construction, where the contender seeks to line up a winning coalition from the relevant bureaucratic hierarchs. His platform serves to signal his future policy orientation and to attract political supporters. Stage two is one of coalition maintenance, a period paying off "election" obligations, entrenching one's own position and supporters, and punishing opponents. Sooner or later, if the leaders stay in power for any length of time, the common denominator of the erstwhile coalition begins to erode. This yields a third stage, one of coalition decline and personal politics.

On the basis of this sketchy summary of observed Soviet political patterns, it is possible to suggest the following conclusions, which are supported by evidence and conjectures in the volumes reviewed here. Successful contenders for party leadership generally organize a winning coalition based on preferences for tough foreign and defense policies and conservative economic and law-and-order internal policies. Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Andropov fit this category, while Malenkov and Chernenko fit the opposite category. Successful contenders, once entrenched in power, succumb to the dynamics and logic of

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collective leadership, which tends toward policy moderation and political centrism, both domestically and externally, and toward the concentration of power into the *primus inter pares* of the Politburo coalition. Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev succumbed to these temptations toward the end of their respective tenures. This undermines the initial coalition loyalties and a coalition transformation is likely to ensue.

Post Stalinist Soviet politics, political careers, and political fortunes depend largely on success or failure on the domestic front rather than on foreign or military policy achievements, although these may contribute to a leader's domestic fortunes or misfortunes. Success and failure depend largely on the leader's ability to effectively manage the complex system of governmental bureaucracies, party *apparat*, and economic infrastructures; to maintain reasonable productivity and growth levels in the economy; to stabilize the agricultural quagmire; and to maintain labor discipline and a modicum of social stability. In the final analysis, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Chernenko failed this test. Andropov and his protégé-successor Gorbachev appear to have set out in the right direction, although we will never know about the former, and it is too soon to tell about the latter.

The Soviet system seems to have evolved its own brand of post-Stalinist politics in which the party elites contend for power in a cooptative coalition of bureaucratic oligarchs, with its own rules of the game that seem to stress above all the stability and continuity of the system. In this, the Politburo coalition system is not unlike the College of Cardinals and the Papacy, with its attendant mystique and secrecy, its asserted idealism and transcendental mission, and its ceremonial rituals that conceal sharp or even ruthless politics of specialized interests. These two volumes, when read from this perspective, do yield a substantial array of useful information.

ROMAN KOLKOWICZ
University of California, Los Angeles

The Peoples of the Eastern Habsburg Lands, 1526–1918 *by Robert A. Kann and Zdeněk V. David. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1984. 543 pp. $30.00.*

This book is one of the eleven-volume series, "A History of East Central Europe," edited by two distinguished scholars, Peter F. Sugar and Donald W. Treadgold. The series covers quite a substantial era and presents a comprehensive history of the peoples. Among the contributors are several distinguished experts: Imre Boba, Piotr S. Wandycz, Joseph Rothschild and others. Their contributions add considerable material to the knowledge and understanding of the area and its history. This book is not the most valuable of the eleven volumes, however.

On the subject and the era, Robert A. Kann has already produced two substantial and well-received works: *The History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526–1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974) the contents of which are now repeated to a great extent, and his most substantial contribution to the theme, the monumental two-volume work: *The Multinational Empire Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Empire, 1848–1918* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950). The third substantial opus on the theme is C.A. Macartney, *The Habsburg Empire 1790–1918* (New York: Macmillan,

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1969). This latter book, of course, covers a much shorter period of time than do Kann and David. For the era of 1790–1918, the usefulness of their volume however, does not come close to the Macartney book. The era of 1526–1790 covers little more than Kann's earlier publications.

Why then the book under review? The co-authors try to give the reason in Chapter I, but the whole logic of this chapter is an exercise in tortured thought. They draw an imaginary line between the western and eastern Habsburg lands, but they cannot explain, although they try hard, why the Czechs and the Slovenes—who geographically lie west of the imaginary line—are still included among the eastern peoples of the Habsburg lands.

The book is quite clearly organized into six additional parts that individually deal with the "Government by the Estates, 1526–1620"; "Royal Absolutism and Administration by the Estates, 1620–1740"; "Royal Absolutism and Bureaucratic Administration, 1740–1847"; "Constitutional Era, 1848–1918"; "Cultural Life"; and "Pattern of Spiritual National Development 1526–1918." All these parts of the book deal systematically with the subject indicated in the title. However, one wonders: Why did the Poles receive so little attention? And even more, why was the 1848 revolution (the most monumental event in the Habsburg lands in modern times) so much neglected? On the other hand, the strength of the book stems from Kann's great expertise in constitutional history and the question of nationalism. In this respect, to those who are not familiar with the other Kann and Macartney books, it could give new material.

While the volume is very strong in German and Czech sources, its documentation in Romanian, Croatian, Polish, and Hungarian sources, to list but some of the most neglected ones, is extremely poor. There is no sign that archival material was used at all for these nations. This shortcoming makes the chapter on cultural life and spiritual national developments more a speculation than a substantially well-founded assessment.

Once again, as far as the lands of the Bohemian crown and Slovenia are concerned, the book is excellent and informative, but most of the material could be found in the other three books already offered. The rest of the book is neither new nor innovative nor well documented. For those graduate students who do not want to study the three "basic" books mentioned, this volume might be a good guideline for further study. For experts on the area and the epoch it does not give much new information.

BÉLA K. KIRÁLY
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City University of New York

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Reference Books and Source Materials Received

Africa South of the Sahara 1986, 15th ed. *prepared by Europa Publications. Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Co., 1985. 1,089 pp. $135.00.*

The Asian Political Dictionary *by Lawrence Ziring and C. I. Eugene Kim. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-CLIO, 1985. 438 pp. $37.50.*

Atlas of Global Strategy *by Lawrence Freedman. New York, Facts on File Publications, 1985. 192 pp. $22.95.*

Biographical Dictionary of Modern Peace Leaders *edited by Harold Josephson et al. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1985. 1,133 pp. $85.00.*

Cities of the World, 2nd ed., 4 vols. *edited by Margaret Walsh Young and Susan L. Stetler. Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Co., 1985. 3,056 pp. $235.00/set.*

Congressional Committees, 1789–1982: A Checklist *compiled by Walter Stubbs. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1985. 210 pp. $35.00.*

Encyclopedia of Associations 1986, 20th ed., vol. 4: International Organizations *edited by Katherine Gruber, Karin E. Koek et al. Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Co., 1985. 628 pp. $175.00.*

The Europa Yearbook 1985: A World Survey, 26th ed., 2 vols., *prepared by Europa Publications. Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Co., 1985. 2,952 pp. $210.00/set.*

The European Political Dictionary *by Ernest E. Rossi and Barbara P. McCrea. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-CLIO, 1985. 408 pp. $42.50.*

European Political Facts, 1918–84 *by Chris Cook and John Paxton. New York, Facts on File Publications, 1986. 280 pp. $24.95.*

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, vol. 1: Vietnam *edited by John P. Glennon et al. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985. 912 pp. n.p.*

Government Economic Agencies of the World *edited by Alan J. Day. Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Co., 1985. 546 pp. $78.00.*

Guide to the 1982 Census of Governments, vol. 7. *Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Nov. 1985. 254 pp. Paper, n.p.*

Handbook of the Nations, 5th ed. *compiled and published by Directorate of Intelligence, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Co., 1985. 274 pp. $74.00.*

The International Who's Who 1985–86, 49th ed. *prepared by Europa Publications. Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Co., 1985. 1,676 pp. $130.00.*

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Origins, Evolution, and Nature of the Cold War: An Annotated Bibliographic Guide *by J. L. Black. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-CLIO, 1985. 173 pp. $37.50.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 51: 1919 *edited by Arthur Link et al. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1985. 676 pp. $52.50.*

Political Parties of Asia and the Pacific, 2 vols. *edited by Haruhiro Fukui et al. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1985. 1,346 pp. $145.00/set.*

Population Change and Economic Development *published for the World Bank. New York, Oxford University Press, 1985. 193 pp. Paper, $9.95.*

Sources in British Political History 1900–1951, vol. 6: First Consolidated Supplement *compiled by Chris Cook. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1985. 272 pp. $32.50.*

Women in American History: A Bibliography, vol. 2 *edited by Jessica Brown and Susan Kinnell. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-CLIO, 1985. 383 pp. $64.00.*

Correction: In Roberta S. Sigel's review of Janet A. Flammang's (ed.) *Political Women: Current Roles in State and Local Government* (*PSQ*, Winter 1985–86: 717–18), a *PSQ* typographical error changed the meaning of one sentence. What Professor Sigel intended to say was that Martha Ackelsberg, not Diane Fowlkes, "omitted cited findings from her own work in progress that could have lent empirical evidence for her exposition."

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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James Q. Wilson *on the issues . . .*

D. C. Heath recently introduced the Third Edition of James Q. Wilson's critically acclaimed text, *American Government: Institutions and Policies.* In the following comments, the author reflects briefly on policymaking in the context of the larger political sphere.

Q. Is government today too big, too complex to be responsive to the average citizen?

A. In one sense, yes. The biggest change in politics in my lifetime has been the result of the vastly enlarged scale of governmental activity. When I took my first course on politics at the University of Redlands long ago, I learned that what little federal policy there was resulted from the pressures of a few big "blocs"—the farm bloc, the business bloc, the labor bloc—presided over by a few powerful members of Congress who were part of the Senate "club" or who met with Sam Rayburn's "board of education." Now, the blocs have been replaced with thousands of special interest groups, congressional power is fragmented, and government touches every aspect of our lives.

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Q. So that's why citizens are turned off by politics?

A. Not exactly. People dislike Congress, but tend to trust their own member of Congress. People hate "the bureaucracy," but have good experiences with particular bureaucrats with whom they've come into contact. People revere the presidency, but often dislike the incumbent president. Americans have a love-hate relationship with their government.

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

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

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

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

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